Argentinian here, I don't think I'm exceedingly qualified but I've read my history and can provide some insight.

Before the 1912 Saenz Peña Law, pretty much all elections were rigged, and the PAN (Partido Autonomista Nacional, which was essentially the landowner party, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partido_Autonomista_Nacional ) won all elections. During the last part of the XIXth century the alliance between the local oligarchy and the UK for the massive export of agricultural commodities had given an enormous influx of capital into the country, which was spent by Julio Argentino Roca in modernizing it and building a "Proper Western Democracy". Social tensions started to rise as the middle class wanted to actually cash-out on that "Modernized Western Democracy" idea and actually get a vote in. ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saenz_Pe%C3%B1a_Law )

In 1912 the Saenz Peña Law made all (male) voting secret, obligatory and universal. The political situation was not stable at all by that point, and the ruling party thought that by "giving them what they wanted, the people would see we should still rule this country". This didn't happen, at all, and the PAN started losing elections left and right. A Radical president was elected, and the Oligarchy didn't take well to it at all.

I go on about this because it is enormously important to understand that this is the most important underlying factor of the history of Argentina between 1930 and 2001, in my opinion:

The Land-Owner Class, which would become a sort of "stillborn industrial bourgeois" class, felt entitled historically, economically, ethically and pragmatically to political power. But people wouldn't vote them. They would have an absolutely paternalist reaction to this, taking it upon themselves to decide "when democracy had gone too far" and they needed to step in to "make things right", they struck an alliance with the Military that would be the cornerstone and most important political actor of the 20th Century Argentinean politics by far. Let's look at a quick summary of governments in the 20th century, with a focus on coups d'etat:

• Jose Felix Uriburu ousts Hipólito Yrigoyen, 1930. Elections are held in 1932 where the Union Civica, the most popular party, is proscribed. Military groups alternate powers among each other with no real popular input until 1943 when Peron arrives.

• Peron rules from 1946 to 1955, when he is ousted by a coup himself (It is important to stand out that Peron was elected democratically, but he build his political power as a minister acting in a non-democratic military government)

• After that point in 1955, you would not have true free elections until 1973. All of the "democratically" elected governments (with Peronism proscribed) are interrupted by a military coup. In 1973 Peron returns from exile and is elected president again in the first legitimate elections (no proscriptions) in almost 20 years.

• Peron dies and his wife takes over. Social tension is on the rise now that the figurehead is dead violence is starting to spread. We have Communist Foquism starting to make an influence around this time (1976) and it scares the shit out of the society. Peronist and Communist groups start using terror tactics and the social fabric is showing severe strain after decades of paternalism, peronism and proscription.

• In 1976 and until 1983 the Military take over the country for the last time in history, and they start a policy of ideological murder and exile. It is estimated that between 10,000 and 30,000 people were "Disappeared" (killed without due process, their bodies dumped to the river with weights after being tortured sometimes for months), and a similar number of intellectuals, artists, political activists and others had to go in exile in order to survive.

So, now we get to 1983, 53 years after the 1930 coup d'etat, and the last time you had something that resembled a proper democracy was when Peron was elected for the first time in 1945. Some will argue, and I will agree, that even Peron's democratic governments were hardly democratic beyond "the vote". Cult of personality, massive propaganda usage, persecution of opposition, etc, were signature fascist characteristics that Peronism had.

So, in a nutshell: Argentina, between it's inception in 1816 and 1983 NEVER had a democratically elected president finish a second term. Ever. If you count the years of actual functioning democracy (with true popular participation), you would be hard-pressed to come up with 30 years of True Democracy.

We can discuss why this happened, but I think it is an unavoidable political reality that Argentina simply lacks democratic and republican maturity. It was a stillborn democracy that took almost 200 years to get off the ground and some may argue it still struggles with truly republican or democratic notions.

This should be enough of a source for everything to check out, I'm not talking about anything else than presidential terms here, so:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_heads_of_state_of_Argentina

Reading, souirces:

Felix Luna - "Golpes Militares y Salidas Electorales" Luis Alberto Romero - "Breve Historia Contemporánea de la Argentina" , "Las Ideas en la Argentina del Siglo XX"

For 1976 Dictatorship methods, tortures and estimated numbers: "Nunca Más (Informe de la CoNaDeP)" - Various authors (abridged, EUDEBA, 1984 4th ed.)

One of the big reasons is that Argentina's economy was mainly based on agriculture and agricultural exports. Before World War II, it sold many of it's products to Europe. However, after WWII the Marshall Plan (or European Recovery Program) obliged the Western European countries to import their agricultural products from the United States (and later also Canada) in exchange for the aid given. Argentina tried but failed to be included in the Marshall Plan and therefor lost most of its export clients. During the early 50's, Argentina's export level was only at 60% of what it was during the height of the crisis in the 1930's and only 40% of what it was during the 20's.

Hi, first time I comment/answer here. I think I am qualified (at least in the "economic history" part of this question). But I can provide credentials if its required. I am also an Argentine, so please excuse my English.

