Disclaimer : Mods, not sure if this type of question is acceptable, taking a chance on this, if it violates the sub's rules, I will take it down.
There was this theory (not sure if it is a discredited one or no) that suggested that the Soviet's headlong retreat during the opening phase of WW2 was not a clueless retreat in the face of superior forces, but one that was more of a planned one (doctrinally at least)
The theory was that, the Sov high command reversed Tukhachevsky's offensive operations theories and applied them for defense.
In essence this theory suggested that the Soviet's used a echeloned defense strategy (Operational, Tactical & Strategic layers). Some of the evidence offered was the fact that armour did not make a strong appearance till the Germans reached the Strategic echelon, or some hard defense points that sucked in German troops and delayed their offensive time tables.
It was a long time ago, and I do not recall the source NOR the exact nature of this theory.
Would somebody be able to point me towards the source (and no, it was not Icebreaker)
Thanks.
This is a case of revisionist history if I ever saw one. While it's true that the Soviets did have a layered defense strategy, they also threw huge numbers of reserves at the front line. I think anyone who tries to argue that the Soviets giving up hundreds of thousands of prisoners, huge numbers of aircraft, thousands of tanks (obsolete or otherwise), and the most productive and industrialized land in the country to the Germans was a strategic ploy is... a bit crazy honestly.
The most egregious example of this type of revision is Operation Mars and Operation Uranus. The former was by far the larger and more important operation on paper, but it's failure compared to the stunning success of the later meant it was redefined in Soviet histories (if it were mentioned at all) as a spoiling attack to prevent reinforcement of Army Group A and B in the south. While technically it did achieve that, to suggest that one of the largest offensives by the Soviets to that point in the war was merely a spoiling action is pretty laughable in my opinion.
The Soviet defense being "layered" or "echeloned" wasn't really a theory - it just happened that way by accident. At the start of the war as of June 22 1941, the Red Army simply wasn't mobilized and deployed yet. On the border there was a screen of border guard troops which were fully mobilized and were in a relatively high state of preparedness but by their design this screen wasn't designed to deal with a full on invasion. Behind them were the mechanized corps - the mobile and armored units of the Red Army. According to the mobilization plan, heavy vehicles (tractors, etc) were supposed to be seized from civilian use and turned over to mechanized corps to enhance their mobility. This hadn't happened yet. So the armored units were not really prepared for the invasion. This partly explains their horrible performance and loses in the first weeks of the war (See Battle of Brody on wikipedia). Then there were more troops, mostly infantry, but much of them were still en route from the interior of the country. Simply because of the fact that the invasion was so sudden and because of size of the country, these troops did not have the time to arrive in time to join their comrades at the front. By the time they did arrive, the troops closest to the border have already taken huge losses or were surrounded.
This layering was very much an accident, and greatly exacerbated the situation for the Soviets, because instead of forming a solid front, the various "echelons" just ended up falling like dominoes on top of each other.
Source: mostly works by Alexei Isaev.