For this answer, I'll focus largely on the dangers posed to members of the Royal Artillery, as this is where the majority of my knowledge lies. It is also important to note, that during this period the RA was split into 3 different groups, the Royal Field Artillery, the Royal Horse Artillery, and the Royal Garrison Artillery. However I will use the RA as a collective term for the 3 distinct Regiments.

It is wrong to assume that the RA was an easy posting, it was far from it. Although not suffering the same losses as the Infantry or Cavalry Regiments, throughout the war, the collective RA lost 49,076 members. The RA numbered 548,000 officers and other ranks by 1917, and although this was not the total amount of men that served throughout the war, it suffered roughly 9% of its members killed, with countless more wounded.

Under the German Artillery assaults masterminded by Colonel Georg Bruchmüller, who was a revolutionary Artilleryman who conceived many of the advancements to Artillery theory, many of which are still in use today, The use of gas targeting the British artillery was used extensively along with high explosive rounds onto the enemy guns. Due to the static nature of trench warfare, and the fact that over 50% of the casualties were caused by Artillery, Bruchmüller thought it prudent to target enemy artillery positions in counter battery fire before the infantry assault to neutralise the guns, and prevent losses to his own infantry from enemy counter fire. Bruchmüller's tactics also employed the use of gas in neutralising the enemy, with different tasks for different types of gas, focussing mainly on enemy artillery positions by killing the gunners to neutralise enemy batteries. His use of gas did not stop here, mixing a concoction of lethal, and non-lethal gas, the latter of which penetrated the mask and induced vomiting, forcing the wearer to remove his gas mask and expose himself to the more lethal gas.

However, although the perception of gas is that it killed everything in its wake, this was not the case, out of 186,520 British soldiers exposed to gas attacks, only 5,981 were immediately killed, showing a 3% death rate. These figures however do not account the countless numbers that died due to the effects of gas after the war. Ff we take the 3% as uniform across the board, it shows that the RA lost most If we take in 1917 that the number of deployed soldiers was 4,000,000 and the artillery constituted 548,000 men, the RA made up 13.7% of the British Army's strength. So if we assume that the deaths are uniform are across the board (which they aren't, but I was unable to find reliable figures), then the RA lost 813 men killed as a direct result of gas attacks. Bruchmüller's use of gas was largely focussed on the Artillery positions to neutralise them, so the casualty losses were most likely proportionally higher for the RA. Although many of the men gassed survived, using the Second Battle of Ypres as an example, 60% of the surviving casualties of a gas attack had to be repatriated due to injuries sustained.

If we also look at the total number of military dead, I'll take the Commonwealth Wargraves Commission estimate of 888,246 as my figure, out of the 4,000,000 men at its peak (Once again, unable to find reliable figures for total men served), there was a 22.2% death rate for British Soldiers. As the Artillery number is only 9%, it does show a higher chance of survival in the gunners. Although the rates of Artillery deaths would have increased greatly with the arrival of Bruchmüller on the Western Front in 1917.

This number of casualties in a given sector amplified by the number of guns deployed, in 1917, each British division had 2 RA brigades directly attached to it, with each brigade ranging from between 24-70, guns depending on the calibre of each gun, and roughly 800 men. Therefore per British front line division, there were 1,600 gunners. So in a sector of heavy fighting where divisions were stacked upon each other, more guns would be deployed on either side, meaning casualties would be higher.

Therefore during German assaults, the RA faced the same threats as the Infantry divisions in the trenches, with arguably less cover due to the fact it would be impractical to dig the guns in to a great depth as it would restrict their own guns fields of fire. Although behind the lines, the Artillery were targeted more heavily with gas than the soldiers in the trenches and would face greater challenges in later life, such as scarring on the lungs which led to Tuberculosis, many of these men died before the development of the sulfra drug used for its treatment. It can be said, that due to its extensive targeting by the German Artillery, and the medical problems suffered by many of its soldiers post-war, a life in the RA was not an easy posting at all.

Hopefully this has answered your question, although i've gone off on a tangent a few times, I think i've covered the basics.

Any follow up questions are welcome!

Sources:

Bailey, Jonathan, Field Artillery And Firepower, (Oxford: Military Press, 1989).

Jones, Simon, World War I Gas Warfare Tactics and Equipment, (Oxford: Osprey, 2007).

Zabecki, David T., Steel Wind: Georg Bruchmüller And The Birth Of Modern Artillery, (Westport: Praeger, 1994).

I can't answer the question as comprehensively as I'd like, but I can answer it in a way that applies directly to my current research into Austria-Hungary during the first year of the First World War.

Being an Austro-Hungarian artilleryman was much more dangerous than being a Russian artilleryman.

