The Austrian military had to suffer from a large swathe of problems which inflicted it in 1914. It had clueless generals more obsessed with a perhaps more romantic view of conquest, it had a system which favoured fighting the Franco-Prussian War rather then a modern war of machinery and artillery, it had racial tensions which even filtered down into the ranks and - finally, you may gasp - it ran into every spot of bad luck and misfortune throughout the four years of fighting that one could barely conjure up in a nightmare. The greatest successes of the Austrian military machine were spawned from defence rather then any great offensive. Even the massive movements along the Galician front in 1916/1917 were more a vis-a-vis style assault with the Russians then a victory - and any further successes were by and by creditted to the German co-operation.

I'll be looking at the state of the Austro-Hungarian Army here. The actual state of civil life in the Austrian Empire is as equally fascinating in its twilight years. For, yes, in 1914 Austria had caught the disease, the same one old man Istanbul was dying from for decades - powerful forces of nationalism. Austria was going downhill fast, dragging the region down around it like a dying man. It was a popular cynic's saying in 1914 for the Germans - an ally of Austria who had seemingly given Vienna unlimited free will in July 1914 - was that Berlin was 'shackled to a corpse'. This was hardly propaganda, rather an accepted fact. So hopefully this not only sets up the world which you have to judge the doomed Austrian Army by, but how they descended so low. But we'll leave the politics at that, unless you're interested more.

As for the actual Army itself.

The Austrian army would eventually by 1916 be able to offer valuable support to German offensives. It was an Central Powers offensive which brought down Serbia eventually, and it was Austrian troops who held back the Italians in the multiple campaigns in southern Austria/northern Italy. Most notably is the 1917 repulse of the Italian grand offensive along the southern front - Austrian troops fought tooth and nail succesfully.

But in 1914 the situation was different. A war hadn't be fought by the Austrians since 1866. Its leading general - often regarded as something of a genius even in revisionist histories - was a man who gained his military knowledge from inspecting old Franco - Prussian battlefields all the way back in the 1870s. The jingoistic war command which was seperate from the Chief of Staff - Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf - was often frothing in the mouth for war and was unabashedly desperate to stamp down the Balkan revolutions. Some historians even claim that Franz Ferdinand - yes, that Franz Ferdinand! - was the only real pacifist in the entire upper echelons of the Austrian military establishment. Unsavoury men such as the Governor of Bosnia were happy to twist realties into something which would suit the unending stomp of the Austrian war machine, one all these same war-mongerers were so sure (despite having been involved in only Balkan policing actions since losing against the Prussians in 1866) was one of the prime in European armies. So, that is there first charge of crime in incompetence - they were out of touch with the realities of the political situation which meant they; a) viewed the Austrian army as some sort of hegomonic powerhouse, and b) were blinded to situational truths by their arrogant jingoism.

As to the cause of this blindness of the high command - well, that's almost another question. Was it a historical sense of superiority which, in the previous Habsburg manner, give the armies of the Emperor a sense of European domination? Or was it an institutional breeding of generations of K. u. K. leaders? No matter what the source of this malnourished leadership, it was undeniably a contributor to the ill fate of the early war Austrian armies.

This perhaps leads on into our section port of call. This same blindness which covered the eyes of the Austrian high command was in some ways not exclusive. Many of the same misconceptions which they had were shared throughout many European capitals. A large, modern war had not graced the shores of the continent since 1871. Since then, as we know, not only was technology advanced greatly - in the form of faster firing self-loading rifles and artillery - but tactics were also demanding reform. It is my argument that the means for understanding this reform are limitted by the lack of war - which is both a good and bad thing in this context - but in a way 1914 alone provided a learning environment for these generals to learn their lessons. Some, some did not - we must look at the case of the irrepressible Joffre throwing his country's youth into German machine guns - while some, ala trench warfare - became quickly aware that the old romantic days were passed.

