Ehh...even by 1991 the Coalition was willing to take Saddam and his military seriously (Schwarzkopf was never one to underestimate an enemy), if only so that operations conducted against them would not be taken lightly.

With the benefit of hindsight however, Saddam's regime and the military that propped him up are more akin to a musical-comedy. The issue with the idea of the Baathist regime becoming 'hegemonic' runs immediately into the practical example of the Iran-Iraq war; two similarly equipped and motivated Middle-Eastern militaries meet, months of stalemate, offensive and counter-offensive ensue. Both sides fight to exhaustion...slink away, and both sides declare victory!

What's the point here? Nothing changed, it was for all intent's and purposes, status quo ante bellum. Food for thought: If the Baathist party couldn't overcome Iranian resistance, how plausible is it that they could overcome resistance of equally 'militarized' middle Eastern nations, especially ones that were/are equipped to Western standards due to political necessity (e.g: Saudi Arabia)? This is, of course, discounting any foreign aid that may have immediately come about (again, practically speaking, when Iraq invaded Kuwait) from political allies.