Primarily because of failures by the Arab states to coordinate, train their soldiers properly, and make correct moves in the warfare itself.

The Six Day War is a very interesting case, but one that can be easily explained as a result of a few factors:

• Technological disparities.

• Motivational disparities.

• Military-size disparities.

• Tactical disparities.

To start with the technological disparities, note that the Israelis were able to use superior weaponry to their advantage. In particular, the air force and air superiority of the Israelis was instrumental in the war. Israel had been buying state-of-the-art aircraft with heavy emphasis on fighter jets and bombers for years, and this paid off. Israeli Mirage Jets outmaneuvered Syrian MiGs easily. This is not necessarily because the jet was better, but at least partly because the jet had potential in the hands of better-trained pilots that the Israelis were fielding. However, the Mirages were considered cutting-edge French aeronautics when the Israelis bought them in 1962 and 1963 from France, and the Israeli Air Force was huge and well-supplied. The Egyptians had secured a large amount of advanced weaponry, but were unable to or untrained to use much of it in the desert terrain of the fighting. And where Egyptians and Syrians had planes, they either didn't have the pilots for them or had left them poorly maintained. More on this later when I get to military-size.

On the motivational front, the disparity is far clearer. The Israelis had always regarded war with the Arab states as a fight for survival itself, whereas the Arab soldiers had only hate for Israel to work off of. While this may seem like a small indicator of success, or an attempt to push some Jedi slogan like "Hate leads to suffering", it really did contribute to the war effort. Israelis were willing to come together and work more cohesively, fight harder, and altogether fight together against what they perceived as an existential threat. A motivated soldier is less likely to give up, abandon their friends in the heat of battle, or desert. It really did have a huge impact, by most accounts. But then, I'm relying mostly on accounts by historians and political theorists who may not be military historians specifically. Still, it makes sense, I'd say.

In terms of military size in 1967, the Israelis also had a pretty significant bit of help. They had a professional military, motivated and full of reserves and men/women who had all undergone military training at one point or another, numbering around 250,000. The Egyptian army had 150,000-180,000 troops, the Syrians had 70,000 troops, and the Jordanians had 56,000 troops. Altogether, it was 250,000 Israelis against a maximum of 300,000 Arab troops. Given the other troubles the Arabs would have in the war, in technological, motivational, and tactical failures, this disparity was nowhere near enough to overwhelm the Israelis. The main benefit enjoyed in this regard by the Arab states was that they didn't have to call up a significant portion of their population to fight, meaning they could fight for long if they had just managed to hold off the Israelis. This was partly why the Israelis launched the pre-emptive strike. Facing down the Egyptians and Syrians, as they had for weeks, could not happen forever. The Israeli economy couldn't sustain that kind of call-up. Almost 1 in 10 people in Israel were called up for service, according to population statistics from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Remove kids, Arab citizens who were not likely to fight for Israel, and the elderly, and you'll understand the magnitude of the call-up: Israel had to win the war quickly, or risk a fight it could not economically sustain.

In terms of other military size indicators, let's take a look at what type of tech each side was fielding, and what number.

Israel had 192 airworthy jet fighters and fighter-bombers, with 40 trainers which could do ground-attack missions. They had 3 pilots per aircraft, highly trained airmen, and more. They had 1,400 artillery pieces and heavy mortars and 1,100 tanks, with infantry being transported by vintage, WWII-era renovated halftracks. Because of the draft that had been in place since Israel's inception, there was no shortage of officers ready to command, or trained soldiers.

The Arab armies were also professional, but in all the wrong places. They were not mechanized or well-equipped. The Egyptian Chief of Staff of the Army, Abdel Hakim Amer, had politicized officer appointments, deprofessionalizing large portions of the army. He and Nasser constantly changed the position of army units in the weeks leading up to the war, confusing the soldiers and officers and making them less prepared to fight. The army had more than doubled in size over the previous 10 years, which meant they had a shortage of trained and experienced officers. They had 900 tanks and 800 artillery pieces, with 420 aircraft, many of which were poorly maintained or had no pilots. They also lacked radar capable of picking up low-flying aircraft, a crucial technological failure.

The Syrians were somewhat better off, but fewer in number. They had only 300 tanks, 265 artillery pieces and heavy mortars, and 92 fighters with 2 bombers.

The Jordanians were (as per usual) the best-trained Arab fighting force, but also the most reluctant. They had 264 tanks, as well as 30 belonging to the Iraqis who were supporting them, 160 artillery pieces and heavy mortars, and 34 Iraqi ones. They had 24 Hawker-Hunter jet fighters.

So to sum this up, the Israelis had 1,400 artillery pieces, 1,100 tanks, and 192+40 (232) planes that could do battle easily, all of which were manned by well-trained and coordinated troops. The Arabs had separate armies, OK at best officers and coordination, and not enough pilots with worse technology on average for what they needed, totaling roughly 1,250 artillery pieces, 1,500 tanks, and 550 planes (some of which were hardly operational, or didn't have pilots).

Then there was the tactical aspect. This is the one that I'd say was most often lacking on the Arab side. The Israelis in 1967 launched a pre-emptive strike on Egypt, which worked like clockwork. They flew in low, attacked Egyptians who were not expecting an attack (the Israelis attacked a few hours after dawn, when the pilots would be eating breakfast), and destroyed runways. This grounded the Egyptian planes, who were then sitting ducks. Egypt's anti-air defenses were told to stand down as the Israelis flew overhead and bombed, because they feared that Amer and his airforce commander would be shot down since they were flying over to inspect Egyptian forces in the Sinai. Thus toothless and defenseless, the Egyptians almost immediately lost air superiority. By the time the attack was over, an attack which used 183 Israeli planes flying low with complete radio silence from the north (having flown west over the Mediterranean), the Egyptians had lost 197 aircraft (only 8 of which were destroyed in dogfights), and 8 radar stations, and their 6 forward air bases were rendered inoperable. The Israeli surprise attack established Israeli air superiority for the rest of the war. The second wave of Israeli strikes, with 164 jets flown in (Israeli turnaround and re-equipping of planes was quite rapid thanks to good training), hit another 14 air bases and destroyed another 107 aircraft. This meant that within two waves, 304 Egyptian aircraft were destroyed, at a cost of 9 Israeli planes with 6 more being seriously damaged.

Then, Syrian, Jordanian, and Iraqi aircraft began to attack Israel, so Israel's third wave was aimed at them. Jordan's entire air force was destroyed, and half of Syria's (about 50) were also destroyed. Iraq lost 10. Air superiority was clear from here on out, and it dominated the war. By the end of the war itself, Israel had lost only about 40 planes, while the Arab forces lost at least 450 (all but 70 of which were destroyed while on the ground). Thus the element of surprise was huge in creating this advantage. It also helped Israel win the war after the initial strike, as did other tactical blunders by the Arab forces. The Israeli plan was to attack hard in the Sinai and hit Egypt, while defending and holding against Syria and Jordan. Israel would have a three-pronged attack through northern Sinai, and trap the Egyptian forces by looping south, while the flanking Israeli forces would destroy them later. Sharm ash Sheik in the southern Sinai, and Gaza, would be left for later. There hadn't been any initial intent to head to the Suez, or go that far, perhaps out of fear that the Soviets would intervene if Egypt was threatened near its capital. In response to the Israeli ground attack, which started right after the first wave of Israeli bomber runs, the Egyptian commanders had no orders given to them. They had no idea what to do. They vaguely anticipated a flanking maneuver by the Israelis but had no idea how to block it, and were under air attack with no help from their own air force. Israel ravaged their lines and broke through relentlessly, more motivated and more willing to exploit any hole to break further. The Israelis never let up.

Amer ordered his troops to retreat, as far as the Suez if not further if they had to, which demoralized the Egyptian forces. Perhaps they believed they could hold Israel at the Mitla and Jidi passes in western Sinai, but they instead just confused and demoralized Egyptian forces even more. They had no intelligence, were horrible at orderly retreat (especially considering they had to contend with air attacks and Israeli tank thrusts), and higher ups had no idea where their own forces were. Israel was jamming their radio communications. Amer hoped for a fighting retreat, and got a blind scramble west.

CONTINUED BELOW

http://www.meforum.org/441/why-arabs-lose-wars