Nazi Germany? Established or coherent plans for post-war settlement? Let me wipe away a tear...

As a rule the Nazis were not particularly strong on integrated or long-term planning. This was partly a product of the organised chaos that was the Nazi state (in which competing organisations put forward competing proposals/agendas for the post-war order), partly a matter of Hitler's reluctance to arrive at a definitive settlement before the fighting had ended and partly a product of an often overlooked Nazi pragmatism in the occupied territories.

The latter two factors were key when it came to France. Hitler's immediate objective (outside of protecting his Atlantic flank) was to sustain a Vichy regime that could occupy France at minimal cost to Germany. The French were to be pushed to service the Reich's war but not to the point where they would pass into outright opposition. As such Hitler consistently rebuffed all Vichy attempts to arrive at permanent solution during the war but also restrained his more annexationist tendencies.

This of course was quite likely because Hitler's vision was harsh. We don't know exactly what he intended but the various schemes discussed in Nazi circles were harsh. Goebbels proposed destroying France as a state (talking about a return to a pre-Westphalia or even pre-Verdun settlement) while Wilhelm Stuckart drew up plans for the annexation of the entire north-east to the Reich. The thinking in Berlin was towards an extremely punitive peace, albeit not on the genocidal scale of the East.

Only Otto Abetz, the de facto Nazi ambassador in Paris, shared Vichy hopes for a restoration of France as an important part of the post-war European settlement. This was the chimera that the Vichy regime exhaustingly chased: a vision of France subservient to Germany in a Nazi-run Europe but maintaining a space for herself in the colonies. This was to be a political and economic union, rather than a harsh victor's peace. It was always a fantasy that Germany was careful never to endorse (at no point did Hitler offer real Vichy concessions) but one that was a powerful driver for French-led collaboration.

So there were no firm plans for France. Hitler was pragmatic in installing a quiet client regime to maintain order at low cost to Germany [edit: in the short-term]. That this silence encouraged Vichy into ever-greater collaboration (in search for confirmation on the future) was a bonus.

Sources: Julian Jackson's The Fall of France is probably the best introductory work on France during the war but I also have a fondness for Robert Paxton's Vichy France, the original classic text. Mark Mazower also provides a good general overview of Nazi occupation policies and planning in Hitler's Empire.