How did the scale of destruction in World War I influence the policy of appeasement in the run-up to World War II?

by iamthemoistness
Gimpalong

In the post-WWII era, appeasement is traditionally seen as pacifying an aggressive nation or group by agreeing to their demands. The word "appeasement" itself is laden with a significant historical context and is today often used pejoratively.

In the context of post-WWI Britain, the term "appeasement" broadly reflected a desire to avoid war or pursue peaceful solutions to international grievances in lieu of war.

There was broad public disapproval of a second war in Europe among regular people in Britain. This disapproval, however, was not absolute. In 1933 the "King and Country Debate" at the Oxford Union famously produced the statement that "this House will in no circumstances fight for its King and Country." This was fairly shocking at the time among older people and those serving throughout the Empire. Still, Conservative appeasement policies had, as was pointed out by A.J.P Taylor in his Origins of the Second World War (1961), some degree of public support if only to keep Britain out of another bloody continental struggle.

Among British Conservatives during the 1920s and 1930s, there was a belief that the penalties imposed on Germany by the treaty of Versailles had been too harsh. These Conservatives supported a policy of trying to ameliorate the legitimate grievances that Germany had with the terms that the Treaty had imposed. For example, many in Britain viewed the Versailles reparations as unjust since the economy of the Weimar Republic had been crippled by them. These Conservatives also believe that German minorities, such as Germans in the Sudetenland (formerly a part of the Austrian portion of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and then, after WWI, a part of new state of Czechoslovakia) should be allowed self-determination. Conservatives also saw a reinvigorated Germany as a potential bulwark against communism from the Soviet Union. It important to note that a significant minority in the Conservative Party, most notably Winston Churchill, distrusted Hitler and opposed appeasement.

On the other side of the aisle (maybe not the correct metaphor for Parliament? I'm American...), The Labour Party opposed supporting fascist dictators such as Mussolini in Italy and General Franco in Spain. This opposition was also directed at policies that might empower Hitler. Yet there was also a pacifist segment of the Labour Party that viewed appeasement was a means to prevent another major continental war.

So British attitudes about appeasement were tempered by both a desire to avoid a second war as well as a belief in some quarters that the Treaty of Versailles had unjustly punished Germany and that Germany should be allowed some leeway to rejoin the major European powers through redeveloping its economy, absorbing German minority groups in bordering areas and re-militarizing in the face of Soviet communism.

For a new-ish review of appeasement:

Donough, Frank. Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement and the British Road to War. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998)

Hicks, Geoffrey. "‘Appeasement’ or consistent Conservatism? British foreign policy, party politics and the guarantees of 1867 and 1939." Historical Research 84 (2011): 513-534.