I read a great post here a while ago on how both sides planned for the conflict in Europe to go down. I'm curious about ancillary theaters that may have developed -- I'm thinking in the middle east or pacific. Anything about troop commitments, casualty projections, strategic decisions that have been declassified would be appreciated!
Yes, but in non-European theaters, it was much more likely to be a straight American/Soviet conflict.
This is such a massive topic that I'll focus on one section, of which I have the best knowledge.
From 1957 to 1962, the Strategic Air Command operated a select number of bomber squadrons under the "Reflex Action" program. This program deployed bomber squadrons to bases around the world where they stood on alert. The program allowed SAC to disperse its forces from bases in the United States, complicating Soviet targeting and ensuring a second strike while positioning its strike force closer to the Soviet Union.
The need for the program came from the fact that hardened silos for intercontinental ballistic missiles were not yet in wide use. While the Titan and other ICBMs were deployed by this time, it took hours to fuel and ready these missiles, which could be destroyed by a first strike if they weren't ready in time. Thus, SAC needed an alternative, a way to strike the Soviet Union if war erupted on short notice.
This was a significant concern for SAC, as its officers had joined the military (almost as a rule) during WWII, after the Pearl Harbor attack, and a Pearl Harbor-style surprise attack was what they feared most. Not until the construction and activation of the DEW Line, BMEWS and MIDAS satellite network did the United States and NATO have early warning capability against a Soviet attack. Thus, they needed to be ready to respond in the event of a surprise onslaught.
Reflex Action stationed B-47 bombers in Greenland, Morocco, Alaska, Canada, Labrado, Great Britain and Libya. An entire wing would be rotated into place with crews for an extended stay. The goal was to have these wings ready to launch an attack within 15 minutes of warning.
In 1957, Gen. Thomas Power, commander in chief of SAC, announced to the world that SAC had 11 percent of its 1,528 bombers and 766 tankers on 15-minute alert. By 1960, that proportion had grown to one-third.
As the B-52 replaced the B-47, the need for Reflex Action declined. The B-52's longer range meant it could be based at airfields in the continental United States. The completion of early warning radar networks meant there was no longer a danger of a sudden, out-of-the-blue attack, so continental US bases were safe.
Reflex Action ended shortly before the Cuban Missile Crisis, though in the event of war, many of the bases formerly used for Reflex Action would have hosted tankers, fighters and support aircraft as long as they were able.
What about conventional warfare, you ask? Well, that's more difficult. Before the Berlin Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States didn't really have flexible response options. Following the Berlin Crisis of 1961, President Kennedy asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to draft options that would allow limited nuclear strikes or even a conventional war against the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. Before that, the United States and NATO were geared for an all-out, nothing-spared war if fighting broke out.
During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the strategy in Alaska was a fascinating one. Only one fighter squadron (albeit overstrength) was available to defend the state. Its job was a de facto trip wire against Soviet bombers, thinning them and buying time for continental air defense to get ready.
The U.S. Navy planned a similar trip wire in the Pacific Ocean. At the time, the only Navy ship based in Alaska was an elderly WWII landing ship. At the outbreak of war, a submarine tender would redeploy from Honolulu to Kodiak to supply a flotilla of hunter-killer submarines that would establish a cordon around the Soviet naval base at Petropavlovsk. This submarine effort likely would be supported by at least one aircraft carrier battle group, though that group's combat effectiveness was likely minimal.
In autumn 1962, the aircraft carrier Ranger stopped in the Aleutian Islands on its way back to California from a deployment to Japan in order to test this strategy. It was an abject failure.
The rough seas prevented carrier aircraft from operating effectively, and conditions were so difficult that the Ranger's escort destroyers were unable to refuel. The drill was aborted, and the Ranger's group returned to California after a long stay at sea.
What little I know about the Soviets can be attributed to the story of a single Soviet hunter-killer attack submarine that was deployed from Petropavlovsk at the early stages of the crisis. It was armed with a few nuclear-armed torpedoes, and its mission was to stand off the mouth of Pearl Harbor and attack any ship that exited -- or attack the harbor itself with those torpedoes.
I do not know if this submarine was acting alone or in concert with others. I do not have any information about Soviet ballistic missile submarines, which were primitive but active in the Pacific at that time.