All of the factors you mention were important in different battles except for the first.

There were very few examples of tactical ingenuity of officers or commanders in decisive battles by either side. The reverse was true. There were critical examples of tactical mistakes.

The battles for New York City illustrate tactical mistakes on both sides. Washington made the tactical mistake of trying to defend Brooklyn (where he could have been cut off on Long Island and defeated) (after making the strategic mistake of trying to defend New York in the first place). He only escaped by a desperate night retreat on boats collected by the Marblehead Regiment, over the East River to Manhattan. Then, the British made the tactical mistake of failing to force ships and men up the rivers fast enough to cut Washington's army off and prevent them from escaping Manhattan.

Contributing greatly to the American Victory at Saratoga, was bungling by British general Sir Henry Clinton. The British strategy was to cut the colonies in two, by capturing the Hudson River Corridor (they controlled both ends, at Montreal and New York City). Burgoyne moved south from Montreal. Clinton was supposed to move north from New York. Clinton stalled and dithered and never committed his full strength. The Americans were able to concentrate on Burgoyne and defeat him in the most important American victory in the war (both because it prevented British control of the Hudson Corridor, and because it brought the French into the war as American allies).

This points to another feature of the war. Lack of a clear British strategy on how to win it. The failed plan to control the Hudson corridor was perhaps the only remotely promising strategy for winning the war that the British ever produced. They could capture any American city they wanted to that was on the coast (they all were at this time). Through the war they did control almost every American city at one time or another. (Though they only had the resources to occupy and defend about three cities at once). But capturing and controlling American cities did not prove to be a decisive strategy in a war against a country with a much larger rural than urban population, and a vast hinterland inaccessible to the Royal Navy.

George Washington almost lost the war trying to defend New York, but he was a quick learner, and never committed the Continental Army to a position where it could be cut off from the hinterland again. Washington's new strategy, that victory would come as long as he never suffered a decisive defeat, proved to be successful.

The final major American (and French - there were about as many French soldiers in the battle as Americans) victory in the war, the surrender of Cornwallis' army at Yorktown, was only made possible by the temporary naval supremacy which the French fleet won over the Royal Navy at the battle of the Chesapeake. This prevented the British from evacuating Cornwallis.

The British always enjoyed the best supply routes, because they could supply by sea (except briefly, at a critical time for Cornwallis, when they were cut off by the French), but the Americans had good enough supply from the interior for this not to be a decisive advantage. The most ingenious use of an unexpected supply route to win a major campaign was General Knox sledding the cannon captured at Fort Ticonderoga through the wilderness and over the snow to Boston to force the British to evacuate that city.

The Revolutionary war was really decided because the British never figured out how to win it (and bungled their best chance at New York and their best strategy in the Hudson Corridor). Washington learned from his own mistakes faster than the British, and figured out that he would eventually win as long as he never fought a battle he could not retreat from.

Each battle was different, and you need to look at each one to see what might be considered the decisive moment. If you're looking at broad categories to consider when examining battles here are some more things that you can look at.

• State of health of the various armies. Did one army just complete a long campaign and have to face off against a better rested one?

• What types of men were available? Cavalry? Regulars? Militia units (whether Loyalist or Whig?)

• Terrain. Was it broken up and thus forced many small battles to develop? Were the two armies facing each other on roughly equal physical terrain? Did one army have strong defensive positions?

• Numbers of men involved. This wasn't always a factor, but it could be decisive.

• Cannon and other artillery. How much was there and what role did ti play?

In two days (June 17th) is the anniversary of the Battle of Bunker Hill, so I'll examine that answering some of the questions. For a brief summary--on the night of June 16th a detachment of militia was sent to fortify Bunker Hill. At some point during the night the three senior commanders of that detachment agreed to fortify Breed's Hill instead. As Breed's Hill was close enough to Boston to shell the harbor and the town this necessitated a response by the British.

A force of men was sent and attacked the fortified positions on and around Breed's Hill. The first two attacks were repulsed with heavy losses, the third attack cleared the redoubt at the top of Breed's Hill, securing the victory for the British, though at a final cost of nearly 50% casualties.

1.) Tactics. There's not a great deal of opportunity to employ various tactics in a frontal assault. However this wasn't simply a "charge straight ahead and get slaughtered" situation like it has been so often portrayed. When Howe examined the positions that the Americans had taken he'd noticed that they'd left their left flank exposed. This was a picket fence that ran very nearly from Breed's Hill to the harbor. His plan was to send the first attack at that exposed position and come at the redoubt from it's exposed flank or the rear. However by the time the British forces had landed and proceeded with their attack the picket fence had been fortified. As the British attacked their lines were broken somewhat because of the many obstacles in the area, and they were met with withering fire.

On the second attack Howe decided to attack the redoubt in force, and had no better success. On the third attack Howe sent some men to attack the militia at the picket fence (and keep them distracted) and then sent the remainder of his force (and the reinforcements which had arrived), against the Americans inside the redoubt, finally clearing it on the third attack.

Strategy/tactics

British: In this case it was pretty straightforward. Howe might have displayed better tactics by loading his men that night when the fortifications were first spotted, but a night crossing and landing poses serious risks of it's own.

American: Breed's Hill wasn't a very defensible spot, compared to the original spot of Bunker Hill. It's been suggested that one of the reasons that Breed's Hill was fortified was to provoke the British into a response. The lack of fortification along the exposed left flank of the Americans could have made the situation much, much worse for them, had not reinforcements arrived and spotted the danger in time.

Supply Routes

Supply routes for both armies weren't really an issue as the hill was only occupied for one day. However the Americans were in desperate need of powder and artillery. At one point they had to cut open the cannon cartridge bags to get access to the powder there. Sufficient quantities of powder (say the ammunition and powder sent with Benedict Arnold on the Canadian expedition) might have ended with a victory for the Americans.

Naval vs Land Supremacy

The British had naval supremacy and shelled the redoubt up until the first attack. Had they needed to they could have brought more of the navy's ships to bear on the fort (assuming an American victory). However this didn't really have an impact on the battle.

State of health

Both armies were well rested. Disease had made an appearance in the army besieging Boston, but the men at the battle were healthy as were those attacking.

Forces involved

The forces involved were British regulars against militia, as there was no Continental Army as of yet. This wouldn't have as much of an impact on this battle as it could during other battles. No cavalry were involved as it was an assault on a fortification.

Terrain

This was important to the battle. The Americans had built their fortifications on a hill, and the approach to the hill was over uneven ground with lots of obstacles. The battle taking place on the Charleston neck meant that the British weren't going to be able to land troops to the American rear to cut off any escaping militia.

Numbers of men

The British had about 1/3rd more men than did the Americans. This advantage in numbers is generally reduced when attacking a fortified position.

Artillery

The British used the navy artillery to bombard Charlestown and the redoubt, but stopped midmorning on the 17th. The Americans had some cannon, but not enough, and they didn't have many artillery officers as most of them had fled before the battle even started. Cannon could have played a major role in an American defense, but it didn't.

One of the largest factors for victory was George Washington's ability to save the army from being destroyed. He lost more battles then he won but they were hallow victories for the British. The American army was still moving, and all the Brits won was a meaningless field