The issue was not them lagging behind in "innovations" but stems from your observation of the small size of armies and overall disorganization and there's very good reason for that. On the tail end of the Medieval Era during the War of the Roses what existed of England's highly professional military establishment, which had its roots in the Hundred Years' War, would effectively destroy itself. The Tudors, who took control in the aftermath in 1485, as Koch says, *". . .was not based on a strong military organization but on a rather refined local policing and administrative system, seeing the growth of the Justices of Peace."*^1 The dynasty would in all practicality destroy whatever remained of England's professional forces.

What existed harkened to mainland Medieval history; that is that each county would be required to provide soldiers and officers proportional to the size of the county. In other words, a militia. Prior to this, outside of Ireland, there was no other standing army though. These forces were raised and destroyed as the occasion demanded; such as against the Scots. There were some attempts to create a voluntary standing army but Parliament had an inherent distrust of potential power abuses stemming from one and thus never followed through in allowing it.^2

The simple fact that makes everything pretty clear is that between 1485 and 1642 England, outside of their Irish territories, had no and largely had no reason for a standing army. On the eve of the Battle of Edgehill Parliament would approve the first standing army in a long time; the Eastern Association of Norfolk, Suffolk, Huntingdon and Lincolnshire -- Oliver Cromwell's constituency.^3 This effort would be helped largely by those few who fought in the Thirty Years' War in the Dutch, French, Spanish, and German Imperial armies. It would be crucial that these men would be there during this process to help bring continental ideas, at least in a rudimentary fashion, to what would eventually be called the "New Model Army."

Despite what this man would do later on in the political realm and despite his bias against Presbyterians (he was known to dismiss Presbyterian officers for that reason^4 ) his genius in the aspect of war can not be ignored. Within just a few years Cromwell would take an army which was comprised of literally nothing and turn it into a thoroughly professional standingarmy; one which promotion would (in general) rely on merit and where discipline would be universal and just. To quote Koch in mass:

*"Nevertheless, Cromwell's political shortcomings cannot detract from his achievement of creating an army as disciplined and armed as it was effective. The pike, a prominent weapon in 1643, had been virtually replaced by 1650. When the Civil War began pike sand muskets operated together but in a rather disorderly fashion and without the tactical organization deployed on the continent. Pikes served as defense against cavalry attacks but there is also evidence that units equipped with pikes fought one another. Gradually, however, the musket won the upper hand, particularly when it could be used as a club in close combat. Another factor in favor of the musket was the greater mobility and speed of the musketeers, who wore no armor whatsoever. In the first years of the Civil War the distance infantry could cover on foot was 10 to 12 miles a day. With the discarding of armor and the introduction by Cromwell of uniforms - red coats - the average marching distance increased to 15 to 16 miles a day. The closing campaign of the first Civil War, the second Civil War and the subjugation of Ireland and Scotland bore witness to growing professionalism."*^5

Cromwell would, like Adolphus, begin to address the issue that would plague late 17th and 18th century warfare -- decisiveness. This was a period of warfare in continental Europe where no one side could, in layman terms, force the issue. Decisiveness is critically important in warfare and Cromwell would note the necessity of this. Out of this Cromwell, like Gustavus fighting in Germany, would place heavy emphasis on artillery. The sieges of Pembroke Castle, Pontefract, and later Drogheda showed the result of these siege trains. Both Wexford and Ross would negotiate surrender after the first day of bombardment. He was not a man of slow maneuvering and countermaneuver. MacArthur's maxim in World War II may as well have been Cromwell's: There is no substitute for victory.

However, with that said, he was still no Gustavus Adolphus. He was no Wallenstein. He was no Tilly. He or his English contemporaries were, ultimately, relying on adapting the techniques and tactics which were already in practice elsewhere. They were by not revolutionaries they were, as can be said loosely, enrolled in crash course continental warfare; they were catching up.

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^[1] H.W. Koch, The Rise of Modern Warfare: 1618-1815, 51

^[2] Koch, Modern Warfare, 51

^[3] Koch, Modern Warfare, 51

^[4] Koch, Modern Warfare, 53

^[5] Koch, Modern Warfare, 57