The Japanese high command was not stupid nor were they blind, they could see the massive disparity in terms of military resources and industrial capacity that existed between the USA and Japan. Pearl Harbor was not necessarily intended to cripple the USA in the long term but rather it was intended to buy time. The Japanese had long identified the United States as Japan's future foe (along with China and the USSR), they had begun making plans for how to fight a war with the Americans as early as the 1920's. It was recognized by the Japanese high command that any drive southwards towards the East Indies and Malaya would be under threat from the US pacific fleet and units stationed in the Philippines. Admiral Yamamoto, also recognized this, and began to make plans to cripple the US fleet so as to give Japan time. Now the destruction of the American fleet also gave the Japanese the ability to implement their "ring" defensive strategy. This strategy called for protecting mainland Japan by building a ring of outposts in the Pacific by capturing various strategic islands, once these islands were secured, they would be fortified and any enemy fleet would be vulnerable to planes or guns on the island.

The Japanese knew a straight fight with the Americans would be suicide because of their vast resources, but they assumed that if they could build this defensive ring, that the Americans attempt to penetrate it would result in high casualties, which would make the American populace unwilling to fight the war. The Japanese strategy essentially rested on the idea that the "decadent" Western nations didn't have the morale to fight a long protracted war with high casualties, on the other hand the Japanese high command assumed that the Japanese people would be unaffected by high causality numbers. They also assumed that Germany and Italy would soon force to Britain to surrender which would lead to the collapse of China and cause a severe amount of damage to America's will to fight.

Source:

A History of Japan by L.M Cullen

Japan's Imperial Army by Edward Drea

Yes and no. The army later claimed that the navy said that it would cripple the US. But I don't think the Army can be entirely trusted in this, it is a bit self serving to blame it all on the other branch. And the navy never thought it would be a "war winner" in of itself.

In part it was an extension of pre-war plans. Prior to the war (and I'm talking starting around the the Spanish-American war through the 20s and 30s) the Japanese envisioned the war would start as a sortie of the whole US fleet. The Japanese plan was to harass the fleet with subs and planes and then when it arrived in the Far East worn out and damaged with tired crews the Japanese fleet would engage it in a main fleet battle and destroy it. That would end the war. The US would sue for peace. And that would be that. It was expected to mirror the naval wars the Japanese had fought against other European countries and that the US had fought against Spain to win the Philippines in the first place.

It was not expected to be a multi-year conflict where shipbuilding capability would play a significant role... at least not by most leaders.

So the raids were the harassing plan writ large. Most of the Japanese admirals were still battleship men. And they still thought of carriers as scouts and raiders, not capital ships. The raids on Pearl was seen as a way to weaken and delay the Americans, not to sink the entire fleet. Although after the British success at Taranto the air advocates were beginning to gain influence. The Japanese expectation was that the Americans would gather what battleships they could and come steaming to save their possessions. But the US didn't have any intention of doing that. And after Pearl they didn't have any capability either.

Still even as late as the battle of Leyte Gulf, you can see the Japanese trying to get a mass of battleships into a single spot to sink "the American fleet" in a grand Mahan style fashion. With the idea that if they could do that the Americans would come to the table and negotiate. But the US was basically fighting a different type of war at that point, and unlike the Japanese had resources to fight a war of attrition. The Japanese knew the US had the resources to fight a war like that. But they didn't think the US had the will to fight a war like that.

In any case Pearl in of itself was never supposed to be a knockout blow. And the Japanese didn't achieve their best hopes. They missed all the carriers. And they didn't get the docks and stores. But a lot of their planning had assumed that they would take a lot more damage as well. Most Japanese planners had expected to lose at least a third of the planes and at least one carrier. So on the whole it went better than expected.

For a good overview of the prewar plans, Pearl, and the war as a whole I recommend Ronald Spector's Eagle Against the Sun. It covers what I've mentioned here quite well.

Since we are on the topic, how did Hitler view the attack? Was it something he had prior knowledge of and approved (or disapproved) of?

I can't imagine he felt like has ready for Britain to gain enforcement.

