So, I was reading through blitzkrieg discussions here in askhistorians, and it seems that 1: breakthrough and encirclement and 2: deep penetration are both mentioned, but never together in the same answer. I can think of examples for both (1: the early breakthroughs in the Eastern front and 2: Kursk, for example), but here are the points that made me wonder.
First, breakthrough with heavy units is nothing new, as old as warfare itself, the same is true for encirclement. This isn´t anything revolutionary.
Second, someone mentioned in an answer something along the lines, that Guderian was the first truly clausewitzian general and he fought on several occasion with his superiors to be allowed to deeper penetrate into enemy territory.
As far as I remember (it was long long years ago the last time I read his book) Clausewitz wrote about the idea that making an enemy unable to fight can win battles, not just destroying them. Which applied to armored warfare would mean, that penetrating deep into enemy territory, disrupting supplies, command lines and reorganization renders the enemy unable to fight. This would tip the balance toward deep penetration focus.
All in all: the breakthrough and encirclement view of the blitzkrieg is an oversimplification, and the real revolutionary idea was deep penetration (leaving encirclement to non motorized infantry) or the two are perfectly compatible and the situation dictates always which should be used?
Extra question: Can we really view Guderian as the first truly clausewitzian military leader?
Edit: I´m aware of the importance of Auftragstaktik and land-air coordination, what I am really interested in is the application of armored divisions.
Blitzkrieg was a 2 part concept. The first involved truely combined arms formations to breach the front line and the second was deep penetration of the enemys rear. Armoured units always made the spearheads of the pincers in a strategic envelopment. This would be nearly impossible without armour.
Before the war there were many people who theorized about deep armoured thrusts by all mechanized units but because it had never been done before the unknowns made this experimental idea too dangerous. Germany had little to lose when they implemented blitzkrieg. There was always the fear of the spearheads being cut off and destroyed piecemeal in the enemies rear but guderian realized that speed, shock and momentum of the panzer divisions kept the initiative in their hands. After the break through at sedan in 1940 the german high command immediately tried to slow down the panzer divisions but guderian and rommel dismissed it as convential trap thinking. Their speed of advance to Abbeville on the coast confirmed their ideas and proved for the first time that deep penetration was not only possible but was the key to maneuver warfare and the only way to avoid the static positional, attrition warfare of WW1.
Armored combat vehicles were used in the german army - and are still used to this day - to penetrate deeply behind enemy lines and take certain objectives (e.g. bridges or railroad crossings) far quicker than the time the enemy needs to prepare an adquate defense. When strategically important points in the enemy's rear are taken so that he cannot retreat, the enemy is encircled. Such encirclements by penetrating deep into the "open" rear instead of direct attacks (whenever possible) were the basis of german armored operations and were attempted throughout the war. So the answer is: both deep penetration and encirclement were things armored forces did to help achieve whatever was needed.
Guderian differed from most previous and contemporary military leaders in the level of emphasis he put on the independence, flexibility and sheer "gung ho" attitude he envisioned for armored forces. To most knowledgable contemporaries he must have seemed completely mad. But in the end these qualities were what made the german armored divisions such an effective force. But IMO he wasn't the only - and certainly not the first - general to realise Clausewitz's ideas. He "only" realised better than anyone else how the new technology enabled different approaches to warfare. The british army actually were experimenting with massive armored forces long before Guderian got to implement his ideas. The difference is that the brits did not follow their ideas to their logical conclusions.