"The prisoner has assaulted his jailer, but he is still in jail."

Thus did one American correspondent evaluate the battle of Jutland and its impact on the First World War. Strategically, it changed little immediately (although it meant a lot). The German High Seas Fleet was wasting away in port before the battle (particularly after the battle of Dogger Bank in 1915), and it continued to waste away in port after the battle. It had failed to challenge successfully the Royal Navy and British sea power. All the time spent in port doing nothing gradually destroyed the morale of the High Seas Fleet, eventually resulting in the mutinies of 1918. After Jutland, the Germans turned more and more to u-boats to try to disrupt the trade and sea lines of communication which underpinned British sea power and the British war effort (and indeed national life). The navy which Tirpitz had built up had just about wholly failed. In a way, failure at Jutland led to America's intervention in the war, via the mechanism of neutralist outrage at the depredations of the u-boats.

The geostrategic background to the battle was that the British Isles lay directly on top of of Germany's naval access to the wider world. Ships from Germany had to reach the Atlantic either by passing through the Channel, or around Scotland. Going either way, they can be detected and attacked. Of course, that's easier said than done, and Britain certainly had some difficulty doing so (and not just in relation to u-boats, but also disguised commerce raiders). The distant blockade was a legal novelty at the time, and Britain had to wrestle with all sorts of legal and diplomatic implications thereof, including attempting not to offend neutrals (particularly the United States, but also others). The blockade was kind of like a sieve--it caught a lot, but a lot also got through for one reason or another. Nevertheless, in terms of the armed aspect of sea power, Germany was more or less trapped. During the interwar period, the German admiral Wegener reflected upon Germany's naval experience during the war and complained that the German coast constituted a dead angle in a dead sea.

Nothing short of a wholly catastrophic defeat at Jutland would have changed this basic situation. As Churchill said, Jellicoe was the only man who could lose the war in an afternoon, for precisely this reason. Battle fleets can be sunk remarkably quickly if caught in a bad position, and Jellicoe's whole command during the battle was predicated on preventing such an eventuality. Arguably, this caution also prevented him from recognizing (much less exploiting) any opportunity to crush the High Seas Fleet. But it also didn't matter whether he did or not. Jutland ended "conventional" German sea power, and would have done so whether the High Seas Fleet was decisively sunk or not, as long as the Grand Fleet wasn't.

I don't know much about how the respective publics in Britain and Germany received news of the battle. The British public was surely disappointed by the lack of a culminating, climactic Trafalgar-like battle, stories and histories with which successive generations had grown up. But beyond that, someone else is probably better qualified to comment.