Premise of the question is false, considering the Soviets got the Jupiter missiles removed from Turkey and possibly (direct link is less obvious) others from Italy as a quiet trade-off.

The big loser was Cuba, who earned the scorn of the US for decades, but for Moscow, the Cuba crisis wasn't a loss - though they did prop up Havana until the fall of the Soviet Union afterwards. Moscow tried to set up short-range nukes, failed, but managed to substantially lessen the threat of short-range US nukes in exchange - even if they agreed the US would only do their part 6 months later to save face.

Overall, we could call it a draw. But considering the US' nuclear presence was already established in Turkey and the Soviets were trying for the first time in Cuba, we could even say the Soviets got the better end of this particular crisis.

It says something for the US, though, that they said behind closed doors "OK, we'll pull these out but in 6 months" (while the Soviets had to immediately renounce nukes in Cuba) and actually did it. Washington pulled some seriously shady moves over the cold war, but rarely if ever welched on a quiet deal.

The United States did withdraw its missiles from Turkey, but that move was done quietly, several months after the crisis ended. There were several reasons for this. The first was diplomatic. Turkey took great pride in the presence of the Jupiter missiles, even though they were obsolescent even in 1962.

Turkish soldiers were trained on the missiles, the Turkish flag was painted on them -- for Turkey, they were a sign that the country was a modern, contributing member of NATO, just as good as Italy, France or West Germany. Furthermore, publicly withdrawing the missiles would have been seen as a sign that Kennedy was willing to sacrifice a NATO ally to secure American interests. That would have been a crippling blow to NATO relations.

The second was domestic. Kennedy was under enormous pressure politically and militarily to take a strong, uncompromising line on Cuba. Although Walter Lippman had suggested the missile swap several days before Khrushchev made the suggestion on the radio, it was a radioactive-hot issue. Had the missile swap been made public, Kennedy would have lost an enormous amount of political influence, possibly dooming his ability to conduct business for the rest of his term.

At the same time, Khrushchev was under just as much pressure. Based on reports from Havana and America, Khrushchev believed (correctly) that Kennedy would invade Cuba if the missiles were not withdrawn. That would set up a confrontation that he was not ready for. He knew that the Soviet Union was utterly outgunned when it came to nuclear arms, and it would be the loser in any atomic confrontation. Even if the Cuban invasion did not go nuclear, the Soviet Union would be a loser as its proxy -- Cuba -- was invaded and occupied.

Khrushchev believed the best deal he was going to get was an American missile swap, even Bobby Kennedy insisted that it be kept "extremely confidential."

I suggest reading Michael Dobbs' One Minute to Midnight if you're interested in learning more about the Missile Crisis.