/u/kurtgustavwilckens has already written a "political" explanation that I don't completely agree with, but I'm not sure I can rebuff it to the standards this subreddit requires, so I wont even try.

I'd like to answer the economic aspect. For the quickest explanation, go to the last "section".

##NO economic collapse

First, I think your questions posits that the Argentinian economy collapsed after the 30's. And further more, that the reasons are clear. I don't believe that to be true. Of course, the economy took a hit during the 30's (and WWII) but performed reasonably well until the late 60's.

By reasonably well I mean that Argentina did not lag behind the US. The following chart shows what it mean (link)[1]. The lines are each country's precapita real GDP divided by the USA's percapita real GDP. The idea being that if the line is at 80, the country's percapita GDP is 80% of the the US's percapita GDP. So you are 80% as rich as an American. As you can see Argentina was reasonably stable (if lagging behind other Latin economies, specially Brazil during the ,so called, miracle) until the early 70's.

From then on there was a decline, a brief revival during the 90s and a second revival during the 2000's after the collapse of the late 90s.

I'd say that the "collapse" wasn't during the 30s but rather during the 70s and 80s. What is true (and i know the graph provided isn't enough evidence as it only has 2 countries, but i can get data if someone asks for it) is Argentina's lack of progress compared to other developing countries (specially compared to countries in east asia), countries who have "gotten closer" (or converged) towards US-level wealth

The collapse of the 70s and 80s is very likely attributable to such a degree of political turmoil (again, see /u/kurtgustavwilckens comment) that had negative effects on the economy.

However the the "lack of progress" I noted above is (i think) not caused by political problems. (As a side note, the phenomenon is (often) called "stagnation", "secular stagnation", "relative stagnation", etc.).

##ISI and Industrialization

You mentioned the Junta and the 1930's as the starting point of Argentina's industrialization (via ISI). That is (somewhat) incorrect. Argentina's industrialization can be traced to the early 1920's. At the time Argentina was part of a "commercial triangle" with the US and the UK as explained in Fodor (1973) (link to the article); in this arrangement Argentina was a net importer of industrialized consumer goods from the US.

Eventually foreign investment started coming as an attempt to capitalize the growing middle class (mostly immigrants) and some industrialization started taking place (Villanueva (1972) link and Aguirre (2006) link).

In the 1930s the ISI started to take much more form and the process was not "directed" by the state in the sense that all industries received approximately the same treatment (in terms of tariffs, subsidies, etc) and most of the industrialization was in light industries (textiles, food processing, etc).

WWII was a definite help as it essentially stopped imports and kept argentinian export prices (mostly foodstuffs) high, thereby providing the foreign currency required to buy the inputs for the light industry.

##Perón and the external constraint

At the time of Perón's goverment (1946) there was an established national industry that was primarily light and labour-intensive. By the use of subsidies [2] to most (if not all) industries Perón was able to increase the amount of industrial labour force (his biggest backers via the trade unions) and sustain economic activity and create political support.

However, two things went wrong[3]:

(1) The external demand for Argentinian goods faltered; this, in part due to lower int'l prices and in part due to low demand from European countries. This as a penalty for Argentina's external policies (Llach, 2001 link, Zanatta 2013).

(2) As the industries became bigger and bigger they needed more and more inputs (especially energy imports). Since there had been very little in terms of "upstream" industrialization most raw materials were imported. With exports going down, there was no way to pay for the imports (Llach, 2001 link).

To make matters worse as the Argentine industrialization was not "directed" and had grown under protectionism, there was no way Argentine industrial goods could be exported as they were not competitive.

This is known as the "external (sector) constraint", "external choking", etc

In 1952, after his re-election, Perón launched a bunch of measures to solve the "external constraint". Most relevant: salary caps, limited subsidies to industry, devaluation, the start of investments in heavy/basic industries (don't know the precise words, think blast furnace, metallurgy, etc) and foreign investment (which was, de-facto, banned during his first term).

It is unclear if his plan would have worked as he was ousted in 1955 by a coup. Some (example Diaz Alejando, Cortés Conde) think it wouldn't and some (ex, Gerchunoff, Llach) think it ,perhaps, would've worked.

##Stop-and-go

The same problem Peron faced (the external constraint) was to be the bane of all following governments.

Most governments would launch a economic plan that invariably involved some sort of currency depreciation and then growth start. That would last for a couple of years and eventually industrial growth, inflation and general "macroeconomic-overheating" would meant that exports just wouldn't be enough to buy al imports. The economy would grind to a halt. This became known as the "stop-and-go" cycle or "ciclo de marchas y contramarchas"[4].

The fact that during all this governments ran deficits that were promptly monetized didn't help as inflation quickly flared and caused even more balance of payments problems.

Some governments extended the cycle by becoming indebted, and temporarily thus solving the "external constraint" (see Menem's presidency during the 90s or El Proceso during the late 70s)

Some simply couldn't and thus the cycle was either short (see Revolución Argentina 1966-69) or just altogether non-existant (see Alfonsin's presidency during the 1980s).

