From what I read Caesar brought 2-3 legions with him on his way to Britain, and that it was more of a successful political stunt. I mean he only went up to the Thames river, won a battle and then went back to Gaul, to gain popularity with the citizens of Rome. So as some of my friends summarize Caesar's conquest, "looky looky where I am, I'm a roman in a spooky land." Also please tell me if I'm missing anything from the actual conquest or if I took a simplistic view of it. Because it seems like it's not an actual invasion or conquest.
Edit:thank you for your great responses.
He never attempted a full invasion, it was more of a punitive expedition to punish the Britons for raiding and harboring Belgic raiders. His first landing at Dover was almost a disaster, but they still made it ashore and won the battle. However, while he was in Britian rebellions broke out in Gaul (which was the province he was actually supposed to govern.) and he was forced to return to the continent.
It is obviously more complicated than this but if you are interested check out http://thebritishhistorypodcast.com/?cat=4 episodes 3, 4, and 5.
Who considers it a massive failure? It wasn't his intention to occupy the entire of Britain.
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0001%3Abook%3D4%3Achapter%3D20
in almost all the wars with the Gauls succors had been furnished to our enemy from that country
nor what harbors were convenient for a great number of large ships.
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0001%3Abook%3D4%3Achapter%3D21
Having given them an audience, he after promising liberally, and exhorting them to continue in that purpose, sends them back to their own country, and [dispatches] with them Commius, whom, upon subduing the Atrebates, he had created king there, a man whose courage and conduct he esteemed, and who he thought would be faithful to him, and whose influence ranked highly in those countries.
This paints a picture of the reasons for Caesar's invasion.
Before the invasion he sent out friendly celts to treat with various tribes and find allies. The first invasion revealed problems with the ships used to transport troops. The second invasion was a success, allowing an army to besiege a hill fort and influence the Trinovantes.
Is it considered a "massive failure"? I must say I've never read or even heard anything remotely close to that.
He went to Britannia twice and I don't think that either the first or the second crossing could be considered a conquest. I feel that the first crossing was a show of force, yes, but an expedition more than anything else, while the second crossing was purely a show of force. I'll expand on the two crossings and you can come to your own conclusions, though I think you're pretty much spot on with the "political stunt" interpretation.
He crossed the channel in 55 BC with two legions; Legio VII and his favored Legio X. The crossing of the channel was rough but the Romans made it. The landing, however, did not go unopposed. Also, as the Roman vessels were designed for deep water operations, with a substantial part of their hull beneath the waterline, they couldn't take the troops all the way to the beach, so the legionaries were forced to stagger towards the shore all the while being struck by neck-high waves and British arrows. Once the bulk of the legionaries managed to get their footing on dry ground, they counterattacked and drove the Britanni away from the beachhead. Having narrowly escaped a rout, Caesar claimed victory.
The Romans held their beachhead but never marched inland in force. Even Caesar acknowledged that his men were at a disadvantage in combat against the mounted Britanni in the wooded hills of Cantium. As the weather worsened Caesar decided that lingering in Britannia without adequate provisions was an untenable position. And although he withdrew, he had done so on his own terms without suffering a defeat. Thus he was able to spin his campaign as a victory.
During the winter, Caesar was plotting to return to Britannia in 54 BC, and was examining all the things he had done wrong so he could do them right this time around. This time he'd use the shallow draft boats that could get all the way up to the shore, and instead of the expeditionary force of two legions, this time he'd land in force, with five legions. Despite the size of force, this was not to be a precursor to Caesar's long-range ideas about a permanent Roman presence in Britannia. As had been the case the year before, Caesar's purpose was a show of force to demonstrate Roman military power.
This time the landing was unopposed and Caesar moved quickly. He left a few cohorts to defend the fleet and marched the remainder of his men inland. There were occasional skirmishes but the Romans pressed on. They reached the Thames upriver from its mouth at a place where it was broad and difficult to cross. Numerous enemy forces were marshaled on the other bank of the river and although the Thames was shoulder deep, Caesar ordered an immediate attack. The speed of the crossing apparently caught the Britanni off guard and compelled them to retreat en masse into the woods. Now that he was into the heartland of Cassivellaunus, he knew that he could do more damage by laying waste to the fields and by burning the villages of the Britanni rather than chasing the Britanni into the woods where the looming threat of an ambush is omnipresent. The process of scorching enemy land did not often win friends, but in Caesar's experience it often neutralized foes.
Many of the Britonni tribes surrendered in short order. Those who did not, attempted a desperate last strike against the Roman base camp at the beachhead but they lost. Now even the most rebellious of tribes reluctantly surrendered. Caesar never set foot in Britannia again. Even though he may have imagined a permanent Roman presence in Britannia, his strategic reasoning clearly involved the greater glory of Rome.
I guess you could call his first incursion of Britannia a failure if you wanted to but I think the second was definitely a success. I hope this helped.
His crossings were extremely poorly planned, he badly misunderstood the political situations, and although he could defeat the Britons in the field his army was always two steps away from starvation because he never managed to secure his supply lines.