So I just read Forsyth's "The Biafra Story". It was really fascinating, as the conflict is one I quite literally knew nothing about aside from the fact it happened, and Jello Biafra took his stage name from it. But, that being said, it left me with a lot of questions, which I was hoping you fine people might be able to assist with.
For starters, Forsyth is obviously pro-Biafra, and he makes no effort to hide this. The book was published while the war was still ongoing, and clearly is intended as a bit of boosterism for the cause. As portrayed by Forsyth, the Biafrans are the unambiguous force of good, and the Nigerians are only a half-step below literal Nazis. But just because Forsyth is biased doesn't mean he is wrong. So do most of the observations about Nigerian warcrimes hold water? And does his tilt in favor of Biafra cloud his perspective, or does he nevertheless present a rather fair treatment of their cause, namely that they really were "the good guys"?
A few others things that left me wondering. As it is portrayed in the book, up until the mid-1960s, it was Northern Nigeria who wanted to secede, and the only in '66 is there a sudden about face, with Biafra now the region not pressing for unity and wanting to go their own way. I don't feel the reasons behind this were portrayed satisfactorily. So what caused the change in positions so quickly?
Also ill explained was why Britain was so forcefully supportive. It comes off as a small cabal of civil servants directing policy in something no one higher up even cared about, and whether true or not, I fail to see what the UK stood to gain from their continued support. Peace and stability seemed in their best interest no matter what.
And lastly, Nigeria was supported by both the east AND the west!? The Soviets were giving them a good bit of aid! How did that come about? Biafra seems like the kind of thing the Soviets would have supported to the uninformed at least, yet in the middle of the cold war, you have Nigeria getting military aid from both sides. Did anyone make a big deal out of this?
So, thats what I really was let wondering, but if there is anything else worth touching on that Forsyth might have misrepresented, I'd love to hear it.
I can answer a little on British foreign policy towards the Biafran war. I'd suggest that you elaborate a little on which specific war crimes you're referring to so that other people can answer more in depth on that.
Remember that five years earlier, in 1962, was the Cuban Missile Crisis. Seems quite tenuously related but what this means is that the Biafran war would break out in the middle of the Cold War, a time where "stability" was fetishised, and "uprisings/rebellions/revolts, etc." were demonised.
Also just before the Cuban Missile Crisis, in 1960, Nigeria had gained independence from the UK. But only seven years down the line, it's not as if British presence (read: business interests) have entirely disappeared from Nigeria. The country was born into and for colonialism.
Here's a word you're probably bored of if you've read about colonialism (or whatever name it goes under nowadays): oil. Nigeria is oil-rich. Yes, the northern Emirs "wanted to secede" because it was an artificial country that no one really identified with... But then again did they want to lose that southern oil revenue? No.
Oil in Nigeria was dominated by Shell-BP. Here's a pretty black-and-white declaration in now-declassified Foreign Office files:
"Our direct interests are trade and investment, including an important stake by Shell/BP in the eastern Region."
Britain had a really cushy deal here. As you state in your post, OP; "Peace and stability seemed in their best interest no matter what."
Absolutely, but the definition of peace and stability depended heavily on this Cold War, colonial atmosphere.
From the British point of view, newly independent states in Nigeria aren't guaranteed to put up with the status quo. They certainly aren't guaranteed to work together, unlike a unified state where you don't really have the choice:
We cannot expect that economic cooperation [between two independent states] will necessarily enable development and trade to proceed at the same level as they would have done in a unified Nigeria
— George Thomas, commonwealth minister.
So the Foreign Office made the decision to intervene, suppress (contain?) the rebellion and keep pumping oil.
Further reading:
Unpeople: Britain's Secret Human Rights Abuses (Mark Curtis, 2004)