Try here, from one of our recent threads:

Austria-Hungary had some great hardware, things like the artillery produced by Skoda had a great international reputation (at least as good as their cars now). But they were in no way ready to produce enough to supply an entire army (or three armies, rather) so while some units were specialists with the best equipment (especially the mountaineers, the k.u.k. Gebirgsjäger) a great many units were terribly undersupplied. Hell, some of the cavalry couldn't even be supplied with proper uniforms at the start of the war and had to march on Serbia in their shiny parade gear.

And the other important point is that the Austro-Hungarian army was at that point in a state of essentially complete rebuilding initiated and led by the Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

Not having been involved in a war since the crushing defeat at the hands of Prussia in 1866 much of the tactical modernisation over the previous decades had not fazed the country particularly and the philosophy of Attaque à outrance was the prevailing opinion, especially propagated by Chief-of-Staff Conrad von Hötzendorf in several leading tactical handbooks. Once lauded as a military genius von Hötzendorf was actually at that point very much out of touch with military reality and was at the start of the war only still in office because Franz Ferdinand had not been able to find a proper successor to the man he absolutely loathed for his arrogance yet. And once the outdated policy had caused those terrible early losses in Galicia of both properly trained troops but even worse large parts of the experienced officer corps it was impossibly to replace that.

Also, the Isonzo front with Italy was just a single great alpine maelstrom for both sides and especially on Austrian side was run largely by what were essentially gamekeepers (Landesschützen) who were told they could either bring their own rifle or get the reserve-reserve-special-I-found-this-somewhere-in-a-shed version, the Werndl-Holub, which was probably older than themselves.

The German offensive also relied heavily on gas, something the Austrian troops rarely used since Kaiser Karl, having taken over from his deceased great-uncle Franz-Joseph in 1916, abhorred it and did his best to limit its use in the Austro-Hungarian armies even if he never really was in control of them as Franz-Joseph had already given the whole army command to the Germans.

And here

The Habsburg Army was also woefully unprepared for the First World War. As far as how the Habsburg Army was perceived in 1914, I can't exactly speak to that, though I can tell you the reality of its preparedness. Austria-Hungary was arming less of its population than any other European Great Power, less even than Italy! In terms of technology, the Austro-Hungarian Army was also lacking. The three most important technological innovations of the First World War - aircraft, rapid-firing steel-barrelled artillery and machine guns - were all insufficiently prepared for by the Army of Austria-Hungary. Most of Austria-Hungary's field artillery brigades were armed with copper-barreled guns, which were cheaper but metallurgically inferior to those of Germany, France and Russia. Its shell reserves were low (though nearly every country during the First World War experienced shell shortages) and many of its guns didn't have armored crew shields which had become almost standard by the beginning of the War. The Austro-Hungarian machine gun, produced by Mannlicher, was a perfectly adequate weapon except that there just weren't enough to go around. Finally, in terms of aircraft, the Austrians beat only the Russians in numbers of aircraft procured. In my own research into the field reports of the Imperial-Royal 13th Landwehr Division of Austria-Hungary, I've come across two separate reports begging Austrian soldiers not to fire at airplanes, whether friendly or foe. Apparently, Austrian troops were so unaccustomed to aircraft that they shot down two friendly planes within a month or two of each other.

Austria-Hungary had also not adjusted to the tactical improvements made since the turn of the century. The Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 - fought in Austria-Hungary's backyard - should have taught her generals something about the importance of close infantry-support artillery fire or the defensive power of machine gun fire. Instead, Austria-Hungary's commanders, who had not fought a real war since 1866, were still incredibly offensively-minded, commanding their troops to advance forward under withering machine gun and small arms fire in tightly packed skirmish lines, with bayonets fixed. Their main tactical assumption was that a well-trained, highly-motivated body of men could overcome the defensive power of modern weaponry. This assumption, which persisted even into the latter months of 1914, cost thousands of Austrian lives.