I'm going to commit a cardinal sin by talking past the question itself to get to the crux of the matter. Please let me know if the below in no way helps you.

The obvious answer is that Lenin didn't do any of that, on his own at least. He'd be the first to argue that he came to office on the back of a popular revolution. And, whatever about the political manoeuvrings that saw them emerge on top, the Bolsheviks were part of a broad mass movement.

Which is something that's not always been acknowledged by generations of historian - both Soviet (to whom Lenin can do no wrong) and Western (who focus on the corrupting effects of a cabal of intellectuals, see Pipes). The legacy of the cult of Lenin is still strong.

In reality, or one reading of it, Lenin's role in 1917 was important but this was through occasionally reorientating Bolshevik policy. We can discuss his political acumen, sheer certainty or odd ideological flexibility but to understand the creation of Soviet Power, to say nothing of victory in the Civil War, we have to look beyond Lenin. What we find then is a broad and diverse mass movement.

Let's illustrate this by looking at the role Lenin himself played during the decisive year of 1917:

Lenin of course was in exile during the February Revolution (as he had been for the previous decade). He played absolutely no role in these events whatsoever. The Bolshevik apparatus in the country consisted of the Russia Bureau (eg Shlyapnikov) and local Petrograd/Vyborg committees. Both of which were sidelined by the return of Kamenev and Stalin in March. In any case, the Bolsheviks (while not as anonymous as sometimes suggested) were not key actors in February.

Yet Lenin's arrival in April was pretty damn important. His April Theses committed the Bolsheviks to a far more radical role than anticipated. This was a genuine break with not just Social Democracy but also, arguably, Marxism. Sukhanov recalls the "bafflement" of Bolsheviks as they tried to come to terms with an apparent return to the political wilderness. But it took time for Lenin to win the party around: most provincial organs initially rejected the Theses and he had to make compromises to secure their adoption at the party congress at the end of that month. Even then Lenin did not have it all his own way: that same congress returned a Central Committee that was generally conservative and dominated by the Kamenev faction.

The next major issue was of course the July Days. This crisis was primarily the product of the Bolshevik Military Organisation, a radical and loosely controlled body of soldier activists, who independently decided to overthrow the government. As you do. This unexpected attempted coup caught Lenin by surprise; his only real decision during the crisis was to flee rather than accept arrest.

Hence Lenin spent most of the remaining pre-October months hiding in Finland. He continued to dispatch notes/letters to Petrograd but his influence was limited, to say the least. A number of his letters were deemed by the Central Committee to be too radical for distribution and essentially censored. Lenin in return fell back on the Petrograd Committee as a source of support, using it to pressure the Central Committee. I won't go into detail on these tensions but the essence is that rather than being a tool of Lenin's, the Bolshevik committees were something to be navigated and negotiated with.

When he did once again return to Petrograd, clean-shaven and with a wig, Lenin succeeded in again orientating the party leadership towards a more radical path. Nonetheless, Central Committee refused to accept a timeline for insurrection and, as it happens, the eventual assumption of power (with the key role played by the Congress of Soviets) owed more to Trotsky and chance than Lenin's exhortations. The 10 October decision to push for an insurrection is, in my view, often overstated in importance.

So why does all this matter? The point here is that the interplay of various Bolshevik organs was complex and that the party was not simply a tool of Lenin's. His influence was often limited and at every step he had to cajole/convince others. (This pattern continued through his years in government.) The composition and actions of the Bolshevik party as a whole, not just its leadership, is what drove the party to power in 1917. And this is all within the Bolshevik party alone; now place this as one part of the revolutionary coalition.

Looking at Lenin alone is far too narrow a view to appreciate this. He was important but as one of many, many actors in a complicated revolutionary situation.

I moved the conclusion to the top to save people reading all that if they disagreed with the core thesis. As I say, I'm happy to talk about specifics that I've missed above.

Sources

Rabinowitch (Prelude to Revolution and The Bolsheviks Come to Power) are essential for understanding the intra-party dynamics of 1917. James Whites' Lenin: The Practice and Theory of Revolution is an interesting look at the gaps between, well, his theory and practice. Sukhanov's memoirs remain a classic. Plus the usual standard histories.

[Edit: Tidied the language slightly.]