While I agree that the crisis was not quite the lopsided victory that the Kennedy Administration might have wanted people to think it was, I also think you may be ascribing a level of strategic foresightedness to Khrushchev that he did not possess.

To be sure, Khrushchev wanted to protect Castro. Cuba was an important ally for the USSR, but more than that Khrushchev loved Castro on a personal level and grew very protective of him after the Bay of Pigs (Castro's revolutionary enthusiasm made Khrushchev feel like a young Bolshevik again). Khrushchev was convinced that the US would try to topple Castro again at some point. So the missiles were meant as protection for Fidel. There is some dispute over to what degree Khrushchev was also reacting to the Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Italy. Most scholars argue that Khrushchev absolutely hated that those missiles were so close to the USSR and sought to give the Americans a taste of their own medicine. I believe that he stated as much in his memoirs. On the other hand, in their book One Hell of a Gamble, which used a lot of previously unseen Soviet archival documents, Alexandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali argue that Khrushchev did not care much about the missiles, and that Kennedy tipped his hand by agreeing to remove them. In any case, it seems to me that what your question gets to is whether or not Khrushchev intended for the missiles to stay in Cuba, or whether he wanted to use them as a bargaining chip and always intended for them to be removed at some point. I doubt that the latter was the case. Frankly, I'm not sure that Nikita Sergeyevich was thinking that far ahead. There were a number of problems outside of protecting Castro and achieving a first-strike capability that placing missiles in Cuba helped with, namely:

1. Berlin. In 1961, Khrushchev failed to secure NATO withdrawal from West Berlin at the Vienna Conference. West Berlin had been a major thorn in the Soviet side ever since the Cold War started, since it was a beacon of Western values within East Germany. Even though Khrushchev "beat hell" out of Kennedy (JFK's words) at Vienna, West Berlin remained in the NATO sphere of influence. The Berlin Wall represented something of a compromise, but it didn't make a divided Berlin much easier for Khrushchev to stomach. Sending missiles to Cuba may have been Khrushchev's way of obtaining greater leverage over NATO in hopes of forcing their withdrawal from West Berlin.

2. Domestic politics. Things were not good in the USSR in the early 1960s. Khrushchev's agricultural programs had collapsed and he faced much internal discontent. A common reaction to such problems is to attempt a bold foreign policy move as a distraction. Hard liners within the Soviet government may also have forced him into the deployment.

3. China. By 1962, the Sino-Soviet split was deepening. China was beginning to assert itself more forcefully, and ideological disputes also factored in. Sending missiles to Cuba may have helped Khrushchev maintain geopolitical prominence over China and possibly prevent Cuba from gravitating toward Beijing.

All of the above problems point toward Khrushchev placing missiles in Cuba for the long term rather than as a short term bargaining chip.

i guess this is taking for granted that the USSR did not want to use to bomb just as much as the US didn't.

That's the problem - in the end, the US and USSR came this close to nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Several of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (namely Air Force Chief Curtis LeMay) really did want to go in and bomb the missile sites. Castro reported to Robert McNamara many years later that he recommended to Khrushchev that the nukes be used in the event of an American invasion. Bear in mind that Castro was well aware of what that would mean for Cuba, ie total destruction. At the end of the day, quite a lot of international politics means dealing with the unseen ramifications of decisions made to secure short-term victories.

Sources:

Fursenko, Alexandr and Naftali, Timothy. "One Hell of a Gamble": Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy, 1958-1964: The Secret History of the Cuban Missile Crisis. WW Norton, 1998.

Munton, Donald and Welch, David A. The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Concise History (Second Edition). Oxford University Press, 2011.

Nash, Philip. The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy and the Jupiters, 1957-1963. UNC Press, 1997.

Essence of Decision is a great book if you're interested in more details on the Cuban missile crisis, but there are some points that it is very important to keep in mind:

• The missiles that were successfully shipped to Cuba were sent in great secrecy, and the US didn't discover them on the way to Cuba.

• The Soviets planned to conceal the missile construction in the forests, but the forests weren't dense enough, nor could it be, to conceal a missile launch site.

• They did, however, put into place effective camouflage after the sites were discovered. However, these were teams that were used to building in the Soviet Union, where they didn't have to conceal their activities, and they were on a tight construction schedule.

• The United States made it very clear to the Soviets that they knew the USSR lacked second-strike capability, so they weren't scared of them.

• The removal of the missiles from Turkey was done months later, and the fact that the US had traded them for the missiles in Cuba was kept a secret.

• The missiles in Turkey were obsolete and the US was planning on removing them anyway, above Turkish objections.

So no, I wouldn't say it was a Soviet victory. If anyone really won I'd say it was Castro, but Kennedy didn't do too poorly for himself either. The placement of missiles in Cuba was never meant as a trade for the Turkish missiles, and I'd find it hard to believe someone would let it be known they're doing something very preventable in order to attempt a trade.

The Cuban missile sites were very vulnerable to attack, as they were totally unhardened and weren't built so they could be hardened later; they'd only be useful for a Soviet first-strike against the US, as the US could just obliterate the sites with conventional attacks at the same time they launched a nuclear first-strike against Russia.

Also, documented Soviet behavior precludes it being intended for the sites to be found before they were ready. They got their hand caught in the cookie jar, and wanted to get out of it. When it was revealed that the United States didn't fear a nuclear attack from the USSR, they took what they could get without a war.