I've picked up more than a few errors in David Graeber's "Debt: The First 5,000 Years" (his "history" of Apple Computer is hilariously wrong). But those errors are recent errors in recent history or the present day. What about the historical accuracy? And is the author leaving out examples that run contrary to his over-arching theory?
Interested in an answer to this question as well, but I'm thinking it might be worthwhile to ask it in /r/AskAnthropologists as well (if such a thing exists) as a large part of the book isn't so much about history as it is about anthropology.
The book is written for a popular audience, so it's clear that Graeber is more addressing popular conceptions of economics than how historians or other scholars generally think about them. I don't know of many historians who accept Adam Smith's schema of stages of economic development as anything other than indicative of cultural attitudes of the time, nor do I know many historians who treat economic history as an either/or when it comes to barter and coinage. It's been accepted for some time that credit systems and monetary systems have existed side by side for a long time, and that often the two tend to reinforce one another. Treating them as a dichotomy seems more motivated by political views than historical ones.
I disagree, for example, with Graeber's assertion that the Atlantic economy was a bullion-based one. True, the Spanish did ship large amounts of silver from the Andes to China (see, for example, Steve Stern's "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System in the Perspective of Latin America and the Caribbean"), but historians have shown that most trade in the Atlantic economy operated almost entirely on systems of credit, especially the slave trade (Pierre Gervais' "A Merchant or a French Atlantic? Eighteenth-century account books as narratives of a transnational merchant political economy" is a good example of these studies).
The "military revolution," too, was also a result of the expansion of stable credit systems and not simply an influx of bullion. Large, expensive ventures like recruiting, supplying, and maintaining an army were only possible through either state direction of finances (see John Brewer's The Sinews of Power) or economic structures that allowed states to borrow large amounts of money (like the Bank of England). Graeber doesn't seem to be arguing so much with professional historians - who have accepted these developments for years - as much as public pundits supporting an ahistorical view of markets.