I'm not aware of any serious military historian who would contend that dive bombers were ineffective at Midway, or that they were only effective because of mitigating circumstances, at least today. That may well have been the case in the past, such as the 1950's articles referenced by your links, but I'm quite younger than that and haven't come across any. Nowadays, one of the authoritative accounts of the battle is Shattered Sword by Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully, and the author of the first article seems to have read it and seems to be rightly expounding its virtues. However, the articles you have linked to seem to be written by people with some large chips on their shoulders and invested in inter-service and infra-service rivalries.

As for your question, I can't comment on "black shoe" or "brown shoe" admirals; I'm not in the military and don't know enough about what goes on or went on behind the scenes in the command organization. I can't tell you why there would be such contention, or even if it exists or existed at all. I can, however, talk about dive bombing at Midway, and put in context of dive bombing and torpedo bombing throughout the course of the war.

"All four Japanese carriers were sunk by dive bombers from the Enterprise and Yorktown"

Absolutely true.

The final attack on the fourth carrier (Hiryu) was undertaken by only 25 dive-bombers without escort and intercepted at high altitude by the Japanese air patrol before and during their dives (challenging the common theory that the torpedo planes distracted the CAP fighters by pulling them to sea level)

True again, although it seems to be a bit of a straw man being set up. The CAP distraction misconceptions I've heard of refer to the first dive-bomb attack on the Japanese fleet (the sinkings of the Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu). There were no torpedo aircraft present during the attack on the Hiryu late in the day, so it's kind of hard to have a misconception that the CAP were distracted.

The Hornet’s squadrons of fighter planes, dive bombers, and torpedo planes inflicted no damage while taking heavy losses

Yes, the Hornet's attack squadrons had a terrible time during the battle. However, this applies to both dive bomber and torpedo squadrons, so I'm not sure how it's relevant. The dive bomber squadrons did not rendezvous correctly and missed their targets, several of them ditching when they ran out of fuel, while the torpedo squadrons were famously massacred. This adds nothing to the debate over the effectiveness of dive bombing.

At the time of the Battle of Midway, in June 1942, American torpedoes were extremely unreliable, both the models in aircraft and those in submarines. Problems included faults in depth keeping, an insistence on using flawed magnetic detonators, and fragile impact detonators that would snap rather than trigger upon striking the target. The Germans had their own torpedo crisis during the first year of the war as well. Also, the standard American torpedo bomber during the battle, the TBD Devastator, was obsolete and being replaced by the TBM Avenger. (Although a small force of Avenger torpedo bombers were also mauled by Japanese fighters during the battle, though we will get into that later).

One of the most important things to realize is that dive bombing and torpedo bombing are most effective against different targets, and in different roles. Dive bombing was much more precise, reliable, and accurate than torpedo bombing, as well as being safer because of the higher altitude of attack. Flying torpedo bombers at low altitude, unescorted, against modern fighter opposition is always dangerous; dive bomber pilots at higher altitudes had a lower chance of being intercepted, as well as more options once under attack. However, the types of damage their weapons cause is drastically different. Torpedoes blow large holes underwater, often bypassing armor, and can easily sink or cripple even armored vessels. Bombs don't have much penetrative force behind them, and are most effective against unarmored targets. The Japanese carries at Midway were the perfect targets for dive-bombers; relatively unarmored, full of flammable aviation gasoline and ammunition stores. It is important to note that none of the Japanese carriers sank directly because of the dive bomber attacks; rather, the secondary explosions and fires reduced them to smoldering, burning (but still floating) wrecks, and they were scuttled. Compare this to the sinking of the heavily armored Yamato in April 1945, at a time when American torpedoes were reliable. It was the cumulative effects of torpedo hits that caused the vessel to sink, not the relatively superficial damage inflicted by dive bombers. Different aircraft fill different roles; the real lesson of Midway was not to send unescorted torpedo aircraft straight into the teeth of massed fighter opposition, not that torpedo bombing was useless, and that dive bombers attacking carriers could cause substantial damage, especially when surprising defenses.

If you are still in doubt, just look at the attacks on the American carriers at Midway. Japanese dive bombers scored the first hits on the Yorktown, causing substantial damage (again, carriers are light targets and are especially vulnerable to bombing), but it was the subsequent two hits by torpedoes that were truly crippling, and almost sank the ship outright. This torpedo attack did rely on a bit of luck to get through, but the Japanese torpedoes were excellent and very functional, and it shows the value of a well delivered torpedo attack.

Ultimately, the American success at Midway should be divied up between excellent signals intelligence and scouting practices, very competently executed dive-bombing attacks against very unorganized Japanese defenses, and a little bit of good fortune. Lots of credit should go to the dive-bomber attacks, but it is much too simplistic to say that the VB and VS squadrons represented the pinnacle of WW2 naval aviation and were the ultimate weapons of the carrier force.