I've had a look through a few of my sources, and there doesn't seem to be a great deal of information regarding artillery on the eastern front. I will however, try my best to answer your question!

I will focus mainly on German artillery tactics, as this is mainly where my focus of research will allow me to provide a constructive answer. Although artillery tactics were believed to be made and adapted on the Western Front, the first adaptions to artillery tactics during the war took place on the Eastern Front. German Colonel Georg Bruchmüller, due to the fluid nature of the fighting fought, introduced artillery fire support designed not to completely obliterate defensive positions (such as those on the Western Front) but to stun the enemy senseless. This was driven by the general feeling among senior German artillerymen that artillery was more efficient, and effective, when neutralising rather than destroying enemy positions. When combined with infantry advances, this proved an effective tactic. These barrages were split into a number of phases, each phase being designated a specific role within the fire support operation. The three main phases were:

• A short surprise strike on the local command, control and communication elements, aimed at instilling mass confusion and fear within the enemy ranks.

• A period of fire against enemy artillery positions to reduce losses for the infantry's advance.

• A final phase before the main assault against the enemy's forward positions.

Bruchmüller's tactics also employed the use of gas in neutralising the enemy, with different tasks for different types of gas, focussing mainly on enemy artillery positions by killing the gunners to neutralise enemy batteries. His use of gas did not stop here, mixing a concoction of lethal, and non-lethal gas, the latter of which penetrated the mask and induced vomiting, forcing the wearer to remove his gas mask and expose himself to the more lethal gas.

Bruchmüller also split his artillery into task specific groups. German artillery technology and manufacturing was better than the Russians, who quite frankly had very limited and sub-standard equipment. Widespread thinking regarding counter-battery fire was that bigger was better, however Bruchmüller decided to use lighter guns for this task, and due to their faster rate of fire, and availability of gas shells of their calibre, to great effect.

As the war progressed, so did German tactics. To prevent concentrations of Russian troops, and to allow for the increased fluidity of the battles, the Germans employed long range guns to strike at the Russian reserves and supply lines, which were already stretched as it was. The 150mm "K16 Long Gun" with an impressive range of 22km wreaked havoc among the Russian lines. This weapon outranged and outgunned the Russians biggest gun in large usage, the 122mm 1909 Field Howitzer with only a range of 7.5km was unable to strike the German rear to such effect.

Both superior German tactics and weaponry on the Eastern Front, along with the length of it, prevented the stalemate that occurred on the Western Front. The Russians were simply unable to deal with the varying tactics and firepower that the Germans under the brilliant Bruchmüller could bring to bear. The success of Bruchmüller is shown by the decision in the German high command to bring him to Europe once the truce in the East had been gained with the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, with his expertise being used in the last German offensives. The tactics used by Bruchmüller and developed on the Eastern Front are still used in the artillery of many nations today.

I hope this provided a little bit of insight into artillery on the Eastern Front, and I apologise for any gramatical errors, I wrote this in my lunch break!

If there are any follow up questions I will be happy to answer!

Sources:

Bailey, Jonathan, Field Artillery And Firepower, (Oxford: Military Press, 1989).

Hogg, Ian, The Guns: 1914-18, (London: Pan Brooks, 1971).

Zabecki, David T., Steel Wind: Georg Bruchmüller And The Birth Of Modern Artillery, (Westport: Praeger, 1994).