Now, I know that's a weird way of wording an answer, but I am currently working on a history of a particular Austro-Hungarian (A-H) division at the battle of Komarow, Galicia during the first weeks of the War on the Eastern Front, fought between A-H and Russia.

Russia's artillery corps was much better prepared for the First World War than their Austro-Hungarian counterparts. First of all, their guns were better and there were more of them. Due to meddling by Hungarian politicians during the decades leading up to the First World War, the A-H military establishment was woefully underprepared in terms of technology and equipment. This affected the A-H artillery units especially hard. The massive part played by artillery in the First World War exacerbated this problem and put A-H infantry units at a huge tactical disadvantage.

A-H divisions had fewer guns, (45, compared to 68 in Russian divisions - sorry I'm writing this on the train, and these numbers come from memory, but I can get you exact numbers if you're really interested) and the guns they did have were built from metallurgically inferior bronze-steel rather than straight steel. As a result, A-H guns had shorter effective range and were less accurate than almost every other major Power during the First World War.

On top of this, the relatively modern innovation of adding a crew shield to the front of battlefield guns - was only haphazardly adopted by Austrian artillery units. The best Austrian guns matched up - more or less - with their German and French counterparts, but there were just too few of them. Most Austrian units were outfitted with comparatively weak guns lacking even basic crew protection mechanisms.

Austrian gunners before the war were also - again, due to Hungarian budget restrictions - perennially low on practice rounds with which to hone their battlefield accuracy. Shell shortage plagued every European nation before and during the War, but Austrian gunners got less live-fire practice than those of almost any other Great Power. To add on to this, Austrian battlefield coordination between divisions and their incredibly slow-moving ammunition trains (not locomotives, but rather long columns of horse-drawn wagons) and were thus often several kilometers ahead of the resupply wagons, leaving them short of shells on the battlefield.

Now on to the implementation of artillery on the battlefield. Austro-Hungarian military doctrine was highly offensive-minded. Basically, A-H military doctrine called for cavalry units to scout the enemy and search for his flanks while the infantry engaged in massed frontal assaults aimed at overrunning enemy positions. The popular image of hours-long artillery barrages prior to "going over the top" simply didn't happen on the Austrian side during 1914. Preparatory artillery barrages might last a few minutes, if that.

Sorry for the slight detour. Anyways, Russian gunners were much more adept at preparatory artillery barrages and in-battle anti-infantry fire. However, where they really succeeded is anti-artillery artillery fire. When battle was joined, Russian gunners often concentrated their fire on Austrian artillery positions in an effort to knock them out, at which point they would turn their deadly fire onto the infantrymen charging in tightly-packed skirmishing groups. Thus, in many of the earliest battles between the Russians and Austrians, Austrian gunners would be killed and their guns knocked out of commission very early on in the battles.

The Russian gunners were effective as hell. The Austrians... not so much. Austrian fire often fell short of Russian guns in cases of anti-artillery actions. Their bronze-steel guns couldn't reach Russian positions, whereas Russian guns could quite effectively reach Austrian gun emplacements. Thus to be effective, Austrian gunners had to advance their guns forward on the battlefield, dragging them forward under ever-more-accurate artillery fire from their Russian counterparts.

Anti-infantry fire was also an often haphazard ordeal on the part of the Austrians. Captured Russians in the year 1914 would often report that the Austrian gunners were setting their shrapnel shell fuses wrong, resulting in the anti-infantry shells exploding too high in the air. Russians could usually advance under the Austrians shrapnel, which exploded too high and then fell harmlessly to the ground (as harmlessly as a chunk of shredded metal can fall, that is; obviously many Russians were still killed by Austrian shrapnel). Austrian artillery supply, as mentioned before, was just haphazard all around. In one action at the Battle of Komarow, one Austrian battery realized - during a temporary pause in combat - that they had been firing blank rounds used for training and ceremonial purposes. Blanks!

Sorry if I didn't exactly answer your question straight up. I don't have statistics on Austrian artillerymen deaths but I can elucidate some of the tactical and logistical limitations of the Austrian artillery corps which made it very dangerous to be an Austrian gunner.

Outdated equipment often put Austrian gunners well within effective range of Russian and Serbian gunners; their own guns couldn't reach the enemy and necessitated advancing the guns under withering fire. Very accurate Russian gunners often took advantage of this and killed many an Austrian gunner before battle was even joined in earnest. When the Austrians did manage to open fire, their lack of practice and ever-present supply problems kept them from effectively defending themselves or supporting their infantrymen in attack.

Sources:

Wawro, Geoffrey. A Mad Catastrophe: The Outbreak of World War I and the Collapse of the Habsburg Empire

John Schindler, A Hopeless Struggle: The Austro-Hungarian Army and Total War, 1914-1918

Prit Buttar, Collision of Empires: The War on the Eastern Front in 1914