Theory Thursday | Academic/Professional History Free-for-All

by AutoModerator

Previous weeks!

This week, ending in August 14th, 2014:

Today's thread is for open discussion of:

  • History in the academy

  • Historiographical disputes, debates and rivalries

  • Implications of historical theory both abstractly and in application

  • Philosophy of history

  • And so on

Regular participants in the Thursday threads should just keep doing what they've been doing; newcomers should take notice that this thread is meant for open discussion only of matters like those above, not just anything you like -- we'll have a thread on Friday for that, as usual.

tilsitforthenommage

To what extent does the work from other disciplines like geography or ecology inform your work?

gent2012

I'd like to repost something that I've posted twice before over the last month or so, but haven't gotten any responses. If anyone has seen this before, I apologize and this will be the last time I post it. I've been trying for a while to bounce my ideas around and see what people had to say so would love other peoples' views on the matter.

I'd like to talk about historical inevitability. Particularly, I want to argue that I think it is OK to sometimes speak of certain historical outcomes as inevitable.

When we talk about historical inevitability what we're ultimately talking about is the relationship between people and structures. In the words of William Sewell, Jr. structures are "mutually sustaining cultural schemas and sets of resources that empower and constrain social action and tend to be reproduced by that action." In other words, structures are, to a large extent, the organizing ideas that govern human action.

Historians run into trouble whenever they give too much agency to structures over people. This was the problem with Whig historians who saw history as the inevitable progress of liberalism and capitalism. We've also seen it in more recent decades to describe the inevitability of the Cold War (Communism's inherent expansionist tendencies ensured the Cold War would happen) and the Holocaust (the inherent, virulent form of anti-Semitism in Germany ensured the Holocaust would occur). All of these interpretations, with perhaps an exception for the one regarding the Cold War, are rightly discredited by most historians. The problem with these interpretations is that they give little to no historical agency to people, or put in another way, give way too much importance to contemporary structures.

In response to these historians, I've seen many other historians go in the complete opposite direction, arguing that nothing in history is inevitable or, in other words, that people always have the ability to break free of the contemporary structures that guide their worldview. I think this is an equally dubious intellectual leap to make. While there may be some chance for people to do so, it is highly improbable. (As a sidenote, I will say that I am using inevitability in a loose sense. Obviously, nothing is impossible, although some outcomes are so highly improbable that I believe it is acceptable to still refer to them as impossible). Sometimes, contemporary structures are so prevalent and so ingrained that they can override a person's choices. In this sense, structures can constrain human action and contingent historical actions. I can't think of any historian that would say structures don't play an integral role in history. In some cases, those structures are so strong as to constrain human action to make certain outcomes inevitable or highly likely. This is an argument made by Melvyn Leffler in his book on the Cold War, For the Soul of Mankind. Leffler argues that, although the creation of the Cold War was not inevitable, insecurity and ideology forced the continuation of the Cold War until it ended when it did. Likewise, John Prados has made a similar argument in his recent book, Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945-1975.

To make sure I'm being clear I want to repeat what I tried to say in the previous sentences: Structures can constrain human action and, in some cases, make certain historical outcomes inevitable. I don't believe too many people would actually disagree with this, even though I hear many on this sub-reddit speak about how it is ahistorical to speak of inevitability. To believe that inevitability is ahistorical is directly contrary to another popular line of reasoning on this sub-reddit: that we cannot place contemporary values, or for that matter any other value system, on individuals other than the one in which they lived. Why do we follow this idea? In large part, because we recognize that in many cases historical actors are unable to break free of contemporary structures. These two beliefs then--that historical inevitability is ahistorical and that we cannot displace a historical individual from the value system in which he lived--seem to be paradoxical. We cannot accept that historical inevitability is an invalid concept while at the same time arguing that individuals are unable to step beyond their contemporary structures and worldviews.

How then do we correct the two poles of historical thought--the one that gives too much agency to structures and the other that gives too much agency to human actors? In my opinion, historians must come to use historical frameworks that give a more equitable relationship between structures and human agency, frameworks that, in the words of William Sewell, Jr., understand that "Structures shape people’s practices, but it is also people’s practices that constitute (and reproduce) structures.”

[End copy and pasted part] On a related note, I just recently read an article on post-Cold War international thought in The Global 1989: Change and Continuity in World Politics. The author argued that every type of prominent international theorist of the post-Cold War era--Francis Fukuyama, Charles Krauthammer, Robert Kaplan, Samuel Huntington, Michael Ignatieff, and many more--all employed eurocentric understandings of world affairs to try and comprehend the new world order. Do you believe it is possible for Westerners engaged in any type of international relations to move beyond eurocentric/Orientalist understandings of world affairs?

yodatsracist

Yesterday, there was an interesting question: Did Pagan religions have definite names?. I gave my answer to it here, where I said, basically, just as the original autonym/endonym of most groups before the existence of states was something along the lines of, "the [original] people", "the free ones", "the ones who can speak", "the ones who live in this place", or "the ones who do this one weird thing", most of the religions before contact with Buddhism/Christianity/Islam were just called "the true path" or "our customs" or "the way of our ancestors" or "knowledge of the gods" or things like that. I am confident in that answer, but I was having trouble coming up with specific examples, because I haven't read any early anthropological accounts, early colonial accounts, or ancient primary texts in a while. Do you guys have any examples, or counter-examples (non-esoteric ones--mystery religions of all sorts are obvious counter-examples), from early accounts of the Americas, primary sources from the Ancient Mediterranean/Near East, pre-Christian Scandinavia/Africa/Pacific Islands, etc.?

What did specific groups call their practices before they were taught by Buddhist/Christian/Muslim missionaries that what they were doing was really a "religion" (and a false religion at that)?

gitacritic

Who are the historians of human trafficking? In what sub-discipline of history is it taken care of? How are historical investigations in these areas structured

[deleted]

How difficult is it to study the "Jewish Nakba"? As opposed to the 1948 Nakba?

I'm of the impression that Arab archives are difficult to access, but that Israeli archives are also heavily redacted.

How divided are the present generation of historians on these topics? What books on these subjects would you recommend?