Considering there were hardly any future engagements, it's hard to argue that the Hood was a massive loss. Air power had then largely eclipsed the battleship and battlecruiser. There was one one subsequent British battleship action in the war (Battle of the North Cape, where Duke of York and escorts sunk Scharnhorst in an Arctic night action)

This was definately NOT understood at the time, however, despite Taranto and the Bismarck's fate. The British still felt they needed Battleships and Battlecruisers to counter Axis capital ships. The Germans still had Tirpitz, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, and the Italians had a substantial battleship fleet as well. The Vichy French Navy could have joined the axis at any time, and the Japanese Navy could (and later did) enter the war with their fleet.

The British Navy started the war with 15 Battleships and Battlecruisers. They had Built two, and lost one. So their strength when Hood was lost would have been 16 capital ships. However in May 1941 the British also had 2 BBs damaged in the Mediteranean, and HMS Prince of Wales was also damaged in the action with Bismarck. So the British had out of action a quarter of their capital ships in a single month, which was understandably alarming. However their dominance in radar gunnery at night, and airpower by day meant British naval superiority was mostly assured until 1942.