The Japanese believed they could cripple the American fleet with their secret weapon, but only with a complete surprise attack, and that part was the gamble. They plotted an unusual path across the ocean to avoid areas where the US Navy trained to ensure the secrecy of the mission. When they arrived at Pearl Harbor they gave the signal tora tora tora exclaiming that it was a complete surprise attack and to carry out the full scale bombing mission.

The secret weapon they employed was modified torpedoes. Up until this time, torpedoes were not effective in the shallow waters of a harbor. they would sink to deep and not carry forward tot heir target after hitting the harbor ground. These torpedoes did not sink as low and decimated the US fleet in the harbor. These big US battle ships trying to fight off the Japanese planes was akin to trying to fight off insects with a revolver. This downplayed the importance of battleships going forward in the military and the uprising of war planes and aircraft carriers.

Related Question: I was under the impression that some substantial fraction of the aircraft carriers stationed at Pearl Harbor were out conducting training manuevers during the actual attack and that this coincidence was not accounted for by Japanese high command. Is that at all accurate?

I'm Japanese. Japanese leaders well know Japan could not win. They want the nagotiation to keep the teritory.

At 1941, U.S. forbit the export of resources to Japan, and Japan had only 1 year's supply of stored resources. U.S. want Japant to abandon almost all their colonies in East Asia. Japan tried to contact U.S. and want to negotiate several times, but U.S. refused it and did'nt changed their requirement.

At September, in Imperial Conference, PM Konoe report the emperor to the war is not avoidable. The emperor was enraged and told directly to PM Konoe (it was rare the emperor tell something directly) to avoid Japan-U.S. war. PM Konoe tried to make summit conference but U.S. refused it. On the other hand, Japan started to prepare the war, and U.S. get the information about this act of Japan, so U.S. recieved that Japan decided the war. With another words, U.S. did not mind to start the war against Japan. U.S. didn't change attitude to require Japan to abandon For Japan, it is impossible to abandon all colonies at that time. Because many Japanese lived in the lands and Japan owe the debt to get colonies. It is likely to abandon exporting cars or electronics in this time.

PM Konoe report the emperor again that the war is not avoidable, and he resigned. As next PM, Tojo was selected. During he was Minister of Army, he was hard advocate for war. But after he become PM, he changed his attitude. At November, in Imperial Conference, PM Tojo was instructed from the emperor to avoid the war. Tojo's thinking is lke one of bureaucratism. As the Minister of Army, he only insisted the benefit of Army. After he became PM, he thought Japan's benefit. He try hard to negotiate U.S. and try to avoid war, but U.S. didn't change the conditions. Japan shows some compromised ideas, but U.S. refused it. In this time, japanese code telegrams ware broken by U.S. and U.S. well knows Japan's acting and preparing.

And then U.S. demand Hull Note, which required Japan to abandon their colonies. At December, in Imperial Conference, it is recorded that Tojo crying in front of the emperor and reported that Japan can not avoid the war. The emperor said like that it is impossible to win Japan-U.S. war. Then Ministers reported Japan can continue the war only 1 year, Japan have to beat the frces of U.S. and negotiate with them to recognize Japan's teritory.

After that Imperial Conference, Japan decide the war. U.S. know the information about Japan's act and Roosevelt sent the telegram to the emperor. The Telegram of Roosevelt tells U.S. want to avoid the war, but the emperor could not read it before Pearl Harbor. Because the telegram was delayed by Ryuzo Sejima who is the staff officer of Imperial Force, Japanese fleets have already be sailing to attack Pearl Harbor.

but wasn't the original plan for the pearl harbour attack much more ambitious - including a strike on the panama canal and an actual invasion of hawaii? Would that have been more successful? considering the outcome in the phillipines and elsewhere, I think it very likely a strong Japanese force could have seized the entire island rather quickly. Thus gaining valuable resources/ infrastructure for IJN or atleast denying the USN much of it's recovery. Also, had the declaration of war been delivered prior to the attack, as had been intended, would the US resolve have been as strong?