The problem with this question is that it neglects two factors that ultimately were decisive in the course of the war: namely, deployment of ships, and sheer industrial capacity.

Japan's land-based forces, while well-trained and fairly numerous, were ultimately fighting with equipment behind the curve. Their small arms, while well-made, lacked the sophistication, rapid-fire, and mobility (for example, Japan's only submachinegun was issued in 1942, and only in limited qualities, compared to the MP40 and the Thompson both being issued in 1938 to German and American troops en masse), due to their lack of industrial capacity. They also lacked artillery and armor, which, while was fine against fighting an underindustrialized China, was no match against the mechanized formations of the Soviet Union as we saw towards the end of the war with the Soviet invasion of Manchuria. Japan also had severe logistical issues, as they lacked the infrastructure to supply a force in areas like China and Burma (to say nothing of the required "Tokyo Express" runs to Japanese forces at Guadalcanal!)

The Japanese air forces, while they were initially superior to those of the US and Britain, and especially superior to the older and under-strength units deployed in the Philippines, Malaysia, and the Dutch East Indies, had another flaw-namely, their extremely strict training regimen. Only a few pilots were trained every year, primarily due to extremely strict competency standards, and partly because most skilled pilots were deployed on the front lines. While this allowed Japan to achieve temporary air superiority, when that elite air corps of pilots dwindled due to attrition, Japan was left with a mediocre base of pilots against an increasingly battle-hardened US air corps.

Lastly, the Japanese Navy, while it was outnumbered by the British and Americans (partly a holdover of the Washington Naval Treaty, which dictated a 5-5-3 ratio for the US, UK, and Japan, respectively (for ships)), had local superiority as most of the British fleet was deployed elsewhere, while the US fleet was split between the Atlantic and Pacific. Japan's war planners had attempted to make up for this by emphasizing quality of ships. Japan had a strong core of heavy cruisers and battleships, and a significant force of destroyers equipped with the dreaded Long Lance Type 53 torpedo, which was miles ahead of Allied torpedo technology. She also had a carrier core, the "Kido Butai (Mobile Force)," which outnumbered American carrier strength in the Pacific 6 fleet carriers to 4 (5 including Ranger). Although, this advantage would soon be lost, as Japan had only one more fleet carrier in the works, while the US had 10.

In addition to technical aspects commenters have pointed out, it's important to consider strategic capability of which Japan was really lacking. Looking at it shows that Japan probably had very little chance of winning when they engaged in war with the US.

There was much argument within the army over whether they should fight a long war or a short war. Even though long, drawn-out wars of attrition were a more modern form of warfare (which many Japanese military officers realized after their involvement in WWI), the faction that preferred to plan for a short, decisive victory gained more influence. Instead of improving technology and logistics and having less but more capable units, these generals who planned for a short war wanted more soldiers and more divisions. Instead of relying on more effective technology, they put their faith in having zealous soldiers who were much more committed to the war than the soldiers of other countries. Consequently, they heavily indoctrinated their soldiers to be ultranationalistic and supremely obedient to their officers and hoped that these hard-fighting soldiers would make up for deficiencies in technology, and the army instead opted to spend their budget on more soldiers.

So basically the way army officers saw it is they would surprise America with the bombing of Pearl Harbor and immediately rush into other places in Southeast Asia and take those, while the Navy captured a bunch of islands in the Pacific. Then they depended on Britain surrendering to Nazi Germany to scare America into surrendering to Japan to focus on fighting Germany instead. Their dependence on Germany is a big flaw, and the other big flaw is that this is about as far as their planning went. The army and navy were not in agreement on many matters, and the army was not completely unified within itself (one example being the short war vs. long war faction). There was no overall grand strategy when they bombed Pearl Harbor. Instead the army expanded in several directions, occupying as much land as they thought possible with no way to defend it (there was disagreement on whether the army should focus on North Asia or South Asia) and the Navy just expanded outward into the Pacific, a completely different direction than that of the army.

Source: The Imperial Japanese Army by Edward Drea