You may be interested in reading Worse Than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia by Thomas J. Christensen, in which he argues that the Sino-Soviet split actually made effective policy more difficult to achieve for Washington. Although this a work of political science, it is based on historical case studies and (more importantly) archival sources. Here is the publisher's description:

In brute-force struggles for survival, such as the two World Wars, disorganization and divisions within an enemy alliance are to one's own advantage. However, most international security politics involve coercive diplomacy and negotiations short of all-out war. Worse Than a Monolith demonstrates that when states are engaged in coercive diplomacy--combining threats and assurances to influence the behavior of real or potential adversaries--divisions, rivalries, and lack of coordination within the opposing camp often make it more difficult to prevent the onset of conflict, to prevent existing conflicts from escalating, and to negotiate the end to those conflicts promptly. Focusing on relations between the Communist and anti-Communist alliances in Asia during the Cold War, Thomas Christensen explores how internal divisions and lack of cohesion in the two alliances complicated and undercut coercive diplomacy by sending confusing signals about strength, resolve, and intent. In the case of the Communist camp, internal mistrust and rivalries catalyzed the movement's aggressiveness in ways that we would not have expected from a more cohesive movement under Moscow's clear control.

Reviewing newly available archival material, Christensen examines the instability in relations across the Asian Cold War divide, and sheds new light on the Korean and Vietnam wars.

While recognizing clear differences between the Cold War and post-Cold War environments, he investigates how efforts to adjust burden-sharing roles among the United States and its Asian security partners have complicated U.S.-China security relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Well, no one was exploited to badly, really, but once China recognized the CCCP as a socialist empire, they got scared. This was the mid 60's, after they realised that the crap machinery the soviets gave them were... crap. Zedong had let this lead him to mistrust with the CCCP. Now they started to push the famous Ping Pong Diplomacy with the US. Here's a well written PDF about it www.ohiohistory.org/.../2011/Bao.pdf The US saw this as an in with the Chinese. And obviously wasn't much, but meant a ton, because it opened a new route to SinoAmerican relations. After the visit to China with Nixon and all that in 1972, which doesn't matter too much right now, there was a lull in SinoAmerican relations. Perfect time for Brezhnev to play his China card as he called it. This is 1982, so China is EXTREMELY upset with Reagan selling weapons to Taiwan. The Soviet Union literally has trade delegates at a whistle blow. Ready to go. That's pretty much the biggest exploit you'll get out of this though. Brezhnev succeded in better relations with China, but just gave a big Fuck You to Reagan. Here is a real article from 1982 about this whole situation. Its the best I could find. http://m.csmonitor.com/1982/0325/032540.html

Anyways, probably not as exciting as you'd like, but still an answer.

For more info, read http://m.barnesandnoble.com/w/soviet-study-of-international-relations-allen-lynch/1100948301?cm_mmc=googlepla--textbook_notinstock_26to75_pt99--q000000633-_-9780521367639&ean=9780521367639&isbn=9780521367639&r=1 Soviet Study of International Relations by Allen Lynchs

Oh and I also have no books on this... yet. You reminded me I need to get down to Half Priced Books!

And dear lord I just looked at the book list. Is there any way I can recommend books?