I would disagree with your premiss that ancient generals/armies are better known by their tactics than their logistics. I don't think there's anyone who's seriously interested in the tactics of the Roman army who doesn't know anything about their logistics. There's probably more of a dichotomy between "laymen who might know a bit of (tactical) trivia" and "people with a serious interest who will be interested in both"

And there's the obvious example of Hannibal who's remembered (by the amateur) solely for transporting elephants.

Sun-Tzu has a quote:

“Victorious warriors win first and then go to war.

You can look at logistics as the details behind any generals overall campaign strategy. The planning an preparation that precede the movement of the ground troops. With pre-modern battles being fought very infrequently, its the movement and supply, and keeping your army in fight shape, that make up the bulk of the day to day.

I can address the earlier armies point.

Legionnaires after the Marian Reforms were known as "Marius' Mules", because they carried as much of their equipment as possible, enough to slow them down. Each soldier was in charge of his own rations as well as cooking gear, a bedroll, their armor and weapons and various other things. The whole point of this was to decrease the number of mules and in general, the baggage train, that had to follow every legion. After all, the baggage train was vulnerable to attack and the formation had to travel around the train to protect it from an ambush.

As for Alexander, for the majority of his campaign he fought with local mercenaries that he steadily gained as he went further and further east. The speed of his conquests did not allow for him to slow and wait for reinforcements from Macedon, and he instead relied on the disbanded Persians to join him, or the people he had just freed.

Further reading into Roman Logistics, though a bit old is The Logistics of the Roman Army At War by Jonathan P. Roth.

"Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics."

I have ambivalent feelings about this statement. On the one hand, the implication that tactics is less important than logistics does a disservice to the importance of tactics. On the other hand, because many people more or less ignore logistics in favor of tactics, it does serve to balance out people's perceptions.

I would venture to say that military professionals have always considered the logistics of equipping and feeding their forces with equal importance to the tactical employment of said forces on the battlefield. Those that don't rarely last long enough to be called 'professionals'. This thread has already produced several examples that illustrate that.

I think a slight rephrasing of the saying captures things a bit more accurately:

Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals know that both tactics and logistics are critical.

It's been that way for a long time. Basically for as long as there's been sedentary societies large enough to marshal standing armies.

Decisive battles are rare. Sieges are common. Skirmishes are common. Events where two armies line up for a pitched fight are rare. That said, there's no surer way to both force a decisive battle and ensure you will lose such a thing than by neglecting your logistics. An army can be seen as a city unto itself. If you don't feed it, it'll starve. If you don't dig outhouses the place will stink like something unholy. Soldiers have to be paid- in the days of yore the Roman government paid roman soldiers so that they wouldn't sack Rome. These armies become economic zones unto themselves.

The example my history professor always offered up as to why logistics was important was documents from a Chinese emperor in either the Ming or Qing Dynasty given that they were dealing with nomads on the Chinese / Russian Frontier in the Steppes. But it literally took months of planning and thousands of pages worth of documentation to move one army a mile outside of Beijing.

And frankly I'd not call it a side show. Logistics defined the face of WW2. Germany's unprecedented success in Poland and France was a direct consequence of logistics because they were badly outclassed in terms of equipment and vehicles, but what the Germans had gotten very good at was making sure troops and armor was deployed exactly where it needed to be and that it was properly supplied. The entire reason they ignored thick armor and well sloped armor was for this exact reason: the panzer 3 and 4 retained what might be considered "obsolete" armor layouts because they wanted room for radios in every tank. This was an era where most tanks typically communicated either by flares or flags or hand signals and only the command tanks would keep a radio.

Similarly Germany's inability to prepare for invading the Soviet Union in terms of the strain it'd put on supply trains all but guaranteed that the three primary fronts would be lost .

I'm currently reading a translation Caesar's Gallic Wars and I'd say that more than anything, he prides himself on his use of logistical trains and engineering feats. Certainly there are tactical tricks and talks about his men's bravery and fortitude, but logistics and engineering seem to be paramount in most of the accounts of his victories (e.g. fortification building, siege weapon construction, bridges, food supply...). It seems to have been very clear to them that if they didn't keep their soldiers well fed and protect their booty, they would lose their edge.

--edited for readability.

Alexander is tremendously well known for his logistical expertise. Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army is one of the go-to texts about military logistics in the ancient world.

http://www.amazon.com/Alexander-Great-Logistics-Macedonian-Army/dp/0520042727

This post might violate the rules of this sub (since I'm no historian and this post won't have any sources), and if so, apologies in advance to the mods. Let me know and I'll remove it.

