The non-military benefits of the revolt were probably more important than its military accomplishments. When the war broke out the British were extremely concerned that the Ottoman Sultan was using his position as Caliph to declare a holy war against Britain. At the time, Britain was the world's largest "muslim empire," as it were, given the huge population of Muslims in Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Egypt, etc. It was probably highly unlikely but Britain just didn't want to deal with that chance, which goes some of the way to explaining why Britain was willing to sign off on giving so much to Sherif Hussein in the Hussein-McMahon correspondences (the other part being that they just weren't really paying much attention, the negotiations were extremely disorganized.)

Militarily the revolt failed in some of its key objectives. It didn't kick off the huge feeling of Arab nationalism that had been hoped (although there is some debate about this, but the general consensus is that it just didn't happen,) and at war's end most of the Arab population of Syria had remained pro-Ottoman throughout. Moreover huge numbers were tied up in the siege of Medina, where the Turkish garrison held out until January 1919.

It's accomplishments, while real, have nonetheless been embellished by films like Lawrence of Arabia. There were no "12 inch guns at Aqaba" that the film continuously drones on about.

The key development in the Middle Eastern campaign, which had been in a quite bloody stalemate, was the capture of Beersheba and then Gaza. The Arab revolt contributed to British success in those battles but it's hard to see their contribution as decisive given how small the numbers were.

I think the case can be made that the real importance of Lawrence comes after the war where Lawrence was integral to the establishment of the successor states to the Ottoman empire, and particularly in getting Faisal and Abdullah the thrones of Iraq and Transjordan, respectively. He, along with a couple other key British advisers like Gertrude Bell and Percy Cox were instrumental in this "Sherifian Solution" to the Iraq problem, that is, granting Iraq to Faisal as a way for the British to extricate themselves.

The Arab revolt was also brought up at the peace conference as evidence that Arab desires ought to be met as a reward for their war contribution as well as in evidence to what kind of fighting force might be raised if if those wishes were not granted. Wilson stressed this point, and it led to the creation of the King Crane Commission, which is quite interesting for a whole lot of reasons, but basically nothing came of it and France and Britain did what they pleased regardless.