I'm reading a book about Soviet forces in Afghanistan. In the books introductory chapter it writes:
The Soviet Army was probably the world's most operationally competent army in terms of theory, planning and execution. Historic Soviet victories were operational and Soviet war-fighting was operationally oriented (compared to Western armies which had more of a tactical orientation).
Can anyone elaborate on any of this. I am curious to know how the Soviet army compared to NATO in terms of quality and doctrine? Thanks
You might be interested in a previous question on Soviet doctrine:
Our forces were more technologically advanced, and theirs were more numerous. Both sides were really good at tactics and operations, because they practiced them constantly. Much of their training was a sham, because the cost of failure-to-impress-your-general was really high, but the exception to this was the readiness of the shock forces stationed in East German and Czechoslovakia; they knew where they would be fighting and what the terrain would be, removing most of the variables. In the same vein, some US soldiers during the 80's referred to US Army Europe as "the Real Army" because they took training more seriously than garrison units in, say, Texas. (Korea is still considered serious duty for this reason.)
Because NATO would have been defending, WP casualties would have been horrific (see WWII Western Front). If chemicals were used, I suspect the war would have ground to a halt, because modern chemical weapons make entire areas impassable for long periods of time, and because throwing chem is almost a guaranteed way to trigger an escalation (nukes). Regardless, even a conventional fight would have been bloody, with the biggest losses among the fleeing civilians.
Old Russian saying: amateurs discuss tactics, professionals discuss logistics (see WWII Eastern Front). The Soviets reputedly had to strip thousands of civilians trucks of their batteries just to invade Afghanistan, so their ability to sustain a long-term conflict is doubtful. I believe they would have started with concrete limited objectives (the Rhine?), and would have sued for peace after achieving them. Plus, they had political cadres of German speakers that could move into West Germany, by they already knew how hard it is for anyone to work with French communists (see 1930's Europe, Spanish Civil War history of NATO). Unlike Americans, the Soviets understood that western ideological "communists" were in no way similar to Soviet "communists". They may have been evil and amoral, but the Politburo was very practical.
Please take Grau's book in the appropriate context. Like the Americans in Vietnam, the Soviets' problems in Afghanistan were caused not by poor tactics or incompetent battlefield leaders, but by failed strategies that were based on ideology, not reality. (These problems invariably lead to poor tactics and incompetent battlefield leaders: See the French in Indochina, or pre-Petreus Iraq.)
Having spent some time debriefing defectors from the Warsaw Pact back in the 80's, I think it's safe to say that neither side really wanted a big fight in Europe, and both sides were less ready than their opponents thought. If you can find a copy of a 1980's-era Dept. of Defense "Soviet Military Power" at a surplus store, you'll see the Russians portrayed as an unstoppable juggernaut that could roll over Europe any time it wanted to. Conversely, The Soviets got it into their heads that the US was trying to create a new Ottoman Empire via the southern front, using Afghanistan as a gateway to destabilize the mainly-Muslim parts of the Soviet south. Both sides were trapped by fear of being surprised, and when I was in Europe, our (my friends and I, intelligence specialists) biggest fear was that it would start by mistake, over some accidental confrontation on the border from which neither side could back down.
Another point of view: The objective wasn't a communist takeover of the world, but rather a permanent standoff between the two sides. The Soviets (correctly) saw that having a big, scary West was a perfect excuse to oppress their own people, and many simple-minded leaders in the West took the Soviet's rhetoric at face value. Both sides backed despicable third-world proxies with wins and losses, but the Soviets didn't treat every loss as the end of the world; they saw it as part of doing business. Having failed to successfully create a workers' paradise in Russia, the nomenclatura (Soviet oligarchy) had no illusions about how hard it would've been rule more of the world. By maintaining the external threat, they kept their masses in willing compliance (See Orwell).