The process continues to this day. Literally as at this very moment Kirchner's presidency is suffering the "stop" part of the cycle (source: a very negative article by the WSJ, if you are willing to accept personal impressions: I live here and do this for a living)

##I hope I helped. Obviously, open to any questions, corrections, etc. I enjoy this subject very much

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[1]Is extracted from a lecture by Prof. Gerchunoff of Torcuato Di Tella University (and for what I understand the data is from Madison's tables (link) [2]More precisely, very cheap credit (as in negative interest rates) [3]Please note that this is very simplified and a lot of info, especially in terms of monetary and fiscal policy, is missing [4]Depending on how "hip" the Argentine economist you are talking to is

It’s cool to see so much interest in Argentina on AskHistorians! Since /u/kurtgustavwilckens, /u/RattleOn, and /u/MCMLXXXVIII have done a great job explaining some of the economic and political developments, I thought I would add a brief historiography to contextualize some of the answers in this thread (even though it’s a little outside of my area of expertise). This question is excellent, but it is also highly controversial among Latin American historians, political scientists, and economists who continue to debate interpretations of the twentieth century. This is an ongoing process, and to my knowledge, no one has completely nailed it down. So if you’re looking to this thread to find “the answer” to this incredibly complex question, you’re going to be out of luck.

First, we can’t just assume that because Argentina had a high level of growth before 1930 that it would continue to have a high level of growth. This vision is ahistorical and completely fails to take into account the incredible changes in the world economy between the beginning and the middle of the twentieth century. Also, it is inherently negative, casting Argentina as a failure, but by what standard? Compared to most Latin American countries during this time, Argentina lagged slightly, especially behind Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, but it was far from a complete failure. These comparisons get even more problematic when we compare Argentina to say...the United States. Yes, they were both settler countries, but is this really fair to compare Argentina to the US since the United States outperformed EVERY country economically? During the 80s and 90s, historians frequently compared Argentina to Canada and Australia (e.g Argentina, Australia, and Canada: Studies in Comparative Development, edited by Platt and Di Tella). These nations more similarly reflected economic growth and questions of indigenous relations. However, these comparisons are also problematic because the countries had vastly different cultures, and since Argentina was outside of the Commonwealth of Nations, it had to provide for its own institutions and stability in a way that other countries didn’t. Additionally, Argentina was devoid of other valuable natural resources that helped diversify their economies. Others have compared Argentina to the “Asian Tigers” but this tends to ignore the political realities found in Argentina (e.g. The question of centralization vs. free market is different in Argentina than it is in Japan). I think it is important to move beyond simple comparative economic history to show instead that each nation is dealing with its own problems, identities, and realities.

For much of the middle of the twentieth century, historians asserted a dependency theory, which stated that until World War I, Argentina’s economy was dependent on British capital. Historians included Argentina in Britain’s “informal empire” but more recent studies have questioned the extent of British involvement in terms of exploitation, sociocultural impact, and military involvement (e.g. Alan Knight, Rethinking British Informal Empire in Latin America (Especially Argentina)). Although the extent and depth of British involvement is debated today, historians during Perón’s time cast him as a leader who attempted to replace the dependence on foreign capital with internal development.

As the political and economic situation in Argentina went south (no pun intended), historians began reexamining their understanding of the Argentine economy. For example, Di Tella and Platt’s The Political Economy of Argentina, 1880-1946 is one important work that examined the early twentieth century. It showed that the “golden age” of Argentina was much more complicated than one might expect. Economic development was uneven, and many Argentines were deeply pessimistic about their country’s economic future. Regarding the period after WWII, Carlos Waisman’s Reversal of Development in Argentina pointed to Peronism as the primary cause of economic failure, especially the frequent changes in economic policy, import substitution, and removal of government support for agricultural development. Following his publication, there were more works published that elaborated on the perceived failure of Perón’s policies, which were increasingly motivated by the influence of neoliberalism in Latin America. They helped cement the idea that Argentina (especially Perón) was a failure.

So that’s a super brief overview of some of the historiography that informs the big picture view of Argentina’s economic history. It’s important to keep in mind how the historical view of this period has changed over time. Many of the approaches to understanding this period are present in this thread, but they exist with little context. Since probably many readers here are unfamiliar with Latin American history, I thought adding historiography might be a helpful. If you know of other trends, works, or something that I forgot, please let me know!

Huh, I can actually recommend something, here:

False Economy by Alan Beattie explores the nature of the economic differences between the U.S. and Argentina, and why two similar colonial nations had such radically different outcomes.

A lot of it relies on industrialization in Argentina (or lack thereof), and the refusal of bosses to sacrifice short term revenues for, what they perceived as, risky ventures in mass manufacture in a country with a relatively smaller number of immigrants (the main factory workforce) than the U.S.

Also, foreign relations. Foreign trade for Argentina was primarily through Spain, with little diversification.