Amidst the changing crisis of miltiary tactics, we again turn to the case of poor, old Austria. She too had not learnt the lessons of 1914. While the Serbians bristled with anticipation in the eventual grand Austrian assault towards Belgrade - a campaign of horror and inhumane crimes - they simply cut down rows and rows of advancing Austrian troops.

And no lessons were learnt. Sure, by 1917 at Caporetto some had finally been knocked into the skulls of Viennese nobles, but it took 300 000 dead within only several months of open warfare before the offensive was called off. No attempts were made thereafter to reform miltiary tactics - relentlessly the high command sent forward their troops to be slaughtered by Serbian artillery. It was a senseless scene of slaughter that was not even replicated properly on the Western Front until 1916.

Still blinded by their imperialistic jingoism, the leaders of the Austrian army had commited it too a death sentence. It is argued by some that the losses sustained in 1914 were enough to restrict Austria from seriously sustaining future offensives. It would appear so - even in 1916 with the famed Brusilov campaign Austria still suffered one million casualties in scenes reminiscent of the Belgrade offensive.

They would - could not - and did not learn any lesson which many other nations did. So, here we can charge them with their second charge of incompetence perhaps related to the first - their inability to keep with the reformation of military tactics brought on by the machine war age.

Finally, possibly the biggest cause of their charged incompetence was the tactical situation itself. Whether you can blame this on the high command or the weaves of history is another matter of dicussion entirely. But when Austria entered the war in 1914 it was faced with a precarious position only matched by its partner, Germany. To the south lay the keg of the Balkans, fuming with anti-Austrian sentiment. Leader of this sentiment was an emotionally charged Serbia which was merely the co-incidental and accidental mentor of the July assasains. Meanwhile, to the east, lay the beast of Russia - angry, protector of the Slavs and most importantly - lusting for Balkan regions. It left the high command with the delicate decision of deciding where to move first.

Serbia did not just harbour hatred - but fostered an hatred from Vienna. Both sides were enemies on many levels, and not just politically. Many who had rode Vienna into war now hungered to open the war with bombing Belgrade. (Which IS what happened! Austrian gunboats bombarded Belgrade as opening shots to the war!). Russia, though, could not be ignored. Quickly mobilizing and having the capability to strike into the heart of the empire at Hungary - Austria had not Poland to cushion the blow like Germany.

And of course, to the south lay Italy. Considered a Central Power merely by writing, it was a loose cannon willing to go to the highest bidder. To betray the southern front would cost dearly. So it was that, in August 1914, the Austrian high command pandered to every situation and issued a complicated set of orders which prioritized a quick, efficient strike which would paralyze Belgrade and knock out Serbia, before sliding the Balkan armies eastwards to Hungary to counter the Russian offensive.

This did not happen as described earlier. General blindess to modern tactics - the devastation of modern artillery - and an ignorance of the high command meant that the supposed Austrian masterstroke turned into a bloodied field. The numbers speak alone - 50% casualty rate in 1914.

So our final charge of incompetence is the tactical situation forced errors of judgement.

The vicious mistakes of 1914 are forgiveable in hindsight, though. This is my charge of competence. Austria did not go on to have a redeeming offensive like Operation Michael. Its two most succesful campaigns of the war - the Brusilov and Caporetto defence - were pyrrhic victories. Brusilov alone cost them one million man. This neutered them of any possible, realistic chance of survival. It was the death kneel of a thousand year dynasty.

There are three points which go against the Austrian army - its high command's ignorance, an aversion to modern tactics and a terrible tactical situation. You can not say they were entirely incompetent. They were a mediocre army mainly due to these problems. In fact, they performed remarkably well when you consider that despite these disadvantages - they still survived throughout the war.

This can be pinned down to the collapse of Russia, the terrain of southern Austria and the help of Germany and Bulgaria - for their successes. But to charge them as incompetent is much too general and all encompassing. Instead, I would class it as that the Austrian armies suffered more misfortune and loss due to their list of incompetencies, but performed to a mediocre standard regardless.

(Paul Ham and Max Hastings are my favourite authors and sources for looking at the politics of the early war, and would recommend them heartily!).