Maybe Stalin would of pulled the trigger on starting a war with Germany, but not 2 years after signing the non aggresion pact (10 years). they needed that pact to build up their forces, as in 1939 they knew they were no match for the german war machine, espeacially after the purges. to me this is reinforced by the somewhat surprising performance against finland.
So basically i dont think stalin was ever seriously planning to attack, atleast not any time soon. you guys know more about history than me, theres some damn smart people here- professional and amateur historians alike- so what im hoping is someone can play devils advocate and try to argue the opposite, or provide some insight on this debate in general.
Although the preemptive war in 1941 thesis found some currency within Nazi wartime propaganda, it was not until the GRU defector Viktor Suvorov (his pen name, his actual name is Vladimir Rezun) published Icebreaker in 1990. Suvorov alleged that Stalin had set up a preemptive attack in the summer of 1941 which Barbarossa only just beat out. Suvorov relied upon a highly selective reading of postwar memoirs and some open primary sources (politburo speeches and the like) to base this argument upon.
However, historians have not been kind to the Icebreaker thesis. The disastrous performance of the Winter War coupled with the expansion of Soviet borders several hundred miles west meant that the Red Army was not in a condition to engage in these types of operations. Scholars like David Glantz who have looked into the archival record have found evidence that supports the opposite conclusion as Suvorov, that the Red Army was on a much less belligerent footing than one preparing for war. Furthermore, aside from the weaknesses of memoirs as a source, other reviewers of Icebreaker like Robin Edmonds noted that it is a common characteristic of all militaries to plan for operations. There is a world of difference between planning for a war and actively taking the steps to carry one out.
Now where the devil's advocate here comes into play is that while Stalin might not, or, more accurately, could not invade German territory in 1941, this does not preclude any action in 1942 or 43. While the relevant archival details of Soviet operations are closed or absent, a later invasion is certainly plausible. Zhukov submitted a proposal to Stalin on 15 May 1941 to invade eastern Poland, although historians do not know if Stalin even saw it. The fall of France deeply shocked both Stalin and the Soviet military establishment, prompting an accelerated rearmament program and mobilization of troops in early 1941.
Nevertheless, the above is less an indication of perfidy and reflects more that the Soviets had accurately evaluated the German threat after 1940. Germany did launch an unprovoked invasion of the Soviet Union and plans such as those of Zhukov's or the mobilization of troops have to be seen within this context.
Sources
Glantz, David M. Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War. Lawrence, Kan: University Press of Kansas, 1998.
_."The Soviet-German War 1941–45 Myths and Realities: A Survey Essay." Paper presented at Clemson University (11 October, 2001).