As other posters have indicated, the relationship began the cool under DeGaull, after France left Algeria in 1962. The defense relationship was a good one for France, whose aircraft company, Dessault, worked closely with Israel in the development of the Mirage fighter, which was the maintay of the Israeli airforce in 1967.

After 1967, things cooled very quickly. DeGaull cancelled an existing Israeli order for a new edition of the Mirage in late 1968-69. In 1969-70, DeGaull's sucessor ordered a number of missle boats that were being built for Israel to remain at the naval base in Cherbourg. The Israeli's, working with elements in the French military, were able to get the boats out of Cherbourg and to Israel under the nose of the French government. That marked the end of any significant French-Israeli alliance for a long time. The relationship seems to be improving as of now, though it is a long way from where it was in the late 1950's.

French-Israeli relations pre-1967 is actually quite complex and is an interesting story of the conflict between France's defense ministry and the French foreign ministry, the Quai D'Orsy.

In 1950, the United States, Britain and France issued a joint statement known as the Tripartite declaration, which was an attempt to stabilize the armistice lines between Israel and the Arab countries and, in particular, to limit the arms flow into the region.

In the early 1950s, despite this agreement and much to the irritation of the British, France had become Syria's largest arms supplier. By the end of 1952, the tables had turned and the British began supplying Meteor jets to the Syrians and France, looking to further its market share in the middle east arms market, began increasing its sales of arms to Israel.

(Source: Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives on the Crisis and Its Aftermath, Simon Smith)

As the British began supplying various Arab countries with equipment, the Israelis increasingly began turning to France. There was a great deal of conflict between the French Defense ministry and the Quai d'Orsai, with the foreign affairs ministry generally feeling that improved relations with the Jewish state could upset both its Muslim and generally pro-Arab colonies and the Americans who were worried of upsetting the Israeli-Arab arms balance.

By the mid-1950s, French intelligence believed that Nassar's Egypt was stoking the increasing turmoil in Algeria and the defense ministry used this as a reason to push the government to increase its ties with Israel over the Quai's reticence, who were worried that increasing ties with Israel would harm France's image with the Arabs.

At the same time, the Israelis began a diplomatic campaign to increase ties to France, which was not without their own objectors. Opposition felt that France's friendship could be finicky and liable to shift at a critical moment (reminding the government of France often not delivering arms it had promised at the last moment) and demanded that Israel find Anglo-American sources as well.

In 1956, in retaliation for attacks on Israeli fishing boats in the Kinneret, the Israelis launched a commando raid into gun emplacements in the Syrian-held Golan heights. This gave the Quai the reason it needed to push to join a temporary British and American embargo on Israel, fearing as they did that Frances sales to Syria and the Arab world would be jeopardized.

However, around that same time, the French elected a socialist government, with a more pro-Israel defense ministry and foreign minister. France ended its embargo and began releasing weapons that were under contract, essentially bypassing the Quai.

In effect, France's ministry of defense hoped to gain needed arms sales and Israeli intelligence on Egypt, while its efforts were often stymied by the more pro-Arab Quai.

(Source: Israel and the Western Powers 1952-1960, Zach Levey)

After the 1967 war, but also in the years preceeding it, things began to famously change. Now out of Algeria, De Gaulle began to shift his foreign policy to supporting non-aligned nations, in particular the oil-rich Gulf nations. Combined with his distaste at what he saw was American ascendance in the Middle East (particularly with Israel) led France to quickly shift away from relations with Israel.

(Source: France and Iraq: Oil, Arms and French Policy-Making in the Middle East, David Styan)