Hey Guys,
this weekend i started to watch the Youtube Series "The Great War". I don't know the educational value of it, but its entertaining and i find the concept of the week by week "realtime" coverage very interesting.
But one, or maybe two, big questions are arising as i'm watching.
The first one is the one is the one in the title. I did my Abitur in Germany with history up to the 12th grade. But i all was taught, or at least remeber, is that Germany, or the Kaiser, wanted his place among the big Empires. Thats it. Now trough the Youtbe Series i learned that Germany's military wanted a war with Russia prior to 1917(?) or they would be unbeatable. Ok, so far so good. But what were the plans for a full out victory? They promised to england to not annex any continental lands of France. Were there plans to annex a big part of russia? Or was to beat the russian army all that they wanted? Sure the problem of an "unbeatable" russia would have arrrsed again? Or were they counting on throwing the russian empire into disarray, like it happened towards the end?
The second might be a bit tricky. I noticed throughout "The great war" that they are starting to paint a bad picture of germany in the war, and i'm not talking about the atrocities in belgium. Sometimes it seems that they are almost on a WW2 level of evil in the portrayal. Correct me if i'm wrong, but Germany was the leading culture in europe prior to WW1, or at least on a good way to becoming it. Important people went to Berlin to study, science and culture were on a high and suddenly they are talking about "the bad thing that would happen if Germany won the war". I'm guessing a big part is, that Germany was leading a war of aggression, at least in the eyes of the triple entente, and there is no denying of belgium. BUt were there really bad things to happen? This ties in to my first question about the goals of germany. Was it just the fear of losing power of the other empires that germany was seen as "the huns" and we still perceive them as the bad guys (at least in popular opinion), when prior to july everyone was looking at Berlin and Germany was culturally striving?
I'm a bit confused. WW1 is greatly overlooked in german education and in general. We bear the cross of WW2 that we seem to forget WW1. All the average german knows is that there was big war prior to WW2, the peace treaty was the reason for the rise Nazism and we got that one book "All quiet on the western front" that nobody read, but there is this boring movie to. Honestly, after school i knew more about the Franco-Prussian-War than WW1.
Thanks in advance for all answers.
Your wide-reaching curiosity for this is good to see! For many, they look at the war of 1914 and see it as much the same as the players of politics at the time did; as an inevitable march to the climax of European history. While revanche, alliances and historical hatred all combined in many regions to concoct four years of horror - ultimately the war was almost a self-fufilling prophecy.
Okay, let's tackle these two one-by-one.
What did Germany want with Russia?
The reasoning for Imperial Germany declaring war on Russia in August 1914 was not an outright lust for territory. Berlin hardly entered the war with the hope of territory on its mind. While parts of the war, such as the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovisk, betray perhaps the opportunities that the Germans grapsed once victory did come - it was barely an intention at the start of the war.
Rather, as you are probably aware from the YouTube series, the war was fought because of the tumbling series of wars which in the end obligated Germany to have to fight Russia. While it was not avoided - the race to mobilization in July and August was tense, as each nation used the threat of mobilizing, an irreversible intent of war, as a loaded gun at each others heads - it was not what Germany really desired for at the start.
Firstly, Russia was threatening to mobilize its huge, untrained army as a response to Austrian aggression against Serbia. The Austrian ultimatum ruffled many feathers in St. Petersburg, for Serbia was under the wing of Russian diplomacy. The Russian ambassador in Belgrade was consistently consulted over the two weeks of back and forth ultimatums in the lead-up to general war. Most of the time, he was the man calling the shots - would Russia come to the aid of Serbia, the Slavic cousin of the great Slav protector itself. Germany, naturally, came to the aid of its ally Austria. So, firstly, it was a tit-for-tat series of mobilizations/the Austrian alliance that obligated a German mobilization.
Secondly, Germany was intent on striking at France before the French could hit them. Ever since 1871 Berlin had been suspicious of the French revanche, an insistent need to prove lost honour. This meant that Berlin was constantly suspicious of encirclement both diplomatically and militarily. So Berlin urged on Vienna strongly in the July ultimatums as it could see Paris stirring in its peripheral vision, or so the Prussian statesmen imaging. So, war with Russia was a given since the 1892 Entente treaty obligated the Czar to help the French in their two-front war. So our second reason is a diplomatic feeling of isolation/encirclement prompted Germany to lash out.
Thirdly, was a deep German fear of Russian capability. The Germans were afraid of what the legendary Russian steamroller could do to eastern Europe - ala their worst nightmare of '44/'45. Germany was strong - but Russia had 114 divisions, twice as many big guns and eight million soldiers. Germany had just 96 divisions and 1 000 less heavy guns then the Russians. The only thing holding back the Slavic steamroller was a lack of capability in railroads. Germany had more railroad potential in Cologne then all of eastern Russia. But Russia - devastated by the defeat of 1905 to Japan - had under Grand Duke Boris Vladimirovich attempted to reform the army. This 'Great Programme', though ultimately delayed by the corruption of the Minister for War after 1908, was promising to deliver a fully-capable railroad system in European Russia allowing them to mobilize the massive Imperial Army not in two years, as the German General Staff predicted in 1900, but in several months.
As such, Berlin felt a need to beat Russia 'to the punch'. Leaders, like von Moltke, said that war must come before 1915 - the finish date of the 'Great Programme' - to allow Germany an even chance to fight a two-front war. It was, in the end, a race against time for military superiority. So, our third reason for war is that Germany felt pressured by Russian upgrades and felt it urgent to war Russia for supremacy before the upgrades of 1915.
Other reasons were psychological. Perhaps more minor to fear of Russian military superiority or alliances, but race was an issue as well. The feeling of racial superiority over the 'Slavs' tinted the feeling of mistrust between Berlin and St. Petersburg. This was also a prompter of warm relations between the United Kingdom and Germany - for both considered each other racial brothers in the Anglo-Saxon mould, and many in both nations deemed each other natural allies. That the Germans let this slip away despite two offers of British alliances in 1904 is a tribute to their woeful foreign policy.
As for psyche, militarism was born in Prussia. The old Junkers class was imbued with a Clausewitzian sense of war from birth. Berlin, and the region of Prussia, positively thrived off war. The entire nation, initially a patchwork of small German states, was born in the heat of war and in the quiet halls of an conquered enemy. As ever the conqueror, the Germans lived from 1871 onwards in constant suspicion of revanche - and despite Bismarck's masterful efforts of realism, they were victims of their own militaristic policies. Berlin simply assumed war would come - and so it did.
So the reasons for war weren't nessecarily prompted by lust for territory or the like, but was rather a result of;
The Treaty of Brest-Litovisk hoisted upon the new Bolshevik government in 1918 was an example of these. It demanded monetary repatriations as well as seizure of Russian Poland (i.e. a buffer against Russian aggression towards the Prussian homeland) and the freedom of the Ukraine. While this was all lost within months, it showed the limits of German jingoism. The war with Russia was, as well as being a result of alliances and national fears of race and isolation, a quick pre-emptive move to cut down Russia before it achieved its foreseen full potential.