Was the Soviet's rise to power a complete loss for the Russian Upper Class, or were there some wealthy people who benefited from it, either from inside or outside Russia?
On an individual level, this is obviously hard to quantify. Some notable Old Bolsheviks did have ancien regime backgrounds (eg, Litvinov was from a family of bankers, Kollontai and Dzerzhinsky were of the nobility) but these were hardly typical of the Soviet movement or the Bolshevik party. When it comes to individuals there are always exceptions that prove the rule.
But, on a broader level, the Russian Revolution should disprove the idea of revolution as "an upper class affair": 1917 did see the destruction of the old elites as classes. While there was some continuity (see below), between the October Revolution and subsequent civil war I can't think of any significant grouping of the old elite that emerged with its position enhanced. The landowning class was largely stripped of its estates, the nobility formally abolished as an estate and the wave of nationalisations of 1918 (something driven from below) severely restricted the urban bourgeoisie.
It's safe to say that of the 500,000-3,000,000 Russians who emigrated during the course of the revolution and civil war, a substantial percentage was members of the old elite. Those that remained were classified as lishenets, disenfranchised and subject to persecution and discrimination. All of which contrasts to their position of privilege during the Tsarist years.
That said, there was significant continuity and, while they didn't thrive, substantial sections of the old ruling class did survive under the new Soviet regime. While the old estates were almost entirely abolished, a decent percentage of former landowners (approx 12% by one estimate) remained on part of their estate until well into the mid-1920s. Similarly, in both the state and industry 'bourgeois specialists' provided the Soviet government with much needed skills; ex-nobles and engineers were able carve out areas of influence and power within the state. Indeed, as late as 1933, despite strenuous efforts to promote workers into positions of authority, only 30% of leading soviet officials were former workers. Now, not all of the remaining 70% would have been pre-revolution bureaucrats but certainly they would have comprised a significant chunk of this.
This was even more pronounced in the Red Army. Despite the officer class providing the backbone of the resistance to Soviet power, and initial revolutionary fervour, it's been argued that 30% of those who were officers on the eve of the October Revolution eventually joined the Soviets (with 40% fighting for the Whites). Many of these were 'national Bolsheviks', like Brusilov, who joined not out of sympathy for Bolshevik ideals but out of a base patriotism. Similarly, the academic establishment (almost uniformly pro-White) managed to come to a very comfortable arrangement with the Bolsheviks, retaining most of their privileges and freedoms.
In all cases efforts were made by the state to protect these 'specialists' from popular anger/discrimination during the 1920s. This lasted until the Shakhty show trials of 1928 when a group of industrial specialists were accused to wrecking. This signified the start of Stalin's 'great turn' and, despite some oscillations in policy, the final end of the old elite. They were eventually lost amongst the masses of newly promoted workers and reduced by purges and repression. The 1930s created a new elite that would rule the USSR for the next few decades.
In summary: whatever about individuals, the old elite lost most of its privileges and positions of power following the revolution. Elements often survived by aligning themselves to the new Soviet state (until the Stalinist drive in the late 1920s) but it can't be said that they 'benefited' from it.
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