I have not read this, but I have read the blerb:
Renowned for its accuracy, brevity, and readability, this book has long been the gold standard of concise histories of the Napoleonic Wars. Now in an updated and revised edition, it is unique in its portrayal of one of the world's great generals as a scrambler who never had a plan, strategic or tactical, that did not break down or change of necessity in the field. Distinguished historian Owen Connelly argues that Napoleon was the master of the broken play, so confident of his ability to improvise, cover his own mistakes, and capitalize on those of the enemy that he repeatedly plunged his armies into uncertain, seemingly desperate situations, only to emerge victorious as he 'blundered' to glory. Exploring this neglected aspect of Napoleon's battlefield genius, Connelly at the same time offers stirring and complete accounts of all the Napoleonic campaigns.
I would say that this is a completely fair assessment. One thing that David Chandler mentions in The Campaigns of Napoleon is how Napoleon often acted without a solid ideal of how to wage war. Further, many afterward argued (particularly Jomini and Clausewitz) about the Napoleonic system of war as if they understood Napoleon. However, as Chandler argues, there was no solid system because of what Connelly mentions, the ability to improvise, cover his own mistakes, and capitalize on those of the enemy.
Napoleon himself made a maxim of this "never interrupt your enemy when he's making a mistake."
However, it also highlights another problem, the ideas of war outside of Napoleon during this era. The Austrians and certainly the Prussians had an idea of war that allowed Napoleon to take advantage. Slow and steady lines pushing forward after making precise movements; the Prussians had a system of war that Napoleon smashed because they followed the rule book too closely.
It seems like a solid book, the one negative comment is about how he's slanted against Napoleon but at least the blerb has me accepting this book.
It's actually a rather interesting book that makes the argument that Napoleon was a master of improvisation that never stopped engaging with the enemy. One might expect that such an argument would come from an anti-Napoleon scholar, but Connelly was a historian who was often quite fair towards Napoleon. In other books, (Napoleon's Satellite Kingdoms most prominently) Connelly argues that the Napoleonic empire existed primarily as a means to create a pan-European centralized state, albeit one run by a French dynasty. Thus Blundering to Glory often examines the reasonable political rationale that underlay the propaganda emphasis upon Napoleon's alleged military infallibility. Connelly would actually get annoyed in reviews with authors who used Blundering to assert that Napoleon relied only upon luck, such as David Gates's The Napoleonic Wars.
Overall, the title is more provocative than the text.