My lecturer contends that a Total War Economy is one where a state will take total control over a nation's economy and gear it to one goal that of maximising output, efficiency and quality for the purpose of war.
He says that Britain entered this in 1941 with the Battle of Britain but Germany only enters it in 1943 after Stalingrad which is why they lost the war since they could not and didnt have enough output to win against the forces arrayed against them
Adam Tooze argues that Germany could never have won the war due to America's Industrial potential, I don't necessarily agree with that because it was a very close run thing and could've gone either way even as far in as 1942. But he's right in that America's industrial capacity out did Germany by a far margin.
It's important to note however that Germany was severely limited by it's access to raw materials, from Oil to Tungsten the Germans constantly struggled to fight an effective war with what it had. There is no point building tanks and planes if you can't supply the needed fuel, many of Germany's tank losses were due to the lack of fuel which became terminal once Romania flipped to the Allies.
The problem with these claims is that theyre often theorised specifically in a way to prove the point being made. Thus IF Germany did A, B and C differently then maybe XYZ, but only of no one else reacts to XYZ. Mebbe if theyd gone into a 'Total War Economy' in 35 and attacked Russian in 39... etc.. etc. Its not like the Germans were slouching that much in their efforts prior to 43 but, sure, its probable that if theyd tried harder and earlier then maybe a Russian stalemate would have led to a truce, or a victory, or just delayed the inevitable defeat. Any theory which changes one variable but allows for no others is essentially flawed anyway imo.