Consider the following selections from Osprey's book on The Battle of Pharsalus:

Caesar made his own luck. Lucan observed that he was 'successful always in his use of headlong speed of warfare'. Indeed, his trademarks were celeritas (speed) and improvisum (surprise). No matter what the scenario, his first impulse was always to strike immediately with what forces he had available, appearing where and when he was least expected and counting on the psychological shock generated by his actions to compensate for his own deficiencies in numbers and organization by upsetting the calculated timetables of his enemies. Having thereby evened the odds, he counted on the superiority of both the men under his command and his own inspired leadership to carry the day in battle.

This consuming self-confidence endowed Caesar with an extraordinary charisma which by itself could achieve prodigies. It was Caesar's only weapon against a republican naval commander who caught him dead in the water while crossing the Hellespont in pursuit of Pompey. As fearless as he was defenceless, Caesar demanded the man's surrender, and he promptly handed over his ships. And Caesar was a master of psychological ploys that could inspire his own men as well as intimidate the enemy, from rallying his beaten army after Dyrrachium to facing down two mutinies so effectively the perpetrators begged to be allowed back into his service.

Appian summed up both the great strength and the enduring vulnerability of Caesar's mode of warfare: 'he always exploited the dismay caused by his speed of execution and the fear engendered by his daring, rather than any strength created by his preparations.' Caesar never seems to have allowed issues like bottlenecks in supply chains, tenuous lines of communications, or any other issues related to logistics inhibit his decision-making at any point. As such he was a product of his era; his unique brand of instinctive genius would be impossible to replicate today because a Roman army could meet its essential provisioning, transportation and materiel needs by living off the land.

These quotations effectively summarise my own feelings on Caesar as a general. On a tactical level he was aggressive, ingenius, confidant, and above all effective at winning. This is demonstrated by has military track record. The post you linked to points to his headlong approach as being negative but who ended up coming out on top between Caesar and Pompey? If taking an outnumbered army against an opponant and coming out victorious is a fault, than both Rommel and Henry V are bad generals. I cannot imagine a person reading through an account of Alesia and not finding themselves impressed at Caesar's tactical skill. He was also an extremely capable politician, which has always been an important quality in a general, but was particularly so in the late Republic, when generals were for all intents and purposes the ones responsible for going to the Senate and making sure the soldiers under their command got the land grants they were promised (this in turn led to soldiers' loyalty's being tied to their general, rather than Rome). As the quotes indicate, Caesar may not have been as effective on the strategic and logistical level as he was on the tactical and political. However, no general is perfect, and I think if you put his skills and faults on a scale the weights will slide him to the level of the greatest generals.