OP, how about a short thought experiment? Suppose you actually are a "professional." E.g. you're an ancient general, and your polity's ruler/supreme authority has placed you in charge of a military force, with which you're supposed to fulfill some mission.

Let's say, you're given 800 men, and you are to subjugate a small town, located a few days march away. 100 miles, for instance. You think the endeavor might take 4 weeks. A few days to march there and back, a couple of weeks to fight, besiege the place if necessary, etc.

Wouldn't questions like "What do we eat? Can we find water to drink? Is there forage for our horses? Where and how do I arrange for my troops to find shelter, to sleep at night?" etc naturally occur to you if you're actually faced with the stark reality and real prospect of having to take 800 guys on a 100 mile march and living there for 2-3 weeks while fighting?

Whereas if you're not a "professional", and only looking at this from a... "fan" perspective, isn't it natural to gloss over the tedious ordinary "eat-shit-sleep" matters that we all unthinkingly deal with every day, and focus on the out-of-the-ordinary part of the story? I.e. the battles, the acts of courage that get remembered by the participants, climactic clashes?

So, to answer your question, my admittedly un-professional (I'm not a historian by trade, nor a soldier. Didn't even major in history nor serve in the military), unsupported by any sources, books, evidence, etc whatsoever except by... I dunno, I suppose "reason," guess is that as soon as polities became organized enough, big enough, and could command enough resources to mount military operations over distances long enough that soldiers couldn't simply march back home at the end of the day of battle in time for supper, the "professionals" had to start thinking, even before about how to win the actual battle, about how to "get there" and how to meet the necessities of life while getting there and once there.

I guess what I'm saying is, I think the real professionals pretty much always thought (cause they had to) about logistics. With the possible exception of 100% nomad comprised armies, like Huns and Mongols. The real question is, why does it rarely occur to amateurs to think about and ask questions about logistics? Why do we amateurs have a tendency to think of battles as Star Trek transporters materialize one army at one end of the field, the other at the other end, then they go at it with tactical virtuosity and coups-de-main and acts of insane courage and shazam! the course of history is changed there and then.

Btw, great question, OP. Thanks for asking it.

Sorry if I am a little late to the conversation. I don't have a definitive answer but I have a great place for you to start your research if you care to continue it. During the middle 17th century to the end of the 18th century the idea of military theory had become a theoretical science that could be studied just like art or mathematics. (No doubt the direct cause of the enlightenment.) In this time almost every major European nation, including the United States of America had created a school for the study of military theory; WestPoint (1802) USA, École Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr (1802) in France, Allgemeine Kriegsschule (1810) Prussia, and Theresian Military Academy (1751) current day Austria to name just a few.

This required most officers to attend war colleges where they learned the science of warfare which included: marching (forced marches and parade ground), setting camps, fortifications, siege warfare, attacking and defending positions, and the understanding of logistics. The idea that an officer with knowledge of war will always outperform one without and a well-trained army with a numerical advantage will win against a force of lesser training. Fredrick the Great could be seen as the father of “military science” with his book, Instructions for His General.

This would be the period in military history that would best reflect the given quote and I’d implore you look further into it because you will no doubt find what you are looking for.

Note: Carl Von Clausewitz is also a great military theorist that speaks about the importance of logistics in his book On War. However it is important to understand that he was part of the counter revolution that disagreed with the pure theoretical study of war and would have rather focused on the practical. I.e. experience. If you want to look more into the Napoleonic Wars you should read The Art of War, Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, who is the expert on this time and is seen as the creator of modern strategy. (I'd argue Clausewitz is but who's to say)

During my research of this topic, for my military science class, I actually found a theorist during this period that created a mathematical equation that connected the supply lines to the front lines. Sadly I no longer have the paper and the source is lost to me. But I promise it exists if you’d like to search for it.

-I'm a US Army Cadet who has been surfing Reddit for 3 years. This is my first post ever, I'd like to thank you for finally bringing me out of my shell. I love all things military theory and would love to have other discussions with anyone!

Arguably any human activity involves a supply chain of some sort so all militaries since the beginning of warfare have relied on logistics. I can't go into a huge amount of detail in one post and other users have covered the basics, but my MSc dissertation considered three historic case studies (the Longbow, the Brown Bess Musket and the 1915 Shells Crisis) in the context of modern logistic theory. You can find a copy of my dissertation here (redacted for some personal information!). Be warned that it is a logistic study more than it is a historical one so the historical methodology isn't perfect, especially in the area of Feudalism as a form of government.

Essentially I argue that wherever you find a successful campaign, you will find a successful supply chain.

But you would think that logistics is a major part of being a tactician.