You would be working closely with the Gallic peoples who lived near or in the Alps. Hannibal's plan was to get those peoples on his side and start a revolt in the north of Italy so it makes sense that he also used them for intelligence.

You probably were part of a group that was in charge of communicating with Gauls. You could be a Celtiberian from Spain who maybe knew some Gallic, a Greek from Spain or southern France who got Shangheied for your ability to communicate with the Gauls (or one of the two Greek historians Hannibal had with him at all times), or a Carthaginian officer. At any rate you were probably relying on a group of foreign people for information and you needed a way to communicate with them.

You probably traveled on horse and communicated often with Hannibal by sending riders. Hannibal marched so quickly through Gaul that he must have known his route ahead of time, but getting through the Alps was a different story and that's why making connections in Gaul was important. That's where you came in.

You probably got paid no different than any other soldier of your rank, and that was basically enough to keep you alive. Hannibal's army had a lot of mercenaries (most Carthaginian armies did) so you might have been promised a certain amount of money, but if you were Carthaginian you served more for duty than pay. Hannibal was chronically underfunded, so your payments were usually in arrears but at the start of the campaign Hannibal probably had enough to keep you happy. The only concrete thing I know about Carthaginian mercenaries is that they were paid in silver. This means that their payments could cover quite a bit of their needs, but I do not know how often or how much silver they were paid.

Edit: I imagine that Hannibal's army was essentially led through the Alps by someone who was quite familiar with them. The issue being that this Gaul wasn't used to leading a giant army through the mountains. This person or group probably made an agreement for compensation or perhaps they were coerced, especially considering that the time of year was not great for crossing the Alps (Hannibal got caught in snow a couple of times). Hannibal probably tried offering protection from the Romans like he offered to the peoples of Italy. This promise worked for some groups but other groups attacked him.

I just want to point out that we don't have any Carthaginian records or primary evidence for any of this, and anything that is said about this level of detail is really just speculation. For example, it is an assumption that Hannibal 'employed' 'military scouts' at all. What if he had some friendly Greek traders from Massilia who knew the area? What is he captured and tortured local Gauls for route intelligence? What if he proceeded with no more than the usual cavalry foraging parties - the passes over the Alps were pretty well known by this point, so maybe he didn't need anybody to tell him which way to go.

There are a few hints in Polybius as to how Hannibal gathered local intelligence (from LacusCurtius):

Book 3, Chapter 42

Hannibal, on reaching the neighbourhood of the river, at once set about attempting to cross it where the stream is single at a distance of about four days' march from the sea.**Doing his best to make friends with the inhabitants of the bank,**he bought up all their canoes and boats, amounting to a considerable number, since many of the people on the banks of the Rhone engage in maritime traffic. He also got from them the logs suitable for making the canoes, so that in two days he had an innumerable quantity of ferry-boats, every one doing his best to dispense with any assistance and relying on himself for his chance of getting across. In the meantime a large force of barbarians had gathered on the opposite bank to prevent the Carthaginians from crossing. Hannibal observing this and concluding that as things stood it was neither possible to force a crossing in face of such a strong hostile force nor to put it off, lest he should find himself attacked on all sides, sent off on the third night after his arrival a portion of his army, giving them native guides and placing them under the command of Hanno, the son of Bomilcar the Suffete.

Book 3, Chapter 44

Next morning, hearing that the Roman fleet was anchored off the mouths of the Rhone, he selected five hundred of his Numidian horse and sent them off to observe the whereabouts and number of the enemy and what they were about...What encouraged the soldiers most in their address was firstly the actual and visible presence of those Gauls who were inviting them to Italy and promising to join them in the war against Rome, and secondly the reliance they placed on their promise to guide them by a route which would take them without their being exposed to any privations, rapidly and safely to Italy.

Book 3 Chapter 48

For in the first place can we imagine a more imprudent general or a more incompetent leader than Hannibal would have been, if with so large an army under his command and all his hopes of ultimate success resting on it, he did not know the roads and the country, as these writers say, and had absolutely no idea where he was marching or against whom, or in fact if his enterprise were feasible or not? What they would have us believe is that Hannibal, who had met with no check to diminish his high hopes of success, ventured on a course that no general, even after a crushing defeat and utterly at his wits' end, would take, to march, that is, into a country as to which he had no information. Similarly, in what they say about the loneliness, and the extreme steepness and difficulty of the road, the falsehood is manifest. For they never took the trouble to learn that the Celts who live near the Rhone not on one or on two occasions only before Hannibal's arrival but often, and not at any remote date but quite recently, had crossed the Alps with large armies and met the Romans in the field side by side with the Celts who inhabit the plain of the Po (as I narrated in an earlier Book) nor are they aware that there is a considerable population in the Alps themselves; but in entire ignorance of all this they tell us that some hero appeared and showed the road. The natural consequence is that they get into the same difficulties as tragic dramatists all of whom, to bring their dramas to a close, require a deus ex machina, as the data they choose on which to found their plots are false and contrary to reasonable probability. These writers are necessarily in the same spirit and invent apparitions of heroes and gods, since the beginnings on which they build are false and improbable; for how is it possible to finish conformably to reason what has been begun in defiance of it? Of course Hannibal did not act as these writers describe, but conducted his plans with sound practical sense. He had ascertained by careful inquiry the richness of the country into which he proposed to descend and the aversion of the people to the Romans, and for the difficulties of the route he employed as guides and pioneers natives of the country, who were about to take part in his adventure. On these points I can speak with some confidence as I have inquired about the circumstances from men present on the occasion and have personally inspected the country and made the passage of the Alps to learn for myself and see.

Sorry for the wall of text, but I want to make the point that while Polybius makes it clear that Hannibal did takes measures to gather intelligence, he doesn't describe exactly how this happened or how much was paid - these kind of minute details hardly ever appear in the sources. And it is always an error to project modern notions of specialized military rank and unit organisation on ancient armies. There was almost certainly no such thing as a professional military scout who performed only that role - the Numidian cavalry mentioned would do scouting, foraging, fighting and anything else as occasion demanded.