Well, the question of the Uganda Plan is very interesting, actually. However, the plan was not passed by the World Zionist Congress. Allow me to expand on that a little bit.

The basic timeline goes like this:

• On October 22/23, 1902, Herzl meets with Joseph Chamberlain (Colonial Secretary) who says he thinks El-Arish or the Sinai would make a good place for Jews to establish self-governance. The Sultan of the Ottoman Empire and the Egyptian government both refused.

• In Spring 1903, Chamberlain instead offers the Guas Ngishu plateau near Nairobi in East Africa (in Kenya, not Uganda as is commonly thought).

• On the 14 of August, 1903, Herzl brought forward a letter from Clement Hill (Foreign Office) referring to the "establishment of a Jewish colony" in East Africa. The letter was received positively, perhaps even enthusiastically, by the Zionist Executive.

• On 23 of August, 1903, Herzl brought it up in his opening address to the Congress. There were heavy naysayers, and the Congress (which Herzl could not discuss with, as his heart condition was acting up) began to rock.

• Chamberlain resigns in mid-September 1903, and his successor Alfred Lyttleton showed no enthusiasm for the plan.

• By 1905, the Seventh Zionist Congress formally rejected the plan, which was already dead.

Now with that background on the events in mind, exploring Herzl's motivations seems far easier. On the surface one might guess he was in support of the Uganda proposal, or wavered and then sided with the anti-Ugandans as some historians claim, but that's not backed up by the letters and actions he took in my opinion. The main crux of it is that it seems a lot of historians want to be equivocal and say he considered it, when in reality he never actually did see it as a viable alternative to Palestine.

For example, one of the most interesting letter exchanges began with a letter dated 7 June 1903, sent from Leopold Greenberg (editor of The Jewish World and Jewish Chronicle) to Herzl, saying that East Africa held no intrinsic value. However, he argued that getting the proposal at all signified major recognition of the Jewish claim of nationhood and the right to a state, which would be useful. He concluded by saying that if they offered East Africa they would be recognizing Jewish nationhood, and that because it was not viable, they would gradually come to the conclusion that Palestine was the actual best option.

Herzl's response, dated 11 June 1903, says, "We must obtain from the British government recognition of us as a nation, and the Charter should include the following phrase: creation of a Colonization Company of the Jewish people."

Greenberg responded, claiming that the criticisms of the Uganda Plan were because of misunderstanding. He said, "Had [the Uganda plan] really been an alternative plan to Palestine, I would have opposed it myself most vehemently. At the moment, the most pressing problem is recognition of the Jews as a people by one of the Great Powers..."

Herzl was very, very clear that the push for Palestine was still the goal, and that this was merely a step on that path. He wrote to Max Nordau, an opponent of the plan (and close friend), to convince him to support the plan. He wrote on 18 July 1903, "This British East African beginning is politically a Rishon Le-Zion." Nordau was convinced by this idea of an indirect way to get Palestine offered, and supported Herzl wholeheartedly as a result.

On the 12th of August, 1903, Herzl received a letter from Russian Minister of the Interior Vyachelslav Plehve, promising that the Tzarist government would intervene with the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire to organize massive Jewish immigration into Palestine, with the ultimate objective of creating a Jewish state. This was a notch under Herzl's belt, and likely continued to persuade him that he was gaining international support that would be crucial for Palestine; not "Uganda".

When Herzl presented Clement Hill's letter, as I mentioned above, to the Executive, some skeptics noted that it did not mention Palestine. Herzl reportedly replied that it was written in "invisible ink", which would become readable within several months. I can't access the original source on this, a biography on Herzl, but what came next is no less certain. In his opening address to the World Zionist Congress that I mentioned, he said "There is no change and there will be no change in our attitude toward the Land of our Forefathers", entirely a statement of support that Palestine would be the ultimate goal. Herzl didn't want to be more open than that for the sake of diplomacy still being necessary with the British, and refrained from taking part in the discussions since his heart condition was worsening. People thought he was advocating for a permanent solution of East Africa, that it would be a temporary "shelter" that turned into a permanent one over time. Those who opposed the Uganda Plan didn't oppose the plan itself, because the plan was never even on the table. They were upset over the idea, yes, but the idea was never on the table. Rather, the only thing on the table was diplomatic cover, sending a Commission of Inquiry to East Africa. The Commission would then report back, the Congress would consider it, and presumably say it was unsuitable so they could continue to pursue Palestine. The naysayers didn't like that idea, they thought it would lead to a permanent settlement in "Uganda". Herzl anticipated that the plan would be announced as unsuitable, forcing the British to find another place, and another, and another, until Palestine was the only place they turned to.

Then when the proposal was effectively shot down by white protestors in the area proposed for Jewish immigration, as well as by Kenya's governor, the British proposed Somalian or Tanaland settlement, both of which were far worse. Herzl was undisguisedly happy, and he sent a circular letter around to the Zionist Executive declaring the East African plan dead. He told Leopold Greenberg to continue working with the British Foreign Office, which he did. When Greenberg met Lord Percy on 14 December 1903, the new Under-Secretary of State, Percy asked him "Was there any serious attempt to acquire Palestine? On the basis of what you told me, it ought to be the most desirable goal", and Percy asked to meet Herzl. Even before then, on September 5, 1903, Herzl briefed Plehve (the Russian) on the proceedings of the Congress, pointing out that Jews would happily leave Russia only for Palestine, and that East Africa would not attract many Jews, thus placing Palestine as most favorable to Jews and Russians alike. On 11 September 1903, Herzl sent Count zu Eulenberg (the German Kaiser's confidante and the German Ambassador in Vienna) a letter saying, "I will gladly let [the Kaiser] have the glory of placing himself at the head of the Concert of Powers on the Zionist question. Although Sir Clement Hill's letter was as generous as it [was] wise we stubborn Jews are more attached to the sand and chalk of Palestine...".

There is no reason, as far as I can tell, to think Herzl ever really abandoned Palestine for East Africa, and then switched back. On 12 December 1903, Herzl sent Izzet Bey (Ottoman statesman) a letter saying the following:

A territory we can find elsewhere. We have found it. You have undoubtedly read in the papers that the English Government has offered me a territory of 60,000-90,000 square leagues in Africa, a rich, fertile country, excellent for our colonization. But nevertheless, I come back once more to my plan for finding the salvation of the Jewish people among the brothers of our race and our coreligionists who live under the scepter of the Caliph, bringing to them what we have...the spirit of enterprise, industry, economic progress.

Herzl continued to court Great Powers as the Ottomans rebuffed him, but he continued to get (rather annoying, in my opinion) criticism from the naysayers to "Uganda" until two and a half months before his death. Only then, in mid-April 1904 during a meeting of the Zionist Executive, did they admit they were wrong and express unswerving confidence in his choices.

His untimely death at 44 robbed the Zionist movement of a huge statesman, and one who (had he not had heart problems for some time already) likely could have continued to command the confidence of the Zionist movement's other leaders. He really was a leader, and a statesman, by most accounts. He appeared wishy-washy in a sense to be diplomatic and ensure the British he was really "considering it", so they would not feel he was just ungrateful, but his eyes never seem to have left Palestine and he wanted his delegates to realize it, even if he couldn't tell them that, and no one could say it out loud.