There was a deep asymmetry in the Cold War up to that point, one which Americans did not appreciate very deeply. The Americans had nuclear weapons within easy striking distance of Soviet soil since the mid-1950s. These included air bases with live nukes in the UK, Spain, Morroco, Tunisia, West Germany, France, Netherlands, Greece, Belgium, Turkey, and Japan, among other places. The US also had over-the-pole bomber capabilities well before it had rockets. (These were aided by its many non-nuclear overseas bases as well, which could provide refueling capabilities.)

Adding a few Jupiter missiles to Turkey did not change that situation much — in fact, Jupiters were such slow-loading weapons that their survivability was considered quite low (and one reason Kennedy was fine with getting rid of them).

The USSR, by contrast, had very few ways of striking the continental USA. It could strike Europe and Asia quite easily. But the continental USA was pretty far away from any of its bases. It developed some over-the-pole bomber capabilities but spent most of its effort trying to develop long-range missiles, because these were going to provide it with the only sort of real deterrent capability (the US was confident it could shoot down a lot of the early Soviet bombers, and the early long-range Soviet bombers were no great shakes anyway). They did have some long-range missiles by 1962, but they weren't particularly accurate.

So from this perspective putting IRBMs on Cuba was pretty attractive from a strategic point of view — it would make the USA much more vulnerable to Soviet attack. From a Soviet point of view, this would restore some parity to the situation. As for the Soviets complaining about Jupiters in Turkey, it could be done, but again, that horse was well out of the barn by 1961.

(For more on foreign deployments of US weapons, this article is invaluable.)