I'm not a historian nor do I claim expertise in this subject, but it is one I've read and studied extensively over the years and lived through when it was an actual possibility.

US Airland Battle doctrine was developed to offset the numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact troops, frontal aviation assets, artillery, tanks and other equipment by taking the battle beyond the initial battleground and defeating or delaying the follow on or second echelons of front armies.

There were a few elements that made up the AirLand Doctrine-

1. See Deep- timely and accurate intelligence by all means necessary to find and pin down exactly where all enemy corp and army formations were, terrain and weather.

FM 100-5 supports the importance of intelligence and states that corps-size units must seek information on enemy forces located up to ninety-six hours from the main battle area.

2. Strike Deep- to destroy or delay the second echelon of Warsaw Pact forces so that the initial enemy forces could be defeated without being reinforced

FM 100-5 indicates that these opportunities can be created by preventing the enemy from reinforcing committed units by delaying second-echelon forces.

3. Move Fast and Finish-halt or delay the the initial attack by first and follow-on echelons as quickly as possible, so to go on the attack and finish the battle against the assault armies before follow-on armies can reinforce.

The main weapon the US and NATO had nominal superiority with the Warsaw Pact was air power in which air interdiction was to play the largest role in the deep attack along with artillery and special forces attacks and electronic warfare. It was hoped that these disruptions would be fatal for the Pact armies timetables and give NATO opportunities to develop local superiority on the ground for counterattacks.

AirLand depended on the following- Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces will deploy in a two-echelon configuration; the U.S. Air Force can execute critical air interdiction; and Soviet/Warsaw Pact doctrine will not negatively affect the deep battle.

The problem with AirLand was the assumption of the Soviet 2 echelon attack doctrine which was developed for tactical nuclear warfare to keep forces dispersed. It was unfortunately, not current Soviet doctrine according to several US military historians such as Lieutenant Colonel David M. Glantz-

maximum force can best be projected if applied simultaneously across a broad front (single echelon at the theater, front, and army level). The results…can generate rapid penetration to the depths of the defense and possibly result in a reduced capability or willingness of an enemy to respond with nuclear weapons.

The superiority of NATO/US air power and interdiction was exaggerated and the technology was just not up to the task at hand and many of the capabilities we take for granted today were just beginning development or not even budgeted when AirLand became doctrine. Soviet air defenses were also highly developed and the deep battle interdiction would have ever increasing difficulty the further into enemy territory.

Finally, and I'm skipping a lot here, the Soviet doctrine of Operational Maneuver Groups (OMG's) and air assault brigades were a greater threat than the supposed second echelon and AirLand did little to respond to these threats. OMG's were tank heavy independent formations designed to penetrate the front lines and attack/disrupt the enemy rear communication, logistics, reserves and capture key terrain. They could also be used against counterattacks by NATO. Air assault brigades were used in conjunction with the OMG's to capture bridge crossings, key terrain and disrupt enemy counter offensives.

The question then becomes-

If the Warsaw Pact's first echelon alone is capable of winning a decisive victory, or at least crashing deep enough into NATO Center to shatter the Alliance's political cohesion, of what value would be even the most disruptive strikes on second- and third-echelon Pact forces in Poland and western Russia?

In short, the US AirLand Battle doctrine, according to many historians was based on faulty assumptions about Soviet second echelon doctrine, inability for Western air power to overcome the technological hurdles and defenses and lack of response to OMG's and air assault brigades.

Edit- formatting.

I'm not aware of any change in Soviet military doctrine based on the introduction of AirLand Battle. In a way both sides were moving towards a more 'conventional' vision for a potential war in Europe (as opposed to it going nuclear immediately) at the same time, and AirLand Battle was part of that conventional warfare response (though it didn't really rule out tactical nuclear weapons).

So AirLand Battle assumed that NATO would be able to hold out/defeat the first wave of Soviet troops, and use airpower to stop formations mobilised and deployed further back (so from elsewhere in the Warsaw Pact territories or rolling from the USSR itself) getting into the fight. The Soviet conventional doctrine assumed a degree of surprise, and that airpower could be reduced as a threat using mobile SAMs etc. So in a way both powers were working on an ideal scenario - the Soviets probably figured they would be all over NATO before they could response and besides their surface-to-air weapons could protect formations on the move. NATO probably assumed they could use airpower decisively enough to stop those formations, possibly with enough warning to attack key bridges, command nodes etc. as the war was commencing.

This was an interesting article I saw recently about the tacit arms race between NATO airpower and Soviet surface-based defences, and how stealth aircraft were an 'offset' - a direct counter to air defences might not be enough of an edge (give the Soviets could upgrade their arsenal) to be sure they could win (and hence provide deterrence) - but stealth aircraft could take an alternative approach to the problem to defeating air defence networks:

http://warontherocks.com/2015/01/why-the-cold-war-offset-strategy-was-all-about-deterrence-and-stealth/