I have always seen Gettysburg discussed as a Confederate defeat due to Lee's failure to organize his corps commanders efficiently, Longstreet's slow movements on the second and third day, and Stuart's search for personal glory. Few historians that I have read give credit to Meade, instead talking about the placement of the corps on the first day as being Reynolds's last act as a good commander, Hancock's effective management of divisions on the second day, and the individual courage of brigade and regimental commanders on the center and left Federal flanks. Did Meade do anything that would warrant accolades other than being the commander of the Federal forces during the three days?
Meade did a number of things that warrant accolades over those three days:
It is also good to remember that Meade had been in command of the Army of the Potomac for only three days when the battle broke out and that his subordinates were a little shaky when it came to following his orders.
It is easy and tempting to view Gettysburg through a thick Confederate lens--it is, after all, the great tragedy of the Lost Cause. But Meade's performance, while not perfect, was instrumental in ensuring a Union victory.
Sources:
Yes, Meade and the Union Army deserve credit for the victory. Some good answers can be found here
Answers in the previous thread help flesh out tactical and personnel improvements, as well as the role of Lost Cause Ideology in why many people ask the question, "why did Lee lose?" rather than "why did the north win?" However, since I love talking Civil War history, we can explore this here. To do this, I'm gonna cover a little about The Lost Cause Ideology and Civil War historiography, then I'll get back to recent works on why the Union won, and finally I'll tackle Meade's specific actions as Army commander.
One main reason why there is a predominance of historical accounts that focus on Lee's failures is due to Lost Cause Ideology. Basically, after the war, many former Confederates (most notably Jubal Early) began a long process of portraying the conflict as, among other things, a conflict between squabbling brothers, a glorious cause against insurmountable odds, and Lee as the greatest genius of the war. It took many decades of publications adhering to this ideology before scholars began to critically analyze the causes and conduct of the war. So basically, the reason why so many publications focus on Confederate mistakes is because of a long history of writing from this Lost Cause perspective (Sources: David W. Blight, Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory; Eric Foner, A Short History of Reconstruction; Barbara Gannon, The Won Cause: The Won Cause: Black and White Comradeship in the Grand Army of the Republic; Gary W. Gallagher and Alan T. Nolan (ed.), The Myth of the Lost Cause and Civil War History; Gary W. Gallagher, Lee's Lieutenants in History and Memory; William C. Davis The Cause Lost: Myths and Realities of the Confederacy).
Once scholars began turning, or rather rephrasing, the question into "why did the Union win," they produced a great deal of excellent scholarship that explored the factors leading to northern victory. As you mentioned, historians found that troop placement, effective management, and individual courage throughout the ranks led to the Army of the Potomac's victory. Again, the previous thread explains this in more detail, but here are some excellent sources that corroborate those assertions (Source: Gary Gallagher, Lee and His Generals in War and Memory. Louisiana State University Press, 1998. Gary Gallagher, The Third Day at Gettysburg and Beyond. University of North Carolina Press, 1994. (Editor and co- author))
However, what is not covered in the previous thread is Meade's own role in the battle and his effectiveness. Meade, though cautious, stubbornly held his ground. We should not take this for granted, previous Union commanders had withdrawn after a tough fight and we should not underestimate the utter carnage that both sides suffered in the first two days worth of fighting. Some estimates place combined Union and Confederate casualties on the 2nd day as the bloodiest day in American history. Both armies' fighting capabilities were significantly diminished and a lesser man may have moved off the field. However, Meade stayed, though I will say he felt inclined to do this as a result of his senior officer's recommendations. In addition, Meade reinforced his flanks, though he still retained considerable amounts of front line men and reserve brigades, should a attack on the center occur. Furthermore, he correctly delegated many tactical decisions, like artillery placement, to his capable subordinates. This also should not go overlooked, as a tendency to micromanage and overrule junior officers, was an unattractive quality of Civil War generals, particularly John Pope. Lastly, Meade did not let Lee slip away unmolested, as has been claimed many times. Several small skirmishes took place during the Confederate retreat to Virginia, resulting in numerous casualties on both sides. In fact, Pettigrew and Kemper (who took part in Pickett's Charge) were killed and captured, respectively, during those skirmishes. This is not to say that Meade could not have done more, but as I stated before, the armies were wrecked even before the final day and implementing an aggressive pursuit of Lee may have been beyond the limits of Meade's boys. Though Meade was replaced by Ulysses S. Grant, Grant kept Meade on as army commander, with only Grant outranking him. Though this was done because of certain political considerations, it was also done because of Meade's capable command. Throughout the Overland Campaign, Meade performed well and certainly earned his place as a senior army commander (Hess, Earl J. Pickett's Charge—The Last Attack at Gettysburg; Gallagher, Gary W. Lee and His Generals in War and Memory; Wert, Jeffry D. Gettysburg: Day Three; Gallagher, Gary W., ed. The Third Day at Gettysburg and Beyond)
So, in conclusion, yes Meade and the Army of the Potomac deserves credit for the victory. Thanks for the question.
Hopefully one of you are more versed will come along to answer this. So I have a follow up question. Meade is highly criticized after the battle for "letting" the Army of Northern Virginia escape. Is this idea valid or just a popular misconception?