One can argue that the bombing raids were largely ineffective since the Germans were able to move their production underground, and were able to actually increase their total output in the last years of the war. However, one cannot argue against the importance of strategic bombing after they switched from the failed focus on ball bearing plants in favor of targetting IG Farben's hydrogenation facilities.

As soon as the Germans were unable to produce aviation gasoline (for which Romanian crude oil was not particularly well-suited), their levels of pilot training went down, and their growing air force spent less flying hours to defend the fatherland. The situation was so bad that the Germans were forbidden from using gasoline in Normandy unless it was for combat, so armored vehicles had to be brought to the front lines by pack animal. The German ability to "blitz" was effectively shattered, leaving them in a defensive position.

When they tried to gather enough fuel for a decisive push on Antwerp, they failed and the panzers ran dry because they couldn't capture enough American gasoline to keep going. How that would have been different had their oil facilities not been targeted is anyone's guess.

The best argument for strategic bombing being a success that I have encountered is only secondarily related to the damage the bombers accomplished. The precision bombing campaigns predicted in the interwar period were largely impossible, given the fierce resistance by fighters and anti-aircraft artillery and greatly increased bombing altitudes. This caused the vast majority of bombs to miss their targets by a wide margin. Martin Van Creveld points to only minimal disruptions in German production until extremely late in the war in Age of Airpower. While strikes against production facilities were literally hit or miss, attacks on objects like rail lines were nearly entirely useless until late in the war. (Christian Wolmar discusses this at length in Engines of War)

So, if the damage done by the bombers wasn't all that significant in terms of production, why was the bombing campaign a success? It obligated the Germans to defend their cities with their fighters, where they could be engaged by Allied escorts and destroyed. Basically, as soon as the Allies were able to provide long-range escorts for their bombers (late in 1943 and early in 1944), the Luftwaffe had to put their fighters and pilots in harm's way. As a result, the German fighter arm was subjected to what amounted to a war of attrition in the skies over Germany. The Allies were able to replace their losses in planes and pilots, and the Germans were unable to do so. The result was that the Luftwaffe was unable to mount any serious resistance to D-Day or the Normandy breakout, and had to use poor weather for their only other offensive in the West during the Battle of the Bulge. So, the real gain from the Allied bombing offensive was the destruction of the Luftwaffe--not the destruction on the ground.

Also, you asked about increased production of tactical air support planes and tanks. The Allied production of aircraft was incredible, especially in the US. The expenditures were so lavish and the destruction of the Luftwaffe was so dramatic that planes like the P-51 were tasked with ground support, despite the fact that the plane was ill suited for the role due to its liquid-cooled single engine and being far better at high altitudes. The radial-engined P-47 was also tasked to support ground troops in huge numbers as well. German accounts--like those of Hans Von Luck and others--make frequent mention of the German inability to move units in daylight due to the huge numbers of Allied aircraft in the skies. Allied production was able to produce so many aircraft that the huge numbers of bombers didn't substantially reduce the availability of air power to an appreciable extent.

Followup questions by OP and others are always encouraged!

This exact question was used for an essay in a class for which I was a teaching assistant last year.