So, I was just thinking. (In fact, I was simulating the speed differences between a bolt action 5 round, such as the Kar98K and the Mosin, and the 8 round M1 Garand) The speed of the gun was vastly higher than any other common infantryman weapon. It couldn't even match the No4 Lee Enfield, with it's 10 round clips.
So, how did this change US Infantry tactics? The increased speed would mean that the average 10 man squad could spit out more fire than any other like-sized squad of the time. But, considering they carried roughly the same amount of clips, surely this would have led to supply issues, or the consistent reduction in ammunition stocks?
I've answered this question in the past, arguing that the adoption of the M1 resulted in a lack of firepower at a squad level as it led to the belief that LMG's (the main provider of firepower at the section level) were not necessary. My answer was first posted here http://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/250vba/was_the_mg42s_rate_of_fire_significant_to_its/ and it might help answer some of your other questions-you might be interested in the paragraph detailing the differences between theoretical and battlefield rate of fire.
'the adoption of the M1 Garand was based upon the idea that America was a nation of riflemen. By equipping all their infantry with semi-automatic weapons, it was felt that it would not be necessary to purchase an effective LMG, troops would be able to instead cover a swathe of tactics situations with just one weapon- close quarters battle, long range snap shooting and suppressing fire.
In an infantry assault the difference between advancing and being pinned or withdrawing depends upon winning the firefight, achieved by throwing more lead downrange than the enemy can throw back (or making the enemy feel that they cannot). LMGS are well suited to this role, as they are able to produce what is know as a beaten zone, allowing one man with an LMG to supress 3 or 4 of the enemy at once. In contrast rifles are based upon accurate snap shooting against fleeting targets- essentially a one vs one activity, so while the Americans may have an edge in the latter stages of the battle (closing and clearing suppressed enemy positions) this is irrelevant when they are unable to secure that first step. attempting to fire a rifle at a rate rapid enough to suppress an LMG would be a waste of ammunition, produce highly inaccurate fire and not be economical with manpower.
Note that this is standard infantry squads, arguably, and somewhat ironically (given their normally lighter scales or equipment), US airborne troops were potentially able to generate more firepower through dropping the BAR for a M1919 converted to an LMG role. While not totally satisfactory, it is probably responsible for some of their famous fighting repute.'
As for the question of did it cause supply issues, it didn't seem to do so. Well trained soldiers would conserve their ammunition by firing at a deliberate rate with aimed shots to identified targets rather than blatting away at everything, while American supply chains were rarely criticised for a failure to supply ammunition or food in sufficient quantities.