I have recently completed a bachelor's degree in philosophy from the University of Alberta, with a focus on the history of epistemology and the philosophy of science. If I were to teach a class on philosophy of science, this is what the general structure would look like. I've tried to organize it into some degree of chronological or historical order. Note that most of what follows is from the tradition of Analytic Philosophy. If someone who specializes in other branches of philosophy would like to chime in on the areas I'm less familiar with, that would of course be appreciated.

Foundationalism vs Coherentism

Foundationalism is the idea that knowledge is linear. It is discovered in a specific logical sequence. There is some starting knowledge that forms the basis for all other knowledge. Metaphorically, knowledge is like a building. For Descartes, that which cannot be doubted ("I think therefore I am.") comprises the cornerstones, and all other knowledge, including science, is built on top of that.

We can contrast this with coherentism. For a coherentist, knowledge is metaphorically like a raft; the raft functions because the pieces support each other. There is no one indisputable truth upon which all else rests. Rather, each belief is judged by whether or not it coheres to the larger set.

• Suggested reading: René Descartes - Meditations on First Philosophy

The Problem of Induction

To what extent is science inductive? Science seems to use empirical evidence to formulate general rules about the nature or the world. However, David Hume proposed a problem with the very nature of induction: that it can only be justified circularly. Induction is the belief that future events will resemble past events, and that causal relationships will function the same way in the future as they have in the past. How do we justify the validity of induction itself, though? The only way seems to be to say that we know that induction leads to knowledge because it has led to knowledge in the past. This is, however, itself an appeal to induction, and thus a circular argument. At this point, Hume shrugs, and says we use induction because it is in our nature to do so. In any case, what is really the alternative?

• Suggested reading: David Hume - An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

Preconditions for the Possiblity of Knowledge

Immanuel Kant argued that there are certain beliefs or concepts about the world that precede empirical investigation. These include the concepts of space and time. These are not a priori true per se; rather, Kant argues, we cannot conceptualize the world in any other way, and thus these ideas are preconditions for any and all science. An even stronger position would be to say that these are actually even preconditions for the possibility of experience; it is actually impossible to have sensory perceptions that violate the preconditions. We can criticize this position by pointing out that the specific ideas of space and time that Kant perceived as being preconditions for the possibility of experience are actually inconsistent with modern ideas of relativity in physics.

• Suggested reading: Immanuel Kant - Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics

Realism vs Instrumentalism

What is the goal of science? A realist would argue that science discovers real truths about the world. By contrast, an instrumentalist would argue that science merely provides a best fit model and that it doesn't matter whether or not it provides truth. The only thing that matters is whether or not a given scientific theory is a useful tool (for tasks such as engineering or medicine, for example).

Falsifiability

Karl Popper used falsifiability to address two topics: the demarcation between science and pseudoscience and the problem of induction. Popper asserted that the origin of a scientific theory does not matter (whether it comes from induction, mythology or a dream). Science proceeds by process of elimination of false theories rather than by seeking proof for a given theory. Thus, science is essentially a deductive process (via reductio ad absurdum) rather than an inductive process. Theories that pass multiple attempts to prove them wrong are deemed more scientifically valid (until they fail one such test). However, theories which are not capable of being submitted to falsification tests are deemed pseudoscience--we have no way of knowing whether or not they are true. An example would be the idea that Satan is responsible for putting dinosaur bones in the ground to deceive us. There is literally no way for us to know if this is true or not, so it is deemed pseudoscience.

• Suggested reading: Karl Popper - The Logic of Scientific Discovery

Verificationism

Verificationism is the idea that meaning in language and logic comes from reference to sensory perception. If a given word doesn't correspond to a sensory impression, then it has no meaning. Thus, we must phrase scientific claims in a way that can be reduced to sensory verification conditions. Another way of saying this is that a claim is only meaningful if it can be described the product of an empirical test. Many verificationists apply this principle to all knowledge. This perspective is criticized because the idea of verificationism itself cannot be reduced to verification conditions. Wittgenstein might say that at this point we must 'throw away the ladder after having climbed up,' and realize that verificationism is a reductio ad absurdum on the enterprise of philosophy of science. At that point, the only thing to do is just do science. Note that Wittgenstein was totally nuts, like actually a crazy person, though. If you want to learn more, research the terms "Logical Positivism" or the "Vienna Circle."

• Suggested reading: Ludwig Wittgenstein - Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

• Suggested reading: Rudolf Carnap - The Logical Syntax of Language

Paradigm Shifts and the Sociology of Science

The basic idea is using science to study science. It's an empirical investigation of how science works as a sociological phenomenon. Kuhn argued that paradigm shifts occur in science when the older generation of scientists die away and the younger generation accepts the new paradigm. This process is causal, psychological and sociological. Science may well discover truth, but the process is fundamentally nothing more than the causal interaction of the physical molecules in scientists' brains.

• Suggested reading: Thomas Kuhn - The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

Clarity would be appreciated as to what your focus is with regard to historical research and the philosophy of science. Are you looking for information on how contemporary histories of science are constructed - structurally, methodologically? Or are you attempting to do a historiographic survey of science (more plainly, history about the writings of science through time)? Or might you simply be looking for secondary materials on the history of the philosophy of science?

Or is the assignment on the history of research?

If you can't tell, I'm a bit perplexed as to what exactly you are looking for.