why lack of genuine industrialization in Argentina?

This is a very good question, but it is challenging (perhaps impossible) to answer. Before delving into a response, I would like to point out some pragmatic challenges that make answering it especially difficult. First, historians and economists have been debating your question for almost a century and so far have been unable to come up with a consensus. As you know, the process of industrialization takes a very long time to occur. It goes through vicissitudes of expansion, contraction, and depression. It is subject to intervention by governments and outside forces. And it often butts up against traditional culture. To further complicate the issue, “industrialization” looks different depending on where in the world you are. German industrialization is different than Canadian industrialization, which is in turn different than Chinese industrialization. So saying there is a “proper” or “genuine” way to industrialize really isn’t fair because it is subjective. This assumes that Argentina has failed. Though many people feel this way, it is not necessarily the case. One could argue that in spite of overwhelming challenges, Argentina has managed to soldier on and maintained a high standard of living in the process.

Also, keep in mind that as historians, it is easier to explain why something happened than to explain why something didn’t happen. Proving why something didn’t happen brings all sorts of hypotheticals into the equation, which isn’t really what historians like to deal with. Finally, how far back should we go to answer this question? I have seen discussions on AskHistorians about industrialization in Europe and its roots in the Middle Ages. Historians often debate the role that the wars for independence and civil wars had on initial industrialization in Argentina. One could also discuss the 19th century positivism which emphasized comparative advantage, order, and progress (the motto that is enshrined on Brazil’s flag). Comparative advantage encouraged developing countries to focus only on what they did well, thereby neglecting the diversification of their economy. Identifying when “industrialization” actually failed is really hard because its roots stretch from the present to the discovery of the New World!

That being said, it seems that you are more interested in understanding why Argentina did not develop following their rise around the turn of the 20th century. I’ll build my answer around that idea. You’ve identified two key reasons why industrialization has been so challenging in Argentina. First, Argentina’s economy during the 19th century was driven by agriculture. Michael Johns, in his article “Industrial Capital and Economic Development,” sees this as the key problem of Argentina’s economy. He argues that despite the wealth acquired during this period, the export economy prevented the development of social and financial institutions that could help aid the process of industrialization. I’m a little skeptical of your assertion that the emphasis on agriculture came at the expense of mining. Argentina has very scant mineral reserves. Unlike Chile, Argentina became an agricultural economy because it could not be a mineral driven economy. Thus, by the end of the Argentine “golden age” wealth was centralized on the Pampas and in Buenos Aires at the expense of the periphery. Di Tella and Platt’s book The Political Economy of Argentina, 1880-1946 examined the early twentieth century, especially agriculture. It showed that the “golden age” of Argentina was much more complicated than one might expect. Economic development was uneven, and many Argentines were deeply pessimistic about their country’s economic future. Yet, there still was a thriving middle class, who struggled through the Great Depression and exist today. The Great Depression and World War II altered the world economy. Argentina’s economy was so heavily invested in the old model that it never fully recovered. The world economy was suddenly predicated on a completely different set of concerns to which Argentina then had to adapt.

This brings us to your other point about social and institutional factors. This is, of course, hotly debated in the historiography. Juan Perón took power, who in turn was expelled by the military, who eventually was replaced by democratic leaders culminating with Carlos Menem, the “Washington Consensus,” and neoliberalism, which in turn brings us up against the twenty year rule. These periods all bleed together, and their social and institutional moves depended on those inherited from its predecessors. With each successive change, new institutions were established that focused on distinct social groups, which created a “stop and go” environment for industrialization. The social structure then played a key role in dividing Argentine society, which in turn led to the rapid change in economic policies.

Yet, I also want to complicate your points. First, industrialization in the middle and late twentieth century is intimately tied to governmental policies. Though the agricultural businesses struggled with the Great Depression, Argentina’s industries actually benefited greatly from both the Great Depression and World War II. They created vacuums of industrial goods which had previously been imported from the United Kingdom and the United States. The hole in industrial imports was thus filled by Argentine industries. How fortunate that in its moment of weakness, Argentina’s economy was buoyed by new opportunities! Perón and later leaders essentially created an artificial vacuum by implementing subsidies for Argentine companies while keeping tariffs high. Thus, Argentine products found a market despite being inferior in quality. On the open market, their industries had no chance, but with this move, Perón insulated Argentina against foreign competition. Argentina’s economy turned inward. Unfortunately, as Carlos Waisman’s book Reversal of Development in Argentina pointed out, Peronism thus became the scapegoat for economic failure. Waisman especially identified the frequent changes in economic policy, import substitution, and removal of government support for agricultural development as key to this disaster.

Unfortunately, once Perón was removed from power, this led to all sorts of macroeconomic problems. The economy became volatile as the military reversed these changes. Thus, the market was suddenly flooded with industrial goods that were cheaper and superior to those being produced by Argentine industries. They failed to protect the gains that Argentine industries had made in the post war years. The economy was racked by hyperinflation, unsustainable wages, and price fixing. Furthermore, reduced assistance to agricultural sectors led to a depreciation of their competitive abilities. This in turn fanned the social flames. Finally, the left itself struggled to create a unifying platform and eventually spawned moderates and radicals alike. Even when Perón returned, he could do little to reverse the chaos or gain control, eventually leading to the chaos of the final military dictatorship. Yet, the military also failed. They never went full “neoliberalism.” In fact, one could argue their management of the economy was even worse than Perón’s, leading to perhaps the biggest economic bubble in Argentine history. So another reason that industrialization struggled was poor economic management by each successive government.

Their actions then created an “alternative reality” of what industrialization looked like. In my opinion, this must be understood in the Argentine context. Comparing industrialization to the United States, Australia, or Canada ignores the contexts that each of these nations dealt with. It paints these nations in a positive light (and Argentina in a negative light), even though they too had many internal challenges. Argentina lacks the natural resources of the United States and lacked the Commonwealth of Nations’ oversight that Canada and Australia benefited from in the middle of the twentieth century. Argentina instead had to go its own way. Though it struggled, it was far from a complete failure. Perhaps a better question would be: Could industrialization ever have looked the same as it did in other “settler” countries? I don’t think so. It ignores the political, social, and cultural setting in which Argentine industrialization occurred.

Finally, I want to point out that recent historiography on the topic has been reexamining industrialization, especially in light of the perceived failure of neoliberal reforms. They have been reinterpreting industrialization itself. For example, James Brennan’s recent article “Prolegomenon to Neoliberalism: The Political Economy of Populist Argentina” argues that the question of industrialization is too closely tied to partisanship in Argentine history. Other works have looked at terms of trade, finance, and concentration as they relate to industrialization and demonstrate the complexity that industrialization took at the local and international levels. All of these are hot topics in Latin American historical circles at the moment. You might want to check out The Oxford Handbook of Latin American History, which has a chapter on the historiography of economic and industrial history. It might provide you with some valuable works to add to your understanding of industrialization in Argentina and see how recent studies are fleshing out other problems and successes of Argentine industries.