Is it true, as this article states, that Patton held anti-Semitic views and while running the Displaced Persons camps in southern Germany, treated Holocaust survivors "little better than the Nazis did," leading to a strong rebuke from Truman?

by Gnagus
notstephanie

I cannot speak about Patton's views but Truman absolutely demanded that action be taken regarding the state of the DP camps and the way DPs were being treated in the American zone.

After protests, President Truman sent Earle G. Harrison of the UPenn to see the Army's treatment of the DPs firsthand. Harrison reported back, “As matters now stand, we appear to be treating the Jews as the Nazis treated them except that we do not exterminate them. They are in concentration camps in large numbers under our military guard instead of SS troops. One is lead to wonder whether the German people, seeing this, are not supposing that we are following or at least condoning Nazi policy.”

This led Truman to write a letter to Eisenhower in August of 1945 stating, in part, “...we have particular responsibility toward these victims of persecution and tyranny (Jews) who are in our zone. We must make clear to the German people that we oughly abhor the Nazi policies of hatred and persecution. We have no better opportunity to demonstrate this than in the manner in which we ourselves actually treat the survivors remaining in Germany.” Truman's letter led to the treatment of DPs and the state of DP camps to become a priority for the US Army. According to Major Irving Heymont, some soldiers were sympathetic while some were annoyed by the problems the DPs caused.

Source: Among the Survivors of the Holocaust - 1945, The Landsberg DP Camp Letters of Major Irving Heymont, US Army The American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, OH 1982

Edit: changed to UPenn, crossed out "(Jews)" in the quote from Truman's letter as it was my addition in my notes I pulled the quote from.

100002152

I can't speak on Patton directly, but American journalists working in Bavaria in August of 1945 reported that the population of Bavaria expanded from 7.5 million to 10 million due to an influx of displaced persons that were housed in camps in that region. Displaced persons were supposed to receive 2000 calories per day as a food ration. In contrast, regular German citizens who weren't pregnant, working hard labor, or sick, were to receive 800 calories per day, with American authorities optimistic that they could survive the winter and increase this ration to 1100 calories.

Choosing Bavaria as a hub for refugee camps makes sense given that Bavaria was also considered the "breadbasket" of Germany due to the relative thriving of its agricultural lands compared to the rest of Germany (and much of Europe as well). This is important because the food situation in post-war Europe was quite dire, and it remained so for the next few years. The occupying military forces from all of the respective nations had a tendency overestimate how much food would be available in the near future to score political points, and food imports from Britain and - most critically - the United States, were irregular and a source of domestic contention. The food ration for German citizens fluctuated throughout the immediate postwar period, but it would be years before there was enough food being both domestically produced and imported from foreign nations to satisfy a 2000 calorie diet.

Think of the phrase "living paycheck to paycheck," and then imagine that the reserves of stored food in an entire nation would literally be finished in a few days or a few weeks (depending on the region) unless another shipment of foreign foodstuffs arrived, and then imagine this scenario continuing without abatement for at least four or five years.

With all of this in mind, it is likely that many displaced persons were probably not fed as much as was planned. Whether or not Patton intentionally mistreated displaced persons is an interesting question that I cannot answer, but the overall treatment of displaced persons was certainly tied to the agricultural and economic crisis of the post-war years in Europe, and it is unlikely they made it through the ordeal without their own physical and psychological suffering due to the food shortage.

My final research project for my undergraduate in history focused on American industrial and agricultural policy in post-war Germany and its relationship with US-Soviet relations. Since I didn't have physical access to the archives in Washington DC, which would have provided these statistics directly from the American military government at the time, I relied primarily on archived newspaper reports from American journalists in Germany (along with documents in the Foreign Relations of the United States from 1945, 1946, and 1947, published by the State Department). Here are some of the headlines and brief synopses I originally wrote during my initial research to get a better sense of the overall food picture:

McLaughlin, Kathleen, “Food in Germany to be Sufficient: Bavaria Has Surpluses of Beef and Potatoes for Shipment to Other Areas,” The New York Times, August 09, 1945, p. 18.

(After harvest, enough food in Germany to prevent starvation for winter 1945-46, but less than other liberated nations; U.S. zone increasing rations from 800 to 1,100 calories per day; 400 head of cattle delivered to Berlin from Bavaria weekly; Bavarian population expanded from 7.5 million to 10 million due to refugees, demobilized soldiers; German civilians receive 1,100 calories, displaced persons at camps receive 2,000 calories; hard laborers, expectant mothers, and the ill receive more calories)

---, "General Food Cut in Germany Seen: U.S. Officials Declare British Action Will Be Felt in All Zones - French Supply Low," The New York Times, March 02, 1946, p. 3.

(Less than 10 days of food left in French territory with no aid in sight; unable to maintain ‘normal’ food supply of 1550 calories per person; considering pooling the food supplies of all four zones together; Lieut. Col. Stanley Andrews interviewed, said that normal supply would require peacetime rationing in the USA until harvest in early fall; German farmers producing more grain now than under Nazi regime, despite poor infrastructure; Soviet Government delivered 92 carloads of sugarbeet and vegetable seeds, fulfilling the remaining seed needs for the American zone)

---. “British Seek Aid On German Food; Crisis in Their Zone Remains Acute as Talks Begin,” The New York Times, November 17, 1946, p. 114.

(British argue that lowered US imports to blame for food crisis; critics argue that raising ration from 1,350 to 1,550 was a political maneuver to influence October 20 elections in bizonal area; majority of British zone industry in Ruhr – six million German inhabitants need food in order to operate industry; domestic potato production lower than expected, starvation imminent in Rhineland and Westphalia)

“U.S. Zone Forbids German Food Cut,” The New York Times, November 24, 1946, p. 13.

(Military government refused to cut ration from 1,550 to 1,300 by the recommendation of the British-United States Food and Agriculture Committee in Greater Hesse; city workers leave industrial posts to search for food; some factories experience 50% of workers missing; in Wurttemberg, none of the demand for potatoes and only half of grain demand can be met; farmers continue to resist requisition efforts; America lent 50,000 tons of food to British zone, hoping to be paid back within several months)

Clark, Delbert, “German Food Crisis Is Growing Worse; Farmers Hold Back; U.S. Shipping a Factor,” The New York Times, December 30, 1946, p. 3.

(British and Americans raised rations from 1,235 to 1,550 calories per day in September; unrealistic, as no guarantees put into place to maintain such levels until next harvest; political maneuver to influence October elections; farmers in American and Soviet zones unable or unwilling to meet quota demands; American zone depends on Soviet food as well; America planned to allow full potato ration to Germans to cover mid-October 1946 to July 1947 in one delivery, now uncertain if such program would work; in September, October, 50,000 metric tons of food imported from USA monthly, need 92,333 metric tons monthly through June 1947 to meet the caloric ration; grain crop 22% below 1939-1944 average; industrial production continues to climb, 85% gain since year began; heavy industry at 50% of 1936 levels, light industry 37%, 44% average of 1936)

“German Food Ration Cut,” The New York Times, January 23, 1948, p. 3.

(UK-USA military governments cut food ration from 1,550 to 1,200 – 1,400 calories per day, depending on location; the Ruhr region particularly distressed, critical due to high levels of industry; more strikes in Ruhr and Bavaria; states to receive imported food only if they meet indigenous quotas; dietary fat shortage in bizonal area; 5,000 tons of fat released for February, half to the Ruhr)