"The regulars of the British staff entertained an implicit contempt for the rapidly trained new men of "Kitchener's Army", largely recruited among workingmen from the Midlands. The planners assumed that these troops - burdened for the assault with 66 pounds of equipment - were too simple and animal to cross the space between the opposing trenches in any way except in full daylight and aligned in rows or "waves". It was felt that the troops would become confused by more subtle tactics like rushing from cover to cover, or assault-firing, or following close upon a continuous creeping barrage"
From "The Great War and Modern Memory" by Paul Fussell
The particular quote was about the Somme offensive particularly the first attack by British forces where many thousands died (he then spends the next few pages blaming Haig about his lack of imagination and his part in the slaughter).
EDIT: Spelling
Well I'm taking some issue with his wording and, as you mention, he clearly is biased toward the "Lions led by Donkeys" perspective but it is overall true. 66 pounds is about right but not particularly heavy; modern soldiers carry 90-100 pounds of gear into combat pretty consistently to give you some perspective.
It is also true that this was the first real combat Britain's first conscript army, Kitchner's "New Army", would see and thus were put in semi-close order formation. This was done not necessary because they were seen as "simple" or "animal", that's a poor choice of words in my opinion and loaded with bias. They were inexperienced and lacked decades of training and years of combat experience that many Regulars had. It's not that they were stupid but an inexperienced man can not be trusted to, on his own whim and never really seeing combat before, to move with a purpose and perform his duties on his own in a complicated maneuver such as assault-firing (small squads supporting each others advance in tandem) or staying just a few yards behind the area of effect of a creeping barrage all whilst under heavy machine gun fire.
It's hard to keep a level head in that situation for anyone, especially some conscript who was in his first offensive ever. So they were put in a formation that was not line formation or shoulder to shoulder by any means, they duck waned and weaved and had space, but were kept close so a combat experienced officer could keep a reign on them. While advancing on an enemy position is a deadly prospect sitting still and cowering or getting too scared to leave a ditch is more likely to kill you and lead to failure of the mission than pushing onward. So by keeping everyone together the men motivate each other and can be kept at least partly organized and pushing forward.
So yes it's generally true but, you need to remember, Paul Fussell is not a military historian but a literary one. That's not to discount his work as he is a genius and I have read his work but he is more focused on the perceptions of the war and the way that those perceptions shaped the world. His argument in that book is that the modern era began not in 1900 but July 1st 1916 as the death and shock of the first day on the Somme knocked 'some sense' into us about the realities of war and death, etc. That's certainly true and the perceptions of the men at the time was certainly that.
However I do feel obligated in the year 2014, 98 years later, to give a narrative which is not based on perception but with a sense of emotional detachment. Haig was not lacking imagination, he was not a "butcher" or sending men stupidly into senseless slaughter as Fussell will accuse; the Somme was easily a victory and the only option for the British to win the war. Haig shouldn't get punished for "the slaughter" because he was doing what literally every other General on the Western Front was doing, attrition was the only option and it was a strategy in which the Entente had the upper hand on. Trying to fight a decisive war of maneuver would only lead to more deaths and ultimate failure. I don't recall if Fussell goes over the numbers in depth but while the 60,000 casualties (20,000 dead + 40,000 injured or captured) is cited for the first day of the battle it would ultimately last five months. It leveled out over time and ultimately the British would have less dead than the Germans; even if you include the total commonwealth soldiers. They did, ultimately, perform the objective of saving the French at Verdun and causing two major losses in one year for the Germans. It did capture the most land since September 1914 and it did cause the German to withdrawal even more miles in just a few months as well.
I do not share any love for Haig though as I think if we want to criticize him for anything it should be Passchendaele as that was an egregious failure and completely his responsibility. It just confuses me why people look at the Somme, the battle that in my opinion spelled the end for the Germans and was Haig's greatest victory, as an example of Haig's "lack of imagination" or as his ultimate failure. While the perception of the men is certainly a critical component to history and their (and the worlds) response to the mass death can't be understudied or understated enough, perception is divided from reality in this example. It's a cold, hard and unfortunate truth that this was a war of attrition. However, the British had to maintain an offensive doctrine (as I go more into here if you are interested), as did the French as their country was being invaded. So the even more unfortunate truth was that the British and French had to be the ones attacking in the war of attrition while the Germans could generally sit back in their, generally, much better off defensive positions as they were the invaders and thus had the luxury of choosing where to dig in and generally took things like hilltops and such.
So yes it's true but in my opinion loaded. He is a literary historian however and discussing perceptions of the war so that is to be expected. You should definitely not view him as "wrong" by the end of this though. He is not for what he is discussing, but the perception of the men must be separated from the realities of the military doctrine and the "lines on the map" in my opinion.
The First Day on the Somme, Martin Middlebrooks
Tommy: The British Soldier on the Western Front, Richard Holmes
