Referencing an amalgamation of sources from Marilyn B. Young, The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990 & Marvin Gettleman et al (eds.), Vietnam and America. Also, the theory I am currently laying out is supported by former Army Commander and CIA Director, General Petraeus. His Doctoral thesis was based on the theory that because we fired so many bullets and bombed so much out of the Vietnamese, we lost the war.

There may be not one particular bombing event that showed the limitations of American air power. Looked at individually, the bombings appeared to have positive short-term results but tenuous and only 'theoretical' long-term impact. It was difficult to say how effective the bombings were against the VietCong or the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) in the long view; the bombings occurred typically in areas that American forces had difficulty penetrating. Therefore, it was difficult to assess the damage to the enemy's forces or infrastructure. Some anecdotal evidence suggests the bombing campaigns were based more or less on hunches, rather than hard intelligence. With hindsight, the total sum of the bombings bring one startling conclusion: American air power cannot defeat the fight for national self-realization. In fact, it may even enhance it.

The Vietnamese, guilded by history of foreign oppression, had already kicked out the technologically advanced French. The North Vietnamese saw Americans as another in a long-line of colonialists. Carpet bombing campaigns and wanton shootings and abuse of civilians among American forces alienated any popular support Americans could have had. The few forces that supported Americans were typically the merchant/capitalists class. Those guys were few in number.

More numbers tell the story. The Vietnamese opponents suffered significantly more deaths, they had less firepower. No planes. Few tanks. Most guerrillas operated in the countryside. Yet, because the guerrillas represented Vietnamese independence and nationalism (plus also enacted moderate land reforms and were seen as natives rather than foreigners) - they had popular support. American bombing, for all its power, probably brought more people to the North Vietnameses' cause than any number of people they tried killing.

I know this isn't quite the answer you're looking for, but I hope this helps.

Source: I'm a Sociologists with a particular interest in counter-insurgency wars - Philippine War, Vietnam War, Iraq and Afghanistan wars.

As an ex Army Aviation officer and with a degree in Intelligence I'd like to add my humble bit here. Your thesis seems quite interesting and would love to see it once finished. However, just to give you a different point of view (and all already said here makes sense) not sure if the bombing operations are as relevant as they look. They are different approaches to the use of air power, and in the Vietnam case being one of the first where counterinsurgents were targets you could argue the operations were as well some sort of trial and error to try to subdue NV.

Here is where the economics of war enter the picture. Carpet bombing was an old WWII tactic used when bombing accuracy was limited so an area was flooded with explosives hoping to hit the intended target; this would also make sense during WWII since industrialised nations were attacking each other factories, powerhouses or refineries, so the high operational costs of men, planes and the losses were worth as the targets were of high value too.

Vietnam however was a totally different story, other than few limited targets around Hanoi, limited in numbers and politically, but most sorties would be in the jungle scenario. Deploying a B-52 or an aircraft carrier and all its escort to launch 4 planes against potentially nothing is very very costly. The Air Force and Navy assets did not have the sort of targets they needed to be efficient. The more efficient air war in Vietnam was that of the helicopters but that leads you to the Army leaving the Air Force domain.

I guess I am trying to say the bombing campaigns by themselves are not that relevant, these campaigns were designed around the political constraints and impositions. You can only judge the limitations of air power according to the doctrine of use and the US doctrine of the time was never put to work because politics strangled it and shaped it and the resulting air power tactics would not work effectively nor its economics work.

Hope I have not gone so far.