Edit. Yes there is a spelling mistake in the title.
To sum it up, would previous battle experience have a significant impact on the risk of becoming a casualty? I distinctly remember someone talking about how the existences of "aces" in the air force was due to the massive importance of the experience gained after surviving just a few missions. I can see how that would be the case in a dog-fighting scenario since that would be very reliant on personal skill rather than other factors.
But as infantry on the ground, I have a much harder time seeing how it would matter that much. Where casualties are mostly from artillery, bombing or machine-gun fire the element of chance seems very high. And while I can see how a unit with long battle experience might have a significantly higher success rate in combat, would it boil down to the individual squad member?
You might find this 1947 speech by Kurt Hahn, a German educator who believed in experiential learning, to be of interest.
http://www.kurthahn.org/writings/train.pdf
One of the things Hahn touches on is how veteran sailors were much more likely to survive at sea if their ships were sunk than fresh recruits, even if the younger men were more physically robust. Hahn believed that all boys should receive an education in sailing, mountaineering, etc., to teach them how to withstand adversity. He says:
"At the beginning of this war we experienced a remarkable change in the young. Every ounce of their human strength was claimed; the light of enterprise and daring was lit in their faces, and some of these young soldiers confessed to me that they felt a great release from their former existence, “which hardly could be called life.” I refuse to arrange a world war in every generation to rescue the young from a depressing peace. Let us rather plan their life at school so that they can discover and test their hidden powers."
"Education has no nobler tasks than to provide “the moral equivalent to war,” as L.P. Jacks has told us 25 years ago. That this task can be fulfilled nobody will doubt who has seen the triumph of mastery in a boy’s face when he is conquering adversities on a sailing or mountaineering expedition. The present Headmaster of Eton has called such victories “conquests without the humiliation of the conquered.”"
Sorry I can't provide statistical evidence, but your question immediately reminded me of Hahn and figured you might find it of interest.
Mark Urban's book The Tank War (Abacus, 2014) details the exploits of the 5th Royal Tank Regiment (5 RTR), who served from the fall of France in 1940, through North Africa as part of Monty's Desert Rats, then to Italy and finally D-Day and the war in Europe.
On June 11th 1944, 5 RTR, who were at this point regarded as a veteran force, took part in an assault on the German occupied town of Tilly-sur-Seulles, supported by the infantry of the 2nd Essex Regiment, who were for the most part green troops, led by fairly inexperienced officers.
A quote from the book (by an unnamed NCO of 5 RTR):
They appeared to be very new, and too spick and span for the work in hand, but knowing what had happened in the previous attack on the woods, we were surprised and shocked to see them lined up as if on the square, and as we began the cover fire they started to walk slowly forward, upright, towards the woods with their rifles 'at the port'. In a few minutes the line was massacred, those who had not been hit fell back against us.
The author elaborates that there were concealed, dug-in firing positions in the aforementioned wood, as well as Flammpanzer flamethrower tanks. Despite knowing these circumstances, the CO of 2nd Essex ordered them in, sustaining 200 casualties by the end of the day.
On the other hand, 5 RTR, which had experienced the tug-of-war in North Africa against Rommel's Afrika Korps, had over time become a more cautious and deliberate force, with a strong and experienced cadre of NCOs to guide, and in some cases, overcome inexperienced officers newly assigned to the regiment. The author mentions that this may have been interpreted as a reluctance to take risks as the end of the war approached.
At the battle of Villers-Bocage some days later - where tanks from 5 RTR and other elements of the 22nd Armored Brigage encountered several Tigers from the 101st SS Heavy Tank Battalion (of which Michael Wittman was a member) - a Sherman Firefly commander observed that "...there was a bit of flapping all round and sad to say one or two even bailed out without being fired upon or firing a shot themselves." In fact four Cromwell tanks were abandoned undamaged by less experienced commanders and troops. (Incidentally Tiger Fear appears to have been a very real thing.)
While this may have been an isolated case due to the focus of the book, it's my opinion that newer units may have been more willing to execute orders directly which more experienced ones would have undertaken with more caution and deliberation. This is especially so for units with a strong and experienced core of officers and NCOs, who may have been better able to read the tide of battle and take initiative where necessary.
Given enough soldiers in a long enough war, statistically speaking you are bound to have veteran survivors. My hunch is that the number of deaths relative to time would follow the